Is new defence strategy old wine in new bottle?

PK Vasudeva

Former Professor, ICFAI University, Hyderabad. 

The Modi government eyes a new national security strategy called the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) under the chairmanship of National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval. The DPC would define national defence and security policy by undertaking security risk assessment. The institutional set-up will also spell out the national military strategy, defence reviews, and an overall national security plan. The body that will envisage a draft national security strategy and will also formulate an international defence engagement strategy. The new strategic think tank will also oversee foreign acquisitions and sales, making defence preparedness much more than an acquisition-centric exercise.

Members of DPC

The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), three Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary and Secretary of Expenditure in the Finance Ministry will be the members of the committee. The Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS) to the Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) will be the member secretary of the committee and the HQ of the CIDS will be the secretariat of the DPC.

It will have four sub-committees. One will look at policy and strategy; the second will work on plans and capability development; third on defence diplomacy and the fourth one on defence manufacturing ecosystem and boosting of exports of indigenously produced defence products.  All reports will be submitted to the Defence Minister to ensure that they meet their desired end. The DPC will work across ministries and obtain approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security. 

Goals of DPC

The DPC has been tasked with ambitious goals. It has been established to assess the external security threat, envisage a strong defence strategy and prioritise issues based on their threat level. With the growing security threats, fueled by both direct and asymmetric means, the DPC has a huge responsibility of bridging the gap between the existing bureaucratic bodies. It is imperative for this new institutional set-up to create a mechanism wherein parties from the ministries, defence services as well as intelligence bodies work in coherence to face threats of all kinds.

The last time the Government of India tried to establish a defence planning body was in 1977. However, the committee established then had not achieved the desired results. To overcome the seizures created due to the absence of a national security doctrine and lack of funds for the defence expenditure, the Group of Ministers under the NDA in 2001 had recommended that a position of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) be created to bring in greater results in the national security matters, but it had failed to take off till today due to bureaucratic hurdles.

There is need to align long-term goals with procurement and doctrines by a mandate to take up "capability development planning" and place it before the Cabinet Committee for Security for approval. Importantly, the panel will "evaluate foreign policy imperatives" and chalk out a strategy for international engagement that includes boosting 'Make in India' exports and foreign assistance programmes.

While India does have a defence planning architecture in place, this is the first time it is creating a body that will factor in everything: from foreign policy imperatives to operational directives and long-term defence equipment acquisition and infrastructure development plans to technological developments in other parts of the world while coming up with a plan.

The DPC will prepare military doctrines and, in turn, define Indian military objectives for the future. The doctrines will reflect India's no-first-use nuclear policy as well as take into account the possibility of a two-pronged offensive from the adversaries. It will justify the Navy's demand of two aircraft carriers and the role of Indian Air Force in the era of long-range standoff weapons and missile theatre defence.

Flaws in DCP work

There are a few serious flaws in the functioning of DPC. Most of what it is meant to achieve is a repetition of what numerous previous mechanisms were supposed to achieve and have obviously failed to do so. Will this too also meet the same fate as it is only old wine in new bottle?

When there are full-fledged and well-structured professionally run ministries of external affairs, defence and finance with a full Secretary to the Government of India looking after these ministries, it needs to examined why things are not working. Setting them right is needed to be done rather than creating new structures which will override some of their functions.

It is not clear whether this is an advisory or executive body. Can it override the existing procedures or direct the ministries to take actions without the concurrence of their respective ministers - can it change the rules of business of the MoD as the MoD bureaucrat will still call the shots, being superior in administration. 

Shouldn't the National Security Adviser be overseeing national security - isn't that his primary function? As the PM's premier representative on issues of national security, he should be ensuring the collective coordinated functioning of the ministries. A glaring omission in this construct is internal security, which is the greatest security challenge at the moment. Isn't internal security integral to national security? Can internal security be de-linked from external security - isn't Kashmir and Northeast a common issue (external and internal)?

What happens to existing organisations like the National Security Council (NSC), the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and the multitude of intelligence agencies — don't they have a role in national security? The government should make all-out efforts to improve higher defence management rather than creating a new untried committee under a person who is not an expert on defence strategies.

The three Service Chiefs as members of this committee do not fit in the committee as they are senior to all secretaries of the government and are equivalent to the Cabinet Secretary. In principle, the Chiefs should not be subordinated to the NSA, being heads of their services. They can be members of a committee under PMO/Raksha Mantri.

In 2001, after the Kargil battle, the Subramaniam Task Force recommended the appointment of a CDS — in existence in all large democracies of the world — to do the same job as is being entrusted to the DPC under the NSA. Later, a Group of Ministers in 2002 also recommended the appointment of CDS. In 2011 again a high-powered committee under Naresh Chandra recommended a `Permanent’ Chairman of Chiefs of Staff (similar to CDS) to carry out a similar job as the new DPC. Appointing the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS) as the member secretary further highlights the issue of avoiding appointment of a CDS. 

The CIDS has been unable to perform its assigned task because of non-appointment of a CDS, thus compelling all services to process their cases directly with the MoD. Placing the Chairman COSC in the DPC enables the NSA to function as a super CDS. 

Thus, control of the armed forces shifts from the Defence Minister to the PMO, with the NSA officiating as the CDS which is non-functionable.