Army in absence of a political solution : The Tribune India

Join Whatsapp Channel

Army in absence of a political solution

UNION Finance Minister Arun Jaitley’s statement that the killing of terrorists in J&K is a law and order issue which cannot wait for a political solution has sought to tone down New Delhi’s assertion that Governor’s rule was imposed to bring in a muscular security policy to contain the spiralling violence.

Army in absence of a political solution

THEY’RE BACK: NSG is no stranger to the state, having been first inducted after Rubaiyya’s kidnapping in 1989, and being a frequent visitor thereafter.



Pravin Sawhney

Editor, Force magazine 

UNION Finance Minister Arun Jaitley’s statement that the killing of terrorists in J&K is a law and order issue which cannot wait for a political solution has sought to tone down New Delhi’s assertion that Governor’s rule was imposed to bring in a muscular security policy to contain the spiralling violence. Unwittingly, he has admitted the limits to the government’s capacity to end the bloodbath in the state, especially when the Army Chief, Gen Bipin Rawat, has stated that rules of engagement for the security forces have not changed with the changed political situation.

The grim security situation has two aspects: known and the not-so-well known. The known is that the entire might of the state has not been able to subdue the people who appear determined to confront them with stones and by supporting terrorists. To hide this unpleasant reality, Delhi has unleashed a perception management campaign.

The lesser known detail is that the Army can do little on the LoC to silence the gunfire and infiltration from Pakistan which is set to increase exponentially. Unlike 2000 when the Pakistan army was down in the dumps enabling the Indian Army to carry out several surgical strikes, the present, to borrow a Churchillian phrase, is not the Indian Army’s ‘finest hour’. Its capacity and capability for an escalation is questionable, especially in comparison with the Pakistan army with assured military support from China.

Delhi’s perception management of security measures has been stimulated at various levels. For example, the recent induction of the National Security Guard (NSG) to support the state police in Srinagar has been projected as something novel. The NSG, first inducted in the state in 1989 in the wake of Rubaiyya Sayeed’s kidnapping, has been a frequent visitor since then. Elements of the NSG’s two Support Action Groups, comprising half-each of the Army’s Para brigade forces and regular infantry, has been brought in to primarily secure the Amarnath Yatra, in addition to the security of sensitive areas.

Similarly, the state police has made an extra effort to point to the presence of IS terrorists in the Valley. But this was denied by the government in January 2018 in a written reply to Parliament; and more recently by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Army too has indicated a change in tactics to ensure minimal collateral damages or civilian killings. From smoking out buildings where terrorists were suspected to be hiding, efforts are being made to bring their families to the operation site to appeal to holed-in terrorists to surrender.

That said, it is obvious that the Army leadership will be under immense pressure to show results, which implies kills. Given that General Rawat’s stated expertise is counter-terror operations and the Northern Army Commander, Lt Gen Ranbir Singh (expected to be the next Chief), got recognition for being the face of the Army during the 2016 surgical strikes, outcomes (which would result in more violence and counter-violence) would matter immensely; especially when the Modi government would want to justify its muscular security policy.

Hence, showing terrorist casualties and captured arms and ammunition will be essential. The hinterland would teem with Army personnel. There will be more ambushes, more area domination patrols, more midnight stand-to to ascertain that everyone is at his post, lesser sleep and more frustration (for fighting a war they cannot win) among soldiers. Unfortunately, there will also be more deaths of civilians caught in the cross-fire. To manage nationwide public opinion, the Army will sponsor more media tours to the scene of action, and television wars would escalate no end.

However, there will be no ‘surgical strike’ by the Army across the LoC. The latter were commonplace in the year 2000. After the ignominious withdrawal of the Pakistan army from Kargil heights in 1999, the Indian Army, emboldened by the fast-tracked war-procurements mainly from Russia and Israel, had, at tactical levels, adopted an offensive posture.

In a tacit understanding, the senior Army brass in Kashmir turned a Nelson’s eye while the units adopted a calibrated offensive action across the LoC to engage the Pakistan army and to sanitise areas of infiltration. For example, on January 22, 2000, fighting in the Chhamb sector left 16 Pakistani soldiers dead. While both sides blamed the other, the truth was that Indian troops, in strength, attacked a Pakistani post and overran it. Similar instances occurred in Akhnoor, Mendhar, Kotli, Naushera and Pallanwala between January and August 2000.

Indian commanders on the LoC started justifying the need for such action on the grounds that Pakistan must face local military defeats. It was argued in private that body bags going home under the glare of cameras would compel Pakistan to rethink its proxy war. Local artillery commanders said in addition to punitive raids by infantry and Special Forces on Pakistani posts, more Bofors regiments should be inducted into J&K. Heavy artillery pounding of Pakistani positions would be a morale booster for Indian troops. Given this situation, in 2000, the then Army 

Chief, Gen VP Malik, said chances of a war with Pakistan were high. His assessment was based on the thinking that Pakistan might retaliate in strength which could result in a full-scale limited war.

All this has changed drastically. Unlike the Indian Army, which is short of specialised ammunitions and essential war-withal, the Pakistan army has adequate capability and capacity to fight a long war with assured war logistics. During Kargil, Gen Pervez Musharraf had travelled to China to seek war capacities. Today, the two militaries have developed interoperability, whose starting point is regular and assured war supplies from the People’s Liberation Army to the Pakistan military. Since India cannot match this war-preparedness, its Army would continue to fight futile small wars it has fought for 28 years in the border state. In this, NSG’s presence or absence in Kashmir amounts to nothing.

Top News

Chief Judicial Magistrate's court in UP's Banda orders judicial inquiry into death of gangster-politician Mukhtar Ansari

UP court orders judicial probe into gangster-politician Mukhtar Ansari’s death, seeks report in a month

Ghazipur MP Afzal Ansari on Tuesday alleged that his brother...

‘Heart attack or poisoning’: The life and times of Mukhtar Ansari—crime and politics

‘Heart attack or poisoning’: The life and times of Mukhtar Ansari—crime and politics

Eastern parts of Uttar Pradesh are among the poorest regions...

CBI files chargesheet against 20 institutes, 105 individuals in Himachal Pradesh multi-crore scholarship scam

CBI files chargesheet against 20 institutes, 105 individuals in Himachal Pradesh multi-crore scholarship scam

22 educational institutions were on CBI radar in the scholar...

Mahagathbandhan announces LS seat-sharing for Bihar; RJD to contest 26, Congress 9

Mahagathbandhan announces Lok Sabha seat-sharing for Bihar; RJD to contest 26, Congress 9

High-decibel contest seems on the cards in Hajipur, where RJ...


Cities

View All