Sunday, November 4, 2001		Books

A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights 1999
by Amarinder Singh. Motibagh Palace, Patiala. Pages 256. Price not stated.

POLITICIANS do not understand military matters and care much less for the sacrifices of those in uniform, or so it is widely believed. Amarinder Singh makes you rethink. A Ridge Too Far is dedicated to the 26 officers, 21 junior commissioned officers and 452 soldiers who gave their lives in the Kargil war between May 5 and July 26, 1999, remembering also the 66 officers, 60 junior commissioned officers and 1,085 soldiers who were wounded.

Educated at Doon School, Amarinder Singh went through his paces at the National Defence Academy, Khadakvasla, and the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun, after which he was commissioned into 2nd Battalion of the Sikh Regiment. During the 1965 Indo-Pak war he was the ADC to the GOC-in-C, Western Command, in whose theatre of operation the entire war was fought. Later, as MP, he was a member of the Standing Committee on Defence. He is presently president of the Congress Party in Punjab.

His earlier book Lest We Forget brought out Amarinder Singh s yen for recording military history which requires detailed research. Not many people can observe and record military history like him, observes former Army Chief Gen V.P. Malik in the foreword. Malik, therefore, had no hesitation in giving him the required assistance for writing this book on one condition that he would not get the Army involved in any political controversy.

Many books have already appeared on the Kargil war, some written during it or immediately after. This is the first attempt to tell the military story after the operation has been studied in detail and the story put through a fine sieve.

Even as the Pakistani intrusion caught the Indian intelligence agencies off guard, the Kargil Review Committee (KRC), severely criticised RAW for its failure to identify the correct number of Pakistani battalions facing Kargil in 1999 leading to the outbreak of the war in May, which it sdescribed as a serious lapse . Amarinder analyses the Pakistani build-up which should not have escaped an alert and discerning mind. His count differs from that of the KRC, and he puts it gently: It has to be said that the Committee... drawing as they did upon the available material, also failed to get that sum right.

Keenly aware of the consequences of the intelligence failure and determined that, once and for all, India would demonstrate to Pakistan and the world that it was quite undeterred by the much vaunted Pakistani nuclear threat and would respond with all its available resources to any intrusion of Indian territory, the Chief of Army Staff visited Kargil sector on May 23 to lay down the broad parameters within which the enemy was to be evicted and his priorities.

Because of the difficult terrain the infantry would be deployed in a ratio of 16:1 to the opposition rather than the conventional 3:1. Furthermore, massed artillery support would be given to all infantry attacks to reduce casualties. His priorities for the eviction of intrusion were: (1) Dras, because it overlooked the national highway; (2) Batalik-Yaldor, as it would give Pakistan a better bargaining counter; (3) Kaksar, because it too overlooked the national highway; and, (4) Mushkoh, as the future area of ingress.

The GOC of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps, Lieut-Gen Krishan Pal was informed that the Air Force operations requested by the Army on May 15 had now received Cabinet approval and would begin on May 25. They would cover the elimination of enemy administrative bases and the tactical support to all infantry objectives, as necessary.

Prompt in reorganising the Kargil sector, Lieut-Gen Krishan Pal was building up troop levels at an extraordinary pace. From the induction of 70 Brigade on May 3 when the intrusion was detected, to the movement of 8 Mountain Division, deployed in a counter-insurgency grid in the Srinagar Valley, in a period of just over two weeks he shifted three brigade headquarters, 19 infantry battalions, four field and two medium artillery regiments into the sector from his own 15 Corps resources.

Whilst the Indian Army was on full alert throughout the war, the strike corps being deployed in both Southern and Western Commands, and Northern Command preparing offensive operations within the Kashmir theatre to counter any Pakistani moves, the Indian Navy moved its Eastern Fleet to join the Western Fleet to bottle up the Pakistani Navy in Karachi as a pre-emptive and protective measure that would also provide us with strategic options in the eventuality of a full-scale war.

The political objective, not written down anywhere but discussed several times, was to get the Kargil intrusion vacated and restore the sanctity of the Line of Control, says Gen Malik. An unambiguous term of reference was that the LoC should not be crossed. The rationale was to impress upon the world that India was a victim of Pakistani aggression... Even though the political term of reference was justified and clear, Gen Malik and his colleagues in the Chiefs of Staff Committee never considered it as non-reviewable or unalterable , which is as it should be.

In the Kargil sector, air operations under the control of Western Air Command (WAC), code-named Safed Sagar (literally translated white sea) began on June 26. The loss of three front-line aircraft in three days put a halt to all air attacks while WAC rethought its strategy. Helicopter gunship operations were stopped permanently, as were low-level ground attacks. High-altitude bombing would now begin.

According to Army sources, 83 rather than the 550 ground support missions claimed by the IAF, were launched up to July 10. Of those 83 only 12 bombs landed anywhere near the target. There were no direct hits. This is a bit hard to digest for those who remember the enthusiastic media coverage showing laser-guided bombs homing in on to targets covered by the aiming sight s crosswire, just as Osama bin Laden is now portrayed! Notwithstanding the Army s claim, the narrative acknowledges in adequate detail, the morale-lifting effect of an IAF aircraft in the skies above and its other meaningful contribution without which we could not have declared victory.

Covered in the last part of the book are the battles fought by ten infantry battalions. The stories of the battalions had to be restricted because of the impossible task of narrating the account of all those that took part. In the words of Amarinder Singh, he has not undertaken to write a history of the war, for histories are too remote and impersonal. This book comprises military stories with a human face, which are yet factual in all respects.

To be fair to all those who fought in the war, he decided to write the stories of ten of the twelve infantry battalions cited by Army Chief for distinguished and gallantry service. The two left out are the two wings of the Ladakh Scouts, which being part of Special Forces had to stay out of the narrative.

Within the hardbound covers of this tome are glossy maps, sketches and photographs that tell the story with an eye for tactical detail and laced with human interest. An account that tells you of those selfless men in uniform who vanquished the enemy. In doing so many died where they lay for want of immediate medical attention, their last thoughts far away in their homes with their families. Time and again soldiers, knowing full well what they faced, readily followed their officers when ordered forward.

The Indian soldier asks for very little and is prepared to give his all in the cause of duty, for his officers and comrades and for his battalion, whose colours he so proudly serves. The casualty figures say it all. No country could have asked more of its soldiers and no soldier could have given more for his country than those who fought and died or survived severe wounding, than those who fought in the Kargil heights in 1999.

The proceeds of this book will go to a Trust to be established as Amarinder Singh s humble contribution towards the maintenance of one officer and three soldiers who lost the sight of both eyes in these battles. That is an added reason why this book must line your bookshelf.