India''s role in Kabul shrinking

Anita Inder Singh

Never a troop-contributing country to Nato's effort against the Taliban, India  failed to dissuade the US, steered by President Obama's re-election priorities,  from withdrawing most of its troops from Afghanistan by 2014. 

But India offered Afghanistan considerable 'soft power'. Over the last decade India gave more than two billion US dollars in Afghanistan in reconstruction aid -- the largest amount of external aid it has given to any country. Most of this investment has been made in Afghanistan's infrastructure, including the construction of highways,  hospitals and electricity projects for rural areas. Indian soft power, in the form of Bollywood films and music, and the construction of Afghanistan's new parliament building in Kabul have earned popularity among Afghans, in contrast to the extremist-exporting  Pakistan, which Afghans viewed as a destabilising country. 

Since  taking over  as President of Afghanistan  last September, Ashraf Ghani has been trying to stabilise his country. He offered the Taliban, who did their violent best to disrupt last year's presidential election, two seats in his government.  Their refusal of his offer signalled the continuation of war and instability in Afghanistan. Afghanistan and the US did sign a bilateral security agreement last year, but Washington's current priorities appear to be the ISIS and the Asia-Pacific - leaving Ghani uncertain how much he can rely on Obama,  

Ghani has paid official visits to China and Pakistan, but has yet to announce a trip to  India. Ghani appears to have decided not to rely on India. Kabul recently suspended a request made by Karzai for deliveries of heavy arms from India. That news came soon after the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Pakistan on February 12.  

The reason for the suspension of the plea for Indian arms is unclear but it is likely that Afghanistan wants to improve ties with Pakistan in the hope of enhancing its stability. From the Afghan side there are reports that Ghani wants close ties with India  but could buy  arms from other countries.  India and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement in 2011 which many thought was aimed at strengthening their ties before the withdrawal of the Nato troops in 2014.  Under that agreement  India would  provide only non-lethal military aid to Afghanistan. 

Between 2012 and 2013 Afghanistan made several  requests for Indian  military equipment; those requests came  at a time when Kabul's relations with Islamabad were fractious. Apart from Taliban violence,  which Karzai believed was sponsored by Pakistan, there were several clashes along the Af-Pak border at the time.  Karzai  repeatedly accused Islamabad of backing Taliban militants to foment  unrest in Afghanistan and of using extremists as a bargaining chip to demand more influence in Kabul. 

But India refused to supply heavy weapons - perhaps   because it did not want to upset Nawaz Sharif's  democratically elected government in Pakistan. Any Indian arms for Afghanistan could have been used as a pretext by Pakistan's army to embarrass the civilian government.  

Power abhors a vacuum, and China and Pakistan, not India, seem to be stepping into the space created by the pullout of most American troops from Afghanistan. India needs to keep an eye not just on China's growing influence in Afghanistan, but the shared interest of China and Pakistan in Afghanistan's political future. 

Strange bedfellows frequently build good political relationships:  Communist China and Islamic Pakistan highlight the point. China's strong economy is enabling it to spread its global clout; Pakistan's weak economy does not dissuade it from training extremists to destabilise Afghanistan, India — and even itself . 

China, perceived as expansionist by most of its neighbours and the US, has one good Asian friend in Pakistan. It has rewarded Pakistan, by helping it, among other things, to build at least six nuclear projects.  That admission has come from the Chinese side. 

Earlier in 2011, Beijing supported Pakistan’s claims to be fighting terrorism when the US killed Osama bin Laden on Pakistani turf. China's help appears to have given it some leverage over Pakistan. In 2007,  under Chinese pressure, Islamabad raided the Lal Masjid "Red Mosque" after militants kidnapped several Chinese citizens. Chinese pressure has been one factor behind Pakistan's offensive against militant groups in North Waziristan. For years, the US unsuccessfully pushed for such an offensive without success. 

Wanting Afghanistan to advance economically,  Ghani attended the  international conference on Afghanistan in Beijing last autumn and secured assurances of Chinese investment in Afghanistan's infrastructure. The extent to which India can help Afghanistan upgrade its infrastructure remains a puzzle, given that New Delhi has approached several countries, including China, to invest in and improve its own outdated infrastructure. China has a vested interest in Afghanistan's stability, and is supporting development projects, including the Kunar dam project in  the strife-torn north-eastern Afghanistan bordering  Pakistan.  China also hosted a Taliban delegation for talks last November, and recently offered to mediate peace parleys — with Pakistan's support. Islamabad and Beijing are discussing stability in Afghanistan - and it is likely that China will expect Pakistan to create conditions that might usher in least some of that stability.  

The outstanding fact is that China seems  willing to increase its investment in Afghanistan  and to discuss reconciliation with Pakistan despite —  or because of Afghan  insecurity  —  with the intent of stabilising Afghanistan. Has New Delhi  got any comparable plans to stabilise Afghanistan and preserve and enhance India's influence there? 

China’s interest in Afghanistan was further revealed during Wang's visit to Islamabad, where he discussed with Pakistani officials ways to coordinate efforts to improve Afghan security. Islamabad assured Wang that Pakistan would cooperate with Beijing on paving the way for reconciliation and reconstruction in Afghanistan. Wang voiced China's readiness to “support the Afghan government in realising reconciliation with various political factions including [the] Taliban”.  Does this imply that China would try to persuade Pakistan to stop training, and exporting extremists across the Durand Line? And would such Chinese efforts succeed? Those are the big questions. 

Meanwhile China's interest, and its political and economic interventions in Afghanistan, suit   Pakistan because Beijing thus keeps   Afghanistan at a distance from India. And with China's encouragement, Afghanistan and Pakistan are discussing future cooperation on counter-terrorism. 

As China and Pakistan strive to enhance their influence in Afghanistan in the name of stabilising it, what is the role of India in Afghanistan's future political and economic development? Time for New Delhi to answer that question. 

The writer is a Visiting Professor,  Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, New Delhi