India-Afghanistan ties do not hinge on Pak

Vivek Katju

As Modi reaches Washington he would be conscious that 16 years into America’s longest war and five months into his administration, Donald Trump is the third President who finds himself searching and struggling, like his predecessors, for an effective Afghanistan policy. Reports emanating from Washington about present US thinking suggest that Trump is unlikely to succeed where Bush and Obama failed—in finding a way to stabilise Afghanistan.

Central to ensuring peace in Afghanistan is to make Pakistan give up its unreasonable and unrealistic strategic ambitions in Afghanistan and its Afghan proxies. Unless this core issue is successfully addressed Afghanistan cannot become stable, and without that no US President will be able to end the Afghan war and bring the ‘boys’ home. There is no indication that Trump is willing to bring enough pressure to bear on Pakistan to desist from stoking terrorism in Afghanistan.

Gen John Nicholson, commander of the US forces in Afghanistan, had told his country’s Senate in February this year that there was a military stalemate between the Taliban and the Afghan security forces. He had also asked for an increase in US troop levels. Over the past few months, a perception has grown that the Taliban and other terrorist groups such as the ISIS have gained ground. A series of massive terrorist strikes against military as well as civilian targets has contributed to a loss of popular confidence in the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG) led by President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah.

In March, terrorists attacked the main military hospital in Kabul. Around 100 persons were killed. In April, terrorists penetrated the Afghan army’s 209 Corps Camp Shaheen near the north-west city of Mazar-e-Sharif and killed around 140 soldiers. On May 31, a sewerage vehicle packed with explosives was detonated during the morning rush hour on a major Kabul road adjacent to the diplomatic area; 150 persons died in the attack. Four days later terrorists attacked a cemetery during a funeral attended by Tajik, especially Panjsheri, leaders, including Abdullah. As many as 20 persons were killed; fortunately the leaders escaped largely unhurt. And as I write these lines terrorists have struck a bank in the south-west province of Helmand. At least 20 persons have died so far in the attack.

These incidents and their negative impact on the NUG have led to Trump accepting his general’s recommendation to increase troop strength in Afghanistan. However, he has left it to Defence Secretary Mattis to take the decision on the precise number of soldiers to be sent to Afghanistan as well as the timing of the increase in numbers. The present indications are that 3,000 to 5,000 additional soldiers will be sent and they may be attached to the Afghan army units for enhancing their counter-insurgency capabilities. It is unlikely though that this approach will decisively turn the tide against the Taliban. For that the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan will have to be eliminated and Pakistan is simply unwilling to do so.

There is impatience in influential sections in Washington with Pakistan. The latest Department of Defence report, released earlier this month, notes, “Afghan oriented militant groups, including the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, retain freedom of action inside Pakistani territory and benefit from support from elements of the Pakistani government.”  However, such exasperation with Pakistan is not new. The question is if the Trump administration will go beyond what the two previous administrations did to change Pakistani behaviour. Reduced assistance and ‘degrading’ Pakistan’s status as a major non-Nato US ally are not likely to modify the country’s Afghan policy. Nothing short of actually putting US boots on the ground to act against Taliban sanctuaries will change Pakistan, and this Trump, like Bush and Obama before him, will certainly not do.

In the absence of directly and effectively demanding and thereafter ensuring that Pakistan changes course, the signs are that the Trump administration is adopting a ‘regional’ approach. The influential New York Times reported, “The White House is calling its strategy a South Asia policy to distinguish it from the Obama Administration’s so called Af-Pak policy. Officials said it would include diplomacy with Pakistan, India and even Iran....”

The Americans believe that Pakistan’s Afghan policy is guided by its desire to avoid Indian encirclement and hence its concerns on India have to be assuaged. India had to categorically tell the US that it would reject any effort to extend Af-Pak to In-Af-Pak. In actual fact, the Obama administration like the Bush administration did not want India to supply lethal stores to the Afghan forces, and the UPA government largely accepted this position. Since the Modi government came to power, it did not feel constrained by the US approaches on this issue. Besides, the Obama administration, upset with continuing Pakistani support to the Taliban, changed course and asked India to support the Afghan forces with weapons in addition to training. India’s supply of attack helicopters was timely and appreciated by the Afghans.

The Trump administration wants India’s role in providing infrastructure development support to Afghanistan to continue. The question is if it will seek to diminish India’s role in the Afghan security sector to placate Pakistani sensitivities. Certainly there is no indication at present that the NUG would like India to do so. All in all, it would be prudent for senior Indian officials to convey to their American counterparts during the Modi visit that India’s relations with Afghanistan are direct and not contingent on any third country. Also that Pakistan’s fears of India’s role in Afghanistan as being directed against its interests are off the mark. This intervention would be timely for the Trump administration is expected to finalise its Afghanistan approaches in July.

It is significant that the Trump administration wants a political resolution between the Taliban and the NUG. This approach is in keeping with the Obama policy and  once again acknowledges that the Taliban cannot be eliminated militarily, which is in turn an acceptance that Pakistan will not close the Taliban sanctuaries. With continuing Pakistani support, the Taliban continue to create instability and have no incentive to enter into negotiations with the NUG. The main Taliban strand under Mullah Haibatullah is wedded to obscurantist ideologies and does not appear to be interested in power sharing under the constitution. Besides, with Russia and Iran now not only in touch with the Taliban but also believed to be extending support, it has no incentive to change course. Notwithstanding its denials, Pakistan has the capacity to pressure them, but the price it wants of the NUG is to have a veto over Afghanistan’s India policy. This the NUG cannot give.

There is thus no end in sight for Afghanistan’s troubles.The writer is former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs.