Indo-Pakistan imbroglio

S Nihal Singh

INDO-PAKISTAN relations have two dimensions: the legacy of the bloody Partition of the subcontinent and the troubled political evolution of Pakistan in which the army acts as the state and the specific issues that interrupt the dialogue between the two countries for shorter or longer periods. Neither should come as a surprise because they are recurring themes which have a distinct resonance in the two very different domestic constituencies.

The Narendra Modi government started on the right note with Mr Modi inviting his Pakistani counterpart, Mr Nawaz Sharif, to his swearing-in ceremony, an invitation the latter accepted. But the promising beginning was marred by the abrupt cancellation of a first meeting of the two countries’ delegations last year by New Delhi’s objection to the Pakistanis’ meeting with Kashmir’s Hurriyat representatives before the formal talks.

Pakistan said such meetings were part of normal practice — in fact, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led coalition government had allowed Gen Pervez Musharraf to meet Hurriyat representatives during the Agra summit. And although the Indian contention that resolving Indo-Pakistan issues were a two-party exercise has some merit, Pakistanis were loath to give up the privilege they had acquired of meeting Kashmiri separatists, instead of the state’s elected representatives. And Mr Sharif has asserted that the Hurriyat is not a “third party”, as India suggests, but an intrinsic part of talks between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Against this backdrop, the Modi government acted clumsily in the lead up to the national security advisers’ talks that broke down. Indeed, the publicised outcome of the Ufa meeting between the two prime ministers did not mention the “K” word, an omission for which Mr Sharif had to face music at home. It is all very well for the External Affairs Minister, Ms Sushma Swaraj, to make the point that the scheduled talks were restricted to discussing terrorism issues, instead of the wider Kashmir ambit, but it is difficult to separate the two in practice.

Pakistan’s national security adviser Sartaj Aziz has suggested that talks between border security and military aides foreshadowed by the Ufa meeting can proceed nonetheless. If they do indeed take place, they can act as a speed breaker in the name-calling that inevitably follows a hiccup in the two countries’ relations. But India needs to focus on a hoary problem that does not go away. The “no-nonsense” approach the Modi government is so keen to convey to Pakistan must be underpinned by a strategy that makes sense in a situation described to me by a former Indian foreign service official in the Indian idiom, “You can never straighten the dog’s tail”.

It is well understood by the world community that Pakistan will continue to encourage infiltration into India in Kashmir and elsewhere and indulge in periodical firing across the Line of Control and the international border to keep the pot simmering. Nor is it surprising that Islamabad routinely denies infiltration attempts if a Pakistani infiltrator gets caught and makes haste to deny his nationality.

If any history lessons are to be drawn from the past, it is revealing that the closest India and Pakistan came to resolving major issues was during the regime of General Musharraf before his decline and fall frustrated hopes. The general, unlike his civilian predecessors and successors, did not have to look over his shoulder to seek the approval of Rawalpindi, headquarters of the Pakistan army. Second, he realised that a reasonable compromise meant concessions by both sides.

Mr Sharif is, therefore, far from unique in having to listen to the army’s “advice” on dealings with India. Unless the army is convinced that it gains more from seeking peace with India than in pursuing its policy of needling its larger and stronger neighbour through big and small pinpricks, it will continue to follow its present trajectory. And the Pakistan army’s hands are full in seeking to punish anti-Pakistan extremists at home while ensuring to preserve its influence in Afghanistan to consider relaxing tensions with India.

Yet there is no alternative to seeking a dialogue with Pakistan, however difficult the journey ahead. Judging by the assertion of Mr Aziz to an Indian television channel, Islamabad’s attempt is to mollify international, particularly the US, opinion on its intentions is as important to it as it is in India’s interest to project an attitude of reasonableness. In this respect, Ms Swaraj needs to do more homework to put her government’s policies across to the world.

For one thing, the two sides must finesse the Hurriyat issue, which cannot be converted into a permanent roadblock. There are ways Pakistan can seek Hurriyat’s views without a staged camaraderie in Pakistan high commissioner’s Delhi residence. For another, Islamabad should concentrate on substance, rather than symbolism, in promoting negotiations. Whether the Pakistan army will permit a meaningful dialogue to take place in future remains to be tested. The usefulness of back channel negotiations has been proved time and again by how close New Delhi and Islamabad came to a negotiated deal because such a procedure is carried out in the shadows. Meeting outside the subcontinent is an immediate option but can only be a short-term measure — for instance on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

The Modi government’s dilemma is that it is seeking a working relationship with Pakistan without damaging its cultivated macho image. Nothing energises the Bharatiya Janata Party’s rank and file supporters as much as a good spat with Islamabad. The Indian Prime Minister is conscious of the fact that foreign policy cannot be conducted on sentiment and has proved it in reaching out to the US, despite it denying him a visa for years after the 2002 Gujarat riots, that he is very conscious of Washington’s international clout, despite its supposed decline. New Delhi needs to go back to the drawing board to frame a new strategy in tackling a knotty relationship with an eye on what is practicable.