New Delhi,
August 8
In an important judgement pertaining to defining the actual length of time for police custody under Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), the Supreme Court has rejected the plea of Godhra train carnage key accused Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji that it cannot extend beyond 30 days.
The court did not agree with the contention of Umarji’s counsel that for harmonising provisions of Section 49(2)(b) of POTA, dealing with grant of police custody of an accused, with corresponding Section 167 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), the maximum period of police remand under the anti-terrorism law should not extend beyond 30 days.
Under the Act the police remand of an accused could be extended up to a maximum of 180 days.
“The interpretation suggested by the counsel for appellant cannot be accepted. It is to be noted that the acceptance of application for police custody when an accused is in judicial custody is not a matter of course,” the court said.
It said Section 49(2)(b) of POTA provides inbuilt safeguard against its misuse by mandating filing of an affidavit by the investigating officer to justify the prayer (for extended remand) and in an appropriate case the reason for delayed motion in this regard.
It further said that the Special POTA judge, before whom such application is made, has to consider the prayer in its purpose for which the POTA was enacted, and pass a reasoned order justifying the same.
The court did not agree with the arguments of Umarji’s counsel that
there
was always apprehension of “misuse” of the Section 49(2)(b) of POTA by the police if police remand beyond 30 days was allowed under the Act.The Gujarat High Court, where Umarji had filed first appeal against the special judge’s order granting police remand to him subsequent to application of anti-terrorism law against him in the case, had also rejected his plea.
His counsel, while moving an appeal before the apex court had contended that if high court order was accepted, then the period of police remand under POTA would be nearly 180 days, which could never be the legislative intent.
He argued that Section 49(2)(b) is at the most a procedural provision intended to aid the operation of Section 167(2) of Cr.PC and, hence it could not be given an extended meaning as that would frustrate the legislative intent to restrict the period of police custody under the Act.
Rejecting Umarji’s plea, the court said “literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature.”
