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In the light of scanty material
published on the history of Pakistan in India, a recent
unpretentious work aroused my interest entitled
"Reassessing Pakistan: Role of Two-nation Theory" by
Anand K. Verma (Lancer Publications, Delhi, Pages 277. Rs
495).Verma retired as a senior police officer. He researched
for the book as a visiting Professor at the Centre of Policy
Research, New Delhi, a prestigious institution known for a
high level of research in diplomacy and foreign affairs.
As he makes
it clear at the outset, Verma’s aim is to trace the origin
of the two nation-theory and its impact on the creation of
Pakistan and the subsequent developments there which led to
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. In other words, his object
is to see how the concept of two-nation theory maintained,
sustained and fortified by the Muslim League under the
leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah influenced the course that
Pakistan adopted like Islamisation and Talibisation..
Verma traces
the origin of Pakistan to 712 AD when Muslims set their foot
on the soil of India. He suggests that the seeds of separation
were sown the moment Muslim invaders poured in to the country
and established their rule. He identifies some of the
significant issues which reinforced the notion of separation
and widened the gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims. The
role of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, the
foundation of the Muslim League in 1906, and the introduction
of separate electorate in 1909 are cited as the contributory
factors paving the way of the notion of the two-nation theory.
The author
refers obliquely to the Congress refusal to share power with
the Muslim League in 1937 in UP which led to a further
ill-feeling between the Congress and the League, compelled
Jinnah to choose what Mahatma Gandhi called the "war
path" and in the presence of 50,000 people pass what came
to be called the Pakistan Resolution of Lahore in March, 1940.
The author
emphasises that the Muslim League resolution did not contain
the word Pakistan. It is not clear from the narrative whether
Verma regarded the Pakistan resolution a bargaining counter as
maintained by Ayesha Jalal or it demanded a separate sovereign
independent Muslim state.
He flits from
one topic to another without focusing on any specific issue.
He is not consistent either chronologically or thematically. A
tendency to make ex-cathedra statements persists and there is
a fundamental lack of argument to sustain his thesis.
Nor is it
clear how the conclusions are drawn on the basis of the
premises made in the text. For, the thesis Verma intends to
present is that the Talibanisation of Pakistan and the
ascendency of religious fundamentalism are the direct
consequences of the two-nation theory. He does not address
himself to the question how religious fundamentalism has
gained ascendency in Pakistan. The author is oblivious of the
over 7,500 madrasas in Pakistan with about 750,000 to one
million students wherein jehad is being taught to defend and
reaffirm faith in Islam. The students from seven to 20 years
old come from poor families and are taught the Quran.
According to Verma, it was Zia-ul-Haq who had made Pakistan an
Islamic state.
He also
highlights some of the features of the "nizam-e-mustafa"
which had made Pakistan a theocratic state. There is a brief
reference to the Hudood ordinance recommending the Quranic
punishment such as amputation and stoning to death, etc. He
points out the Islamisation of the army and its impact on
politics in Pakistan.
He asserts
that the present political crisis which engulfs Pakistan due
to the menace of religious fundamentalism is a consequence of
the two-nation theory. But how this theory has operated while
both India and Pakistan are independent sovereign states is
not spelt out. He think that economic reforms of a radical
nature in Pakistan, a drastic change in the educational
system, and autonomous grass-root democratic institutions are
the measures needed to restore the democratic system of
governance in Pakistan.
To this
reviewer, Verma’s suggestions are simplistic. The issues are
far too complicated in Pakistan and liberal measures he
suggests are not likely to turn the tide in the affairs of
Pakistan. Verma asserts that after Pakistan came into
existence Jinnah turned into a firm and convinced secularist
though he does not explain why. For this change from a
die-hard votary of the two-nation theory to an adherent to
secularism, he quotes from Jinnah’s inaugural speech at the
Pakistan Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947. In that
speech which his biographer Hector Bolitho calls the greatest
of his life, Jinnah said, "You are free to go to your
temples. You are free to go to your mosques or to any other
place of worship in the state. You may belong to any religion
or caste or creed... that has nothing to do with the business
of the state. We are all citizens and equal citizens of the
state." Jinnah added, "You will find that in course
of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would
cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that
is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political
sense as citizens of the state."
What is the
burden of the speech? Was it a volte face? Did Jinnah abandon
the two-nation theory? There has been much debate in India and
Pakistan on the interpretation of his speech. In the Pakistan
Constituent Assembly, Liaquat Ali Khan, Abdul Rab Nishtar and
I..Q. Qureshi had asserted that Jinnah did not resile from the
Islamic principles because Islam in its essentials is secular
and democratic. I think that Jinnah’s speech has to be seen
in the context of the prevailing situation in Pakistan in
August, 1947. The life and property of the Muslims in India
were threatened due to partition. Jinnah wanted to ensure the
safety of Muslims in India. He also did not want the Pakistan
economy to be dislocated. Hindu bankers in Sindh were fleeing
Pakistan in fear. I think that Jinnah’s speech was political
and timely, but there was no fundamental change in his views
on the two-nation theory. His speech to the armed forces in
February, 1948, and his broadcast to the USA reiterate his
earlier views on the two-nation theory, the Hindus and their
militant caste-ridden security.
This work has a text of 278
pages of which the narrative part takes 157 pages and the rest
120 appendices of the documents which are readily available,
their inclusion has hardly any justification. The bibliography
is thin and except a few books, the others are intended for
general readers. The whole exercise is disappointing and is a
sad reflection on the type of research which is conducted
under the aegis of the Centre of Policy Research, New Delhi.
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SINCE
independence India’s record of producing and publishing
authoritative works on history — ancient, medieval and
modern — has been uniformly impressive, particularly in
social and economic history. But research on non-Indian
history, especially in respect of neighbouring countries, has
been, by and large, almost dismal. British and American
historians have produced excellent historical studies on
China, but in our country except for the historical works by
Sisir Gupta and V.P. Dutt, no commendable study on China has
appeared. For anyone to be enlightened on the history of
Afghanism (which deeply concerns us now) by an Indian
historian is really asking for the moon, though some Indian
diplomats purely interested in contemporary events have
provided interesting accounts.
