How to checkmate China

Lt Gen Bhopinder Singh (retd)

CHINA’S geopolitical ambitions manifest in the strategic outreach of the ‘Pearl Ports’ of its economic, military and political footprints. Ostensibly, safeguarding the choke points along the sea lines of communication (SLOC) for the energy-guzzling Chinese economy (the narrow Straits of Malacca facilitates nearly 80 per cent of the Chinese oil import route). With the Chinese holding energy reserves estimated to last only a few weeks, the vulnerability of the Chinese economic juggernaut (and therefore regime survival) is on perpetual tenterhooks. Then, the inevitable dependence of the energy resources and imports via maritime routes only (at least in the medium term), these ‘Pearl Ports’ become a crucial part of the Chinese realpolitik jigsaw. However, commercial considerations aside, it is the added military and political mandate to these ports that colour the intention for the wary neighbourhood.

Geographically, the ‘String of Pearls’ span from the Hainan Islands in the South China Seas where tempers flare up routinely between China and its worried neighbours to the resource-rich lands in the African hinterland, but for us, it is the more immediate string-ports in Myanmar, like the Coco Islands (20 km from the Andaman & Nicobar Islands) and Sittwe, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan that suffocate India, strategically. The term ‘String of Pearls’ was coined by the consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton to describe the Chinese quest for a hegemonic reign in a bipolar world.

While the Chinese deny any such conceptual sophistry or muscle-flexing capabilities, its actions on these ‘Pearl Ports’, like building runways (e.g. in the disputed Spratly Islands) and deployment of naval presence, point to the contrary. Therefore countries like Japan too, which rely on over 90 per cent of its oil supplies coming via the Pearl Port-infested South China Seas remains restive and tends to join strategic hands with India and the US to counter similar risks to itself. 

For any geopolitical strategy to fructify, the ground realities of the world order ought to support the moves. Post-Cold War, the US/western narrative slipped into an era of over-committed and overstretched stakes in the Balkans and then at multiple points in the Middle East and Northern Africa. Global theatre beyond the Hindu Kush mountains in Afghanistan was a lesser priority of the only reigning superpower, then. So, with the Military Junta in Myanmar upset with Indian overtures to pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, an anti-India sentiment during the intermittent BNP rules of Khaleda Zia in Bangladesh and more recently, the similar hawkish approach of the Rajapaksa decade in Sri Lanka (not to mention the perennial hostility with Pakistan), the nuts and bolts for the String of Pearls encircling India, was perfectly knotted. It seemed the Indian neighbourhood had fallen for the Dragon’s charms, beyond the ‘all-weather’ friendship between Pakistan and China. This friendship is not rooted in any cultural, civilisational, religious or even ideological basis, this is a friendship based on a common foe; subsumed on the platform of strategic counterfoil and convenience. In an era of a constant battle for ‘bargaining space’ and ‘meaningful voice’ in an increasingly intertwined and competing world order, such friendships are perfectly kosher. So, with the emergence of ‘Pearl Ports’, four countries (eg Sri Lanka) along our border began flirting, sometimes dangerously, with China, knowing well the implications for India.

However, there are no constants on a diplomatic chessboard. The current resetting of the dynamics offers a glimmer of hope for India to ‘de-strangulate’ itself — Myanmar is more assured of Indian intentions with the recent incident of allowing the Indian Special Forces to do the requisite action on its soil, Bangladesh has moved on to a decidedly more India-friendly rule of Awami League with Sheikh Hasina in power, Sri Lanka under Maithripala Sirisena is more amiably predisposed towards New Delhi. This is coupled with active Indian engagements and investments in these three countries specifically. This leaves the Gwadar Port in Pakistan as a sore thumb sticking out in the equation. Now, this does not mean the immediate flight of the Chinese stakes in any of the said three countries, but it opens up the Indian diplomatic initiatives, conversations and support to these countries getting contextualised with the specific need to ‘restrict’ the Chinese military or political mandate getting overtly affixed to these ‘Pearl Ports'. Gentle preconditions and nudges can ensure the Indian dialogue to water down the ‘Pearl Port’ intensity. Initially, we may as well overlook the purely commercial aspects and facilities of the current Chinese investments on-site, in order to pace the changes, prudently, as long as the more aggressive footnote of the military and political nature gets tempered down. The current disposition allows for no such laxity in Gwadar. 

Critically, the situational landscape is not completely tilted in India’s favour either. Nepal has been cozying up the Dragon’s alley for some timeand the current Madhesi unrest has left India perpetuating the ‘Big Brother’ syndrome, whereas the Maldives under Abdulla Yameen no longer feels obliged towards India, as the previous President Mohamed Nasheed did. These two nations do offer a counter-port opportunity to the Chinese, at least circumstantially. However, to invest or divest of a strategic checkpoint in the form of a ‘Pearl Port’ is a lot more complex and strategic in nature. But the opportunity to de-strangulate from this threat in the immediate vicinity with dexterity and circumstantial nimbleness is also in our hands, though historically, not a strong point in our past diplomatic record. China is still not a classical blue-water capability navy, a la the US 7th Fleet in Yokosuka, Japan, or Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, however, neither is any other country in the South East Asia or South Asia, individually. However, with unresolved maritime disputes of China brewing with Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and for other reasons, with the other regional powers like Australia and India, the Chinese are now getting tested in their sabre-rattling and show of power on the Eastern seas. Checkmating China would also find passive support in the Washington DC and Moscow, equally, thus a more unified maritime approach and formation that allays the fears emanating from the String of Pearls beckons.

—  The writer is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands & Puducherry