After Washington, what next?

Nirupama Rao

A PICTURE, as they say, is worth a thousand words. A day after he spoke to the two Houses of the US Congress, the photograph of Prime Minister Narendra Modi being surrounded by adulatory members of his audience, made it to the front page of The New York Times. Both the medium and the message came together in a happy confluence. The energy and enthusiasm that connotes Mr. Modi’s approach has been very much in evidence during all his trips since becoming Prime Minister, but nowhere was this more in evidence than in the US. This visit was billed as a “consolidation” of the impressive build-up in India-US relations, particularly since 2014; as it turned out, it also became a reaffirmation, the raising of the baton for a “new symphony” in each nation’s cooperation with the other.

The fallow years in the relationship are clearly over and the India-US relationship does not appear to be in any state of existential doubt — something that seemed to beleaguer it sporadically, through the years. This is not to say that it has attained comfortable cruising altitude — there is a presidential election under way in the US and clairvoyance about the future President’s treatment of the relationship is difficult. Mr. Trump, particularly, is given to unpredictable sways of preference and predilection, and what this can do for elaborately structured, complex diplomatic relationships and power equations may not be reassuring.

Assistant Secretary Nisha Biswal of the State Department has spoken of the operationalisation of the “Modi Doctrine”. On reflection, if one is asked to define this “doctrine”, it must be predicated on the emphasis on co-opting strategic partners for India’s “reform to transform” agenda for its economy, the willingness to embrace bold initiatives to promote connectivity like Chabahar port, readiness to raise its profile in countries like Afghanistan, no-compromise on terror or terror groups, enlarging the scope of maritime activity in the Indo-Asia-Pacific space, a willingness to engage in joint efforts with the US and India’s Asian partners to build, what US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter called, a “principled security network” for the region, and seeking recognition of India’s credentials to be a leading global power.

The special appeal of the India-US relationship lies in its capacity to provide traction for attaining many of these objectives. This stems from the still formidable nature of American power, the compatibility of many security interests, and the multiplex nature of the relationship with its bilateral, regional and global nodes. Of course, much depends on India’s ability to chart a vision that while being sensitive to the aspirations of our SAARC neighbours, it also has the drive and dynamism to promote regional commons. There is no automatic track for leading power status, and India under Mr. Modi must be able to calibrate both boldness and restraint in response to emergent situations, and shed the effacing nature that has marked India’s foreign policy in the eyes of the world. Moving beyond the hesitations of history with the US must also entail other key relationships in our foreign policy.

In the case of the US, the primary areas for attention will involve defence, energy (solar and civil nuclear), trade, technology, investment and innovation. The sun is setting on the Obama Administration, and India is, no doubt, carefully charting its policy options concerning the next presidency, both in the near and long terms. The Indian American community is a critical and strategic asset in this regard: in many ways it is our bridge to the pulsating mainstream of the American political life. Also, there is need for agility and sure-footedness in engaging nominees of both parties in the run-up to the November elections. The bipartisan consensus within the US Congress on the promotion of good relations with India is another source of reassurance.

How does the US see the prospects for closer defence and security cooperation with India? Even as much is given to India at a level unprecedented in the history of the relationship, much is also expected. The veteran, seasoned Senator John McCain sees India as “a country that can and should fight with us to maintain global security”, maintain regional balance “against expansionist adversaries in the Pacific”, even as the US will begin to treat India as it does close partners and allies in streamlining the approvals for defence exports and joint development of military technologies. Meanwhile, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) is pending finalisation because it is understood that the internal processes of approval on the Indian side are being completed. There may not be any other reason for the delay in the conclusion of the agreement. It should be kept in mind that the future US Administration, post-January 2017, will have to carry forward the commitments made by the present one.

In the field of civilian nuclear cooperation, the Westinghouse-NPCIL negotiations are work in progress. The construction of a large-scale nuclear power plant, of the sort envisaged, involves a complex process concerning technical and financial aspects that is moving forward according to government sources.

In the advancement of relations with the US, and overcoming the hesitations of history, our policy makers are, no doubt, alert to the reverberations caused on relations with China. We need not be deterred by Chinese negativity. But we must ensure equilibrium in the “mandala” of all the key relationships, particularly with China, because geography has ordained that it is our neighbour. No underlying meaning needs to be read into the non-mention of the South China Sea in the Obama-Modi joint statement. The statement does underline the settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means and makes a reference to the exploitation of resources as per international law.

The statement makes a brief reference to trade and economic ties and observers have tended to focus on the relative lightness of the document when it comes to this field. This should not detract from the fact that complex issues like negotiations on IPR, the Bilateral Investment Treaty and Totalisation will take time. The scope of trade and commercial activity between the two countries has grown and Mr. Modi’s meeting with American investors is believed to have generated considerable pledges for investment.

The Prime Minister has made a clear and cogent investment in better relations with the US. India must now leverage the energies flowing from this process to its advantage in the region. Mr. Modi spoke of the need for “new eyes” and “new sensitivities”. The Modi Doctrine must incorporate this aspect while advancing Indian interests at home and abroad.

— The writer is a former Foreign Secretary