India must think of South Asia of 2020
S.D. Muni

On the face of it, South Asia presents a spectre of instability and disorder. Some of the western portrayals of South Asian futures indeed draw scary scenarios. The Carnegie Endowment’s index of failed and failing states for 2006, put almost all of India’s neighbours close to dismal prospects. The situation in some of these South Asian countries has indeed worsened since the painting of such scenarios. Afghanistan and Pakistan look far more vulnerable to jehadi terror. Sri Lanka’s undeclared Eelam War IV has acquired uglier dimensions. Nepal’s peace process looks shaky, and the developments in Bangladesh are confused and uncertain.

However, the South Asian states will endure and by 2020, may emerge even more stable and strong. Behind the clouds of prevailing turmoil, there is a strong undercurrent of resilience among the South Asian people, and the international and regional communities have vested interest in ensuring the integrity and longevity of the South Asian states.

The turbulence in South Asia emanates from two basic fault lines; one of authoritarian regimes versus democratic aspirations and the other of sectarian forces versus inherently secular texture of society. Definitive trends are emerging towards the strengthening of democratic aspirations. Even in Pakistan, General Musharraf’s exit, as and when it comes, will unleash forces for the consolidation of democratic aspirations. The persisting internal conflicts perpetuated by the jehadi extremism as also on sectarian and ethnic (Baloch, Sindhi, Shia/Sunni) front, may require dependence upon the army, but Pakistani people are becoming increasingly wary of the exercise of political power by the men in uniform.

In Bhutan and the Maldives, howsoever calibrated, the process of opening polities seems to have begun in right earnest. In Nepal, irrespective of monarchy’s fate and form, the commitment to real democracy is irreversible. Bangladesh’s prevailing political purge is being carried out with the support of military, but the military would not be able to assume direct political control of the country, even if it quietly aspires to do so. Three factors behind the surge of democratic aspirations in South Asia are; expanding civil society resulting from gradual economic liberalisation; growing political awareness at the grassroots levels and the pressure of international system which has put democracy on high premium.

South Asia’s transition to democracy may not be smooth as powerful, feudal and authoritarian vested interests will continue to resist any radical shift in the power structure but these regressive forces will not be able to hold for long in the face of rising peoples’ power. Bangladesh in 1990, Nepal in 2006 and Pakistan in recent weeks have clearly shown the direction of unfolding future. The possibility of the reversal of this trend, a la Thailand, cannot be completely ruled out but by 2020, South Asia will hopefully be more democratic than what it is today.

The second fault line of sectarian conflicts in South Asia would perhaps get strengthened in the decade to come as people get more identity conscious. The simultaneous growth of prosperity and economic inequality may further fuel ethnic identities and sectarian assertions. The jehadi extremism will be reinforced in reaction to the persisting global war on terror which President Bush has projected to be longer and bloodier than the cold war. Jihadi extremism would generate counter-religious and ethnic extremism.

The democratic growth in South Asia may offer a positive perspective to address ethnic and sectarian questions. The inherent cultural current in South Asia is of coexistence and religious tolerance. The extremists are still on the social fringe no matter how vocal and politically aggressive they may be. Indications are positive in India and Nepal at least in this direction.

In Sri Lanka, under Prabhakaran’s leadership, the LTTE will be driven by the Sinhala State, towards the fate of the Khmer Rouge and there may be reluctant and tacit support for this from India and the international community. The only dilemma is if the Sinhala state will be prevailed upon to ensure a place of respect to the Tamil community of Sri Lanka.

On the whole, the democratising states of South Asia will continue to grapple with the ethnic and sectarian challenges as they march towards 2020.

A democratising South Asia will also facilitate growth and prosperity, though not equality. Today, 50 per cent of South Asians live on $2 a day and nearly 30 per cent i.e. 400 million on $1 a day. These numbers are expected to decrease but will continue to haunt the policy makers even in 2020. Globalisation is promoting growth and perpetuating economic disparity. The leadership in South Asia will have to address these distortions. The major economic challenges will be in the fields of water, food, energy and environment.

South Asia’s oil imports will double in 2020 and there will be an estimated 77million malnourished children in the region. The challenge on waterfront is serious as it will become the scarce resource capable of precipitating acrimony and violence both within and between regional countries. While the global warming will add to water scarcity and flooding in the river-fed countries, the island and coastal states like the Maldives and Bangladesh will also face the threat of being submerged. The awareness about the economic challenges is forcing South Asian countries to speed up regional economic integration. Both globalisation and the urge for economic growth have made regionalism as the most sought after mechanism in the world.

The dream of an economic union in South Asia may not be realised by 2020 but both bilateral and regional economic engagements will become intense and productive.

Regional integration will receive impetus from improved regional political relations. It is gradually dawning on India’s neighbours that a growing India is an opportunity to be availed of. There is a steady improvement in the bilateral relations in South Asia. The South Asian neighbours will not be free from issues of contention that will arise in the diverse areas of human movements, sharing of resources, distribution of developmental gains, spillover of internal turbulence and the extent of engagement with the extra-regional powers, but there would also be mechanisms evolved to address these issues peacefully and constructively.

Relations between India and Pakistan will also fall into this pattern though the quality and content of these relations may be somewhat different. With Pakistan’s army getting increasingly tied up with internal security challenge, and India leaping ahead in the growth trajectory, cooperation with India may emerge as a compelling necessity. The grassroot pressures on Pakistani regime to turn cords of conflict into calls of cooperation will gain momentum and weight.

South Asia of 2020 will surely be more open and engaged, both economically and strategically with the world outside. Two major global players, the US and China, will compete for strategic space and influence in Asia, covering South Asia as well. China is already on the fast track to improve its access to South Asia through road, rail, air and communication connectivity with South Asian countries. It will pursue aggressive commercial and economic approach to harness the burgeoning market of the region, more so as China’s far-flung western region is integrated with the mainland. This will add to China’s political clout signs of which are already evident in Pakistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

To balance and contain China as also to be present in the region of growing economic and strategic significance, the US has already initiated moves to forge strong military and political linkages with the countries therein. Access agreement with Sri Lanka and picking up Bhutanese refugees from Nepal are small but firm pointers in this direction.

This competition between China and the US will decisively influence not only the foreign policy priorities but also domestic political and economic dynamics in South Asian countries. These countries in turn will seek to expand their respective strategic spaces and economic bargaining out of the emerging competitive balance.

Much of South Asia’s 2020 prospects will be characterised by India that constitutes two fifths of the region in every respect. India’s steady economic growth, its political stability and its willingness to share these with its neighbours will inspire and sustain the whole region. However, India needs to evolve a clear and committed political perspective to steer the region constructively towards a stable democratic and inclusive political order. Its ad-hockist and reactive approach towards radical transformations undergoing in the neighbourhood could be counter-productive in the long run.

In addition to opening its expanding economic opportunities to the neighbours, India will have to play a pro-active role in ensuring that the region moves towards economic integration and community building. It may call for initial economic sacrifices, but its fruits can be reaped by 2020. The great power competition in South Asia, between China and the US poses a strategic challenge to India. While keeping a balance in this gradually intensifying competition, India has to preserve its own strategic space and initiative to shape the unfolding developments in the region. To dovetail India’s priorities in the region to those of the US in the interest of managing China’s rise, may appear to be a convenient option, but that would prove to be a costly in the long run.

India’s own future is intrinsically linked to that of its neighbourhood. Those responsible for India’s destiny cannot vitiate the inherent obligation to lead the region.

The writer is Editor, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal

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