Inside tales by spymasters

Sandeep Dikshit

A S Dulat and Asad Durrani are yesterday’s men. The former retired 15 years back while Durrani hung up his boots a quarter century back. But since spooking, as they themselves heartily agree, will never end, this first-hand account from retired spymasters and their peep into the present and future is as engrossing and informative as that of the present day pliers of the trade.

The authors make much of the book’s format; it is supposed to be the first-of-its-kind book where a sutradhar, in this case journalist Aditya Sinha, guides, provides continuity and sets the topics for free-wheeling, and surprisingly candid and revelatory conversations that take place between the former chiefs of India and Pakistan’s premier spy agencies. Both are frank enough to confess, as in Jadhav’s case, that their views are based on speculation. They are modest; perhaps the intention is to avoid summons from their respective headquarters, which Durrani has duly received.  But this is the beauty of the book as the two veterans of the world’s second oldest profession try to second guess what their contemporaries in the RAW and the ISI are up to. And who knows they might actually be on the ball?

What raises the book’s readability index over other sub-continental efforts in the strategic security and military spheres is the gumption and boldness of the two spymasters to second guess and confess where either country went wrong in the past. In case of Jadhav and Baluchistan, here are a few teasers from Durrani: Pakistan’s handling of Baluchistan was faulty; it’s silly to get into a flap over Indian consulates and embassies around Pakistan because espionage is not done from here; his respect for the RAW will go down if it is not meddling in Baluchistan because the situation is tailor-made, and the US would like greater Baluchistan (contiguous parts of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan) to remain forever troubled. Dulat is equally forthcoming: it was absolutely incorrect for the media to demolish India agreeing to mention Baluchistan in a joint statement with Pakistan at Sharm el Sheikh; “a mountain was made out of molehill”.

This marked absence to beat around the bush in responding to Aditya Sinha is a secular running thread; even when it comes to frankly examining their organisations and alma mater. Asked to compare the ISI and the RAW — Durrani offers this gem: “There is no number one, two or three. You do a job well, keep a low profile, no one takes credit, no one blamed, no claims. Like you guys did your Mukti Bahini quietly.” There are also nuggets of operational information about the years gone by: In 1965, the Pakistanis got good information about the other side but six years later the ISI failed to anticipate the attack in East Pakistan.

No topic is taboo. The Doval doctrine, for instance, is brutally run down by Dulat as merely “toeing Modi’s line”, or the unsentimental, fact-based running down of the US for its abiding interest in mayhem in the region. 

Naturally, there is repetition, of tales we have heard before: the Vajpayee times and his attempts to restore normalcy with Pakistan. But old topics, such as Kashmir, have been revisited with a candour that gives freshness, as also an opportunity to understand Pakistan’s compulsions. 

Regarding the all-important question on why Pakistan doesn’t stop engaging with militants, Durrani has this to say: “If the State does not engage with the Haqqanis or the Kashmiri militants, others would.” In other words, if the cause is there, agent provocateurs are bound to be lurking around the corner. Yet, he also confesses to the lure of maintaining leverage but manages to bring up a justification: “leverage by means like funding Salahuddin’s son is a way we keep control and prevent catastrophes.” If only the State was as benign!

And so the book unfolds, crisp, attention-retaining brief chapters covering every topic under the Indo-Pakistani sun: Kargil, Lahore, Uri, the Soviets, Bin Laden, Burhan Wani with a marked absence of chest thumping and points scoring. It is almost like what a TV discussion used to be like in the good old days. The added advantage is that in a book, the words are the message minus the distractions of tone, tenor and body language of the TV. For every Indian or a Pakistani, this book ought to disprove a few notions, add to the vocabulary — ‘false flag attacks’ is especially recommended.