LoC in flames, again

Syed Ata Hasnain

IN the 27th year of its continuity, the J&K proxy war is not difficult to predict. The fallout of the Uri attack and the subsequent surgical strikes could be appreciated to be mainly along the LoC or the International Border (IB). Pakistan-backed terror groups were making desperate attempts to make their presence felt in the hinterland of the Valley through the execution of 'fidayeen' attacks. They achieved little at Baramulla, Langaiyat and Pampore except attrition of their scant human resources in the Valley.

More of such attempts with unsuccessful infiltration during the cusp period, leading from the autumn to the winter, would render their resources even scarcer. Prudence for their cause demanded they changed tack and got back to keeping the LoC alive with exchanges of fire and raids by Border Action Teams (BATS); the purpose being to force caution, make the Indian Army along the LoC and the BSF at the IB seek cover, and thereby open gaps for infiltration. This is so old a tactic that it is almost laughable. For the uninitiated, a few explanations:

BATs are combined teams of well-trained terrorists who have completed ‘Daura-e-Khas’ training, Special Forces elements from the Pakistan Army and guides. They usually attempt to observe Indian posts and logistics movements, seeking vulnerable moments, which are exploited to target the posts or personnel to cause attrition. Mutilation of bodies of soldiers killed in such raids is not uncommon, as happened in Machil a few days ago. The Indian public which feels that retribution for such acts is not done by the Army needs to rest its apprehensions. It is not necessary to take any high level approvals for this. It will be done locally and more stunningly than ever.

Pakistan denies its hand in the BAT actions; we need to similarly deny our hand in the response. The unfortunate spat between political parties over ownership of Army operations has left a bitter taste and confused the public. It is best to leave this as operations to suit the times.

This quid pro quo will undoubtedly raise temperatures at the LoC and IB, leading to the larger ceasefire being threatened. Rationale and reasoning are two parameters which matter little in this situation. The LoC battles are all about testing nerves, imposing caution, and making eyes at each other until the other cows down. The Pakistan side knows that India will give it back in equal if not greater terms and quantity.

The civil population in the border villages on both sides suffers in terms of human cost, disruption of normal life and economic losses – houses and property plus cost of destruction of crop. Pakistan has no love lost for the Gujjar and Pahari Muslims who make up the population along the LoC, and the mostly Hindu and Sikh population along the IB. In fact, it is supposedly an apt retribution for the anti-Pakistan and anti-separatist stance of the Muslim groups. There is little one can do to stop the other side choosing to fire and harass our people except to increase the cost of its waywardness.

The breach of ceasefire hurts Pakistan equally, so we must give it back in more than equal measure. There are enough areas along the LoC where the Indian Army’s domination is so overwhelming that it can virtually bring life to a halt for the Pakistan Army and the civil population there. The Neelum Valley is one such area and the complete Pakistani deployment on our side of the Neelum river can be made untenable with sufficient display of aggression. If necessary and without considering the effect on the overall ceasefire India must be ready to take bold decisions just as it did in the conduct of the surgical strikes. However, this is not a one-night affair and it will mean full preparation for a complete meltdown of the ceasefire.

It has been 13 years since the ceasefire came into effect. On both sides a generation of soldiers has grown up without facing the crunch of artillery fire on their defences. However, it is a generation of quick learners. Where we have been slightly tardy is the allocations for construction of permanent defences. The counter-infiltration grid has kept this generation more than busy but the balance between the two will have to be sought. The Army is insufficiently adept at demanding more money and its engineer resources for construction are limited. The Central government, which claims it is gingering the Army, must look at this phenomenon because unless allotments are substantially increased, having permanent defences in place in the right numbers is going to be increasingly difficult. It will then be ‘advantage adversary’. Community bunkers for the public in the mountainous region need to be constructed just as there exist in some areas on the IB.

There is an intrinsic link between the LoC and the hinterland. Change of tack at the LoC is accompanied by change in the hinterland too. As the Army counters BAT actions and silences Pakistani fire, the separatists have commenced burning schools. To those who know the Kashmiri landscape this is another of those ploys to bait us and yet put us off track. It will die down as soon as a few miscreants are caught and taken to task.

The Army’s task here is to strengthen the hands of the local police and give it the confidence it needs after the traumatic experience its men have been through. It is heartening to see the state government not coming between the needs of the security situation and its political compulsions. The recent cordon and search operations at Old Town Baramula, conducted after a decade and a half, are the right message to the separatists. The Army has now to curb the overt vigilantism of the youth in rural areas. These are the tasks for winter even as the government shifts to Jammu, the winter capital.

(The writer, a former GOC of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps, is now associated with the Vivekananda International Foundation and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies)