Ensuring peace and development with N-capability

Our retaliation to ‘first strike’
should be swift, lethal

by Jasjit Singh

THE passage from the first half century of India’s independent history to the next represents a defining moment in our evolution. When India was awakening to its new future at the midnight hour on August 15, 1947, it was a country that had been systematically de-industrialised for the previous two centuries and could not feed its 350 million people. We have come a long way since then and still have "miles to go". During these years since the first Independence Day, the Chinese set out to "teach a lesson" to our country. We hope we have been good students and learnt the lessons well. We learnt that we need peace more than ever before; but that peace will not come from mere hope. We will need to work for it, and also take out an insurance policy for a rainy day that might disturb our hopes and the peace we need so badly for the socio-economic development of one-sixth of humanity that constitutes the people of India. Adequate conventional and nuclear capability provides that insurance as a guarantor of peace and development.

Our strategic interests lie in sustaining our autonomy of decision-making and staying out of any polarisation among the other major powers. For example, the oscillations in the US-China relationship creates problems, especially when it swings to one end or the other, as we have seen during the past two years. In March, 1996, China virtually threatened the USA with a nuclear strike, and in June this year the two countries came together to try and deny India its capability for strategic self-defence. For India, there was never a sensible option to align ourselves militarily with any country. It has become even more important after the end of the Cold War to stay politically non-aligned. This requires India to ensure that its strategic options are built on self-reliance. These must range from high quality conventional capability to a minimum level of nuclear-missile capability which would ensure that conflict is never thrust upon us again.

We must immediately dispel a possible misunderstanding. Our status and prestige will not be decided by our possession of nuclear weapons. Our role will be governed by the way we solve our problems and how we can insulate ourselves from possible challenges that could disturb the peace. Nuclear weapons are necessary only to the extent that no nuclear threat should be imposed on our country at any time in future. We are faced with a nuclearised environment since the early 1960s. It is perhaps known only to few that we sought nuclear umbrella from the USA, the UK and the USSR in mid-1960s and were turned down. People also tend to forget that a security clause was inserted in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty to provide for political deterrence against possible Chinese intervention. Ironically, it was the USA that sailed its nuclear-armed flotilla to coerce New Delhi in December 1971!

The ideal solution from our point of view would be for all nuclear weapons in the world to be abolished. This has been the rationale for seeking global nuclear disarmament from the very beginning. As long as there was scope for definite movement towards total elimination, we could afford to adopt a policy of an open option while building up basic capabilities. Unfortunately, after the Cold War ended, and when actual conditions for instituting total elimination were better than ever before, the nuclear weapon states (and their so-called non-nuclear allies) shifted focus from disarmament to narrow "non-proliferation." This added a second challenge to the earlier one of ensuring means of defence against nuclear threat and coercion.

The non-proliferation stranglehold has been tightening around our open option. It can be argued that we could have kept the option open for a longer period. On the other hand, Pakistan by all accounts had acquired nuclear weapons in 1987 and the USA legitimised that status through its national legislation in 1996. China has continued to transfer nuclear weapons technology and ballistic missiles to Pakistan in violation of its treaty and other international obligations. But the USA and its allies were not sensitive to our security and strategic concerns (possibly in the hope that this, over time, would increase India’s dependence on the USA as indeed the 1971 treaty did in respect of the USSR-India relations). It is, therefore, doubtful if continued restraint would have served any useful purpose. In any case, the BJP government took the initiative in its hand and went ahead with the tests and declaration of our nuclear weapon status.

This has brought India to a defining moment in its history and evolution. We need to constantly bear in mind that our nuclear weapons are justifiable only in the context of providing an insurance against any reversal in our security environment in spite of our efforts to maintain friendly and co-operative relations with other countries, especially the neighbours armed with nuclear weapons. The necessity for restraint, therefore, has not disappeared, but altered somewhat in its content. There is no rush to build up an arsenal, and certainly no logic or necessity to think of a large arsenal. The most likely challenge for which the nuclear weapons are needed is that of threat and coercion by a nuclear weapon state. Empirical evidence indicates that compared to one incident of physical use (at Hiroshima and Nagasaki) there have been 47 incidents where nuclear threats were held out in more explicit terms than the existential threat in mere possession. The very fact of our possession of nuclear weapons, therefore, starts to reduce the possibilities of such a threat emerging. What we need to ensure is that this must remain credible and effective.

There is no political, moral or strategic reason for India initiating a nuclear weapons threat against any other country. There is, thus, no logic for a first strike option. India’s nuclear doctrine and posture can, therefore, be relieved of all the consequences that result from a first strike option. Nor does it make it even notional common sense to consider fighting a nuclear war. Such a war serves no political or military purpose since both parties get destroyed. This was the fundamental error of the USA and the Soviet Union. This was also the reason for their historic blunder in engaging each other in an arms race and in the process deploying 55,000 weapons. These were enough to completely eliminate all forms of life on planet earth many times over. The two countries are now facing a serious problem in winding down their monumental folly.

The maximum (a near-worse case scenario) that India will ever require is a minimum capability to deter any nuclear weapon state from threatening India with nuclear weapons. We should neither expect anything more from nuclear weapons nor is there a rational logic for any different posture. Such a worse case scenario may emerge in the future. But even then there is no requirement for planning a first strike against any other country. What we require is the ability to retaliate with adequate arsenal that must survive a first strike by another country. Even this should be built up gradually and not deployed as a full-fledged weapons system. This implies keeping delivery systems and warheads separate, with the latter themselves stored in disassembled form. But training and communications will have to be fully kept up. The components of the nuclear arsenal will need to be kept dispersed and extensive deception measures will need to be instituted to enhance survivability.

The key in adequate nuclear deterrence posture for us is the delivery system and its cost-effective deployment. Conventional strike aircraft provide the mainstay for such a posture in our case. The essential capability exists and costs are already invested since we require such aircraft for conventional conflicts. In fact, the basic command and control organisation and procedures of the IAF provide the grounds for building strategic deterrence. The maximum change that would be needed would entail re-organisation of existing resources into a strike command and integrate the additional commitments and existing assets.

We need to remember that we possess one of the finest professional air forces in the world which has served the country well in peace and war. Taking on the additional task of strategic capabilities would amount to only an incremental increase in its task and capabilities. Our requirement of strategic deterrence, both conventional and nuclear, must not be allowed to become the object of turf battles. What we need to concentrate on is the intermediate range ballistic missile. The Agni project has already opened such an option. We need to expedite the deployment of the 250-km range Prithvi to gain experience and induct the Agni into the Air Force at an early date. At the same time, there is a need to develop and induct a longer-range missile which could sanitise an area within a radius of about 5,000-km from India.

Many doubts are being raised, mostly from foreign quarters, whether India can have appropriate command and control of nuclear weapons. Leaving aside the implied assumption that somehow Indians are less capable of managing such capabilities, the reality is that in a democratic country, the political leadership and its chief executive is the logical repository of the final control of such arsenals. Nuclear weapons are political instruments and have to be managed on that basis. The Prime Minister, therefore, will continue to be the final authority in nuclear decisions, as much as he has been in control of decisions on the employment of (conventional) military power.

He has the prerogative to choose his Cabinet colleagues, and would have the same right to decide the political chain of succession. The Constitution lays down the chain in case the Prime Minister is not able to do so. At the military level, the Chiefs of Staff Committee has existed for 51 years and the system and procedures are well tested and robust enough to take on the additional responsibility. Since our requirement is for retaliatory strategy only, and nuclear threat and possible use is closely linked to use of conventional military forces, the present system should serve us well in future too.

Nuclearisation of China, India and Pakistan have made conventional war far less likely. If it does take place, it will remain limited in scope and extent. In fact, war prevention for all three countries is the only viable strategy available unless they decide to go down the path of self-destruction. It is possible to argue that this has enhanced the overall security situation in the region. There is a concern, however, that Pakistan may step up its trans-border terrorism and militancy under the nuclear umbrella. Our response cannot be retaliation in military terms. But we should make it clear that if such violence does not stop, we will be forced to take actions on the basis of treating Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism and suspend diplomatic relations with it till there is a clear improvement.

On the diplomatic front, there is a need to have our nuclear weapon status formalised through legal mechanisms. We cannot be members of the NPT and other instrumentality will have to be found. The proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty could possibly provide such a framework, although there will be attempts to turn it into a non-proliferation treaty. How shall we see the CTBT in this context? Our main substantive points because of which we refused to sign have altered in their context.

If disarmament becomes a distant goal and is not included in the CTBT, our arming ourselves provides us with security in the interim period. Designing new weapons could also now be undertaken by us although our capability will lag well behind that of, say, the USA. Pragmatically speaking, it should be possible to sign the CTBT now without compromising our national interests. But there must be adequate incentive for us to make such a concession to the USA.

This incentive must be rooted in acceptance of our weapon status and treating India as a "normal" country for purposes of access to technology and trade issues. This has to be a graduated process. But there should be clear understanding with the USA that each interim step would be reversible if it does not lead to the final goal of formalising India’s nuclear weapon status.

At the same time it is necessary to re-affirm that global abolition of nuclear weapons remains a national security goal, and we must continue pressing for it with dedication and perseverance.

The writer is the Director of the Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Criminal justice administration needs overhauling

We need the likes of Gandhi, Vivekananda, Kabir

by T. V. Rajeswar

INDIA has completed 50 years of its Independence and in less than 30 months we will be entering the 21st century and the third millennium. What is the state of the nation in the matter of security? The economic condition, the industrialisation, the finances, the banking system, the exports, India’s defences and the state of the armed forces are also important and some of them like the defence preparedness are even more important.

But if India is not inherently strong within and does not present a picture of unity in thought and action and preparedness to meet any eventuality or challenge to its integrity, the other parameters become seriously eroded.

When the British left after Partition, the biggest wound and the shock for the country arose out of the Partition itself. Otherwise the country had a stable administration with responsive executive and judiciary. Parliament, which came into being after the first elections in 1952, and the Constituent Assembly which drafted the Constitution earlier, consisted of highly educated and patriotic citizens of the country.

The Indian National Congress had the benefit of guidance of Mahatma Gandhi for less than a year and it was left to Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabh Bhai Patel to guide the nation. After the death of Vallabh Bhai Patel in 1950, it was left to Jawaharlal Nehru to steer the nation.

India’s prestige in the international fora was high and the Non-aligned Movement, jointly founded by Nasser, Tito and Nehru, became a major international factor. Within the country, the Congress held office in all the states but the first break came in 1957 when Kerala became the first democratically-elected Marxist government in the world.

Another 10 years later, and three years after the demise of Jawaharlal Nehru, came the first signs of internal dissension in Congress Party. Charan Singh turned out to be the originator of dissidence and that this happened in the premier state of UP was more than symbolic. Thereafter, dissident activity in the ruling party was not considered undemocratic or indisciplined.

Another ten years later in 1977 came the first non-Congress government at the Centre headed by Morarji Desai. I was a coalition of parties which had suffered during the Emergency years of 1975-77.

Again it was Charan Singh who was instrumental in breaking the Janata government in 1979. The successful return to power of Indira Gandhi in 1980 lasted till 1984 but it was a turbulent period which witnessed Operation Bluestar, which in turn was responsible for the assassination of Indira Gandhi. Rajiv Gandhi inherited a government with a massive majority, which was a record in Indian democracy, due to the people’s regard and sympathy for the slain Indira Gandhi. Rajiv Gandhi’s successor in office, V.P. Singh, in December 1989, was responsible for unleashing the issue of Mandal reservations, and Indian politics has never been the same again.

V.P. Singh in his various expositions had made it clear that the backward classes, which constituted about 30 per cent of the population in the country, not only deserved reservation of an equivalent percentage in government jobs, educational institutions etc but also in power. He asserted that the levers of power in the hands of leaders of backward classes alone would help the backward classes and this message has been well and truly grasped by those to whom it was intended.

The Mandal forces have consolidated the influence of the caste factor and political personalities like Mulayam Singh Yadav and Laloo Prasad Yadav are its most important symbols. For consolidating their influence, the caste leaders have had their own groups and gangs who do not bother much for observing the requirements of law.

This has led to the emergence of a clear nexus between criminal elements and politicians and the growth of a large number of criminal gangs. This phenomenon is not confined to the Hindi belt alone as it is also prevalent in several states.

For understanding the security situation in the country these socio-political developments during the past 50 years should be taken into account. It will show how the problems are deeprooted and cannot be dealt with merely as police or administrative matter. The situation in the country was summarised by the Home Ministry’s 43rd Report on Internal Security placed before the Parliamentary Standing Committee in July, 1998. This report stated that 210 districts out of the total 535 in the country were affected by serious problems of law and order, including insurgency. The report also dealt with the marked increase in the incidence of crime.

The challenge before the police and the problems faced by them today are so vast that they could not have been anticipated in the past. The Police Act of 1861, which was the first definitive legal provision enacted by the British Government after its consolidation in India, had prescribed the responsibilities of the police under several heads, and almost all of them pertained to control of crime and maintenance of public order.

There was a second Police Commission in 1902 and the third and the last Police Commission to go into the entire gamut of police functioning was the National Police Commission appointed in 1977. The National Police Commission prescribed 12 broad duties and responsibilities of the police.

These included, apart from the control of crime, maintenance of public order and effective handling of social and economic offences and attempts to disrupt national integrity and security. The new responsibilities mentioned by the commission reflected the important developments in the country since Independence.

After three wars and lapse of more than 50 years, the Kashmir problem remains unresolved. With the increased presence of foreign mercenaries with highly sophisticated arms and explosives and communication equipment, the proxy war launched by Pakistan in 1989 continues. The nuclear status of both the countries has added a dangerous dimension to the Kashmir problem.

It has be resolved by India and Pakistan by negotiations in which both sides have to make adjustments. Yet another war between the two countries, even if started with conventional weapons, runs the risk of a nuclear war.

In Punjab, various militant groups, which are mostly located in Pakistan and among whom the Babbar Khalsa is the leading one, have been planning terrorist attacks on VIPs and vital installations. Only a series of arrests and recovery of sophisticated arms and explosives had thwarted their plans. However, in this ongoing battle against militancy there can be no let-up on the part of security forces.

In the North-East, the insurgency in the states of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura continues. Bodo militants have carried out periodic bombings of vital installations and ambushes of security forces. The ULFA remains somewhat subdued but their activities are still very much to be kept under watch.

In Nagaland, the ceasefire brought about between the Naga underground and the security forces continues, with negotiations with Muivah continuing in his chosen sanctuary-- Bangkok. Muivah, the leader of the NSCN group, insists that Nagaland should have a special dispensation outside the Indian Constitution and that they should also have a greater Nagaland with parts of Arunachal, Assam, Manipur as well as Mynamar brought together. The demands are impractical even as bargain points and both the sides, Government of India and the Muivah faction, know as much.

The South, which was comparatively free from communal riots and ISI-originated militancy has undergone an unfortunate and serious change as witnessed in the Coimbatore bomb blast during the last Lok Sabha elections. Andhra Pradesh is affected by Naxalite violence and the Home Ministry has set up coordination committee consisting of representatives of the neighbouring states.

The serious crime situation throughout the country, not to speak of insurgency and militancy, cannot be dealt with effectively unless there is a drastic overhaul of the entire machinery of criminal justice administration. This country cannot afford to suffer the enormous delays in the criminal justice system, which we have today. Many legal luminaries have spoken of the inequities prevailing in our judicial system. It is not suggested that the basic judicial system should be given up as it is undoubtedly the bulwark for individual rights and dispensation of justice.

What is necessary is to devise a system whereby we could bring to book, both the rich and poor, the powerful and the deprived, in reasonable time of two or three years. The principle of Lok Adalat could be extended to more categories of offences. Historically, the effectiveness of the village panchayats during the Chola rule in the South is well-known. Even today, in the North-East, tribal panchayats have power to try almost all criminal and civil cases and award punishments.

The re-orientation of police and administrative machinery and the reorganisation of the criminal justice administration would by themselves not be able to bring about fundamental changes in the crime and law and order situation in the country until a fundamental social transformation takes place.

With caste and communal identification getting entrenched and politics becoming a handmaid of this malaise, there are serious impediments in enforcing law and order and putting down crimes in an impartial manner. What the country needs is social reformers in the mould of Mahatma Gandhi, Swami Vivekananda, Sant Kabir etc.

The writer is a former Governor of Sikkim and West Bengal.