Mainstreaming Balochistan

Lt Gen Bhopinder Singh (retd)

DIPLOMACY warrants a certain behavioural posturing that defines the international perceptions and character of a nation, over time. While defining the adjectives of the national ‘endgame’ is kosher, the ‘means’ to achieve the same are often mired in deliberate ambiguity to retain the tactical ploy of ‘deniability’ and ensuring the moral high ground on global platforms. The anti-communist ‘McCarthyism’ of the US during the Cold War era was projected as the noble spirit of liberty and democracy, however the ‘means’ of supporting the Contras in Nicaragua and the Mujahideen’s in Afghanistan was covertly managed without public grandstanding. All sovereign nations have agendas and security imperatives that are best kept away from public microscopes and mainstreaming, as the nation is served better in terms of deterrent value, image management and bargaining power, with certain ambiguity and ostensible restrain in public posturing.

When India conducted its first successful nuclear test in 1974, the ‘Smiling Buddha’ was the outcome of a long (steered directionally towards weaponry by Homi J Bhabha in 1954), expensive (by 1958, the Department of Atomic Energy was consuming a third of the defence budget) and an internationally brazen move that ran contrary to India’s credentials as amongst the foremost protagonists of the NPT. The spin of ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ notwithstanding, India became the first country outside of the five permanent members of the Security Council to go nuclear, militarily. This significant investment in nuclear knowhow was sustained and finally delivered by keeping the public glare out of the issue, especially during the most unpropitious economic circumstances of the 1950s and ’60s with frequent wars, agrarian crisis and investments in infrastructural temples.

Similarly, the much publicised ‘surgical strikes’of the Indian Army, deep in the Myanmar hinterland, could not have been managed without a modicum of understanding that must have been local or at an appropriate inter-governmental level. However, unnecessary politicisation, chest-thumping and appropriation of the act (e.g. a central minister stated, “This is a message for all countries, including Pakistan….”), forced the embarrassed Myanmar authorities to deal with the immediate ramifications of the ostensible permissions, with an understandable denial of either the permission or the operation on Myanmar soil. The delicate and the tentatively transforming situation in Myanmar warranted that New Delhi tread cautiously, without offending any domestic stakeholder in the evolving ecosystem of the Myanmar government (the junta was ceding way to the civilian politicians). But, short-term electoral gains of looking more martial and decisive, as a ruling political dispensation in India, could have dangerously upset the international dynamics and ‘repeats’ of such necessary actions had the political bravado and tom-toming of Indian actions, pursued longer than they already did, in public domain.

It has been argued that the second nuclear test (Pokhran-II) in 1998, had less of a technological and geostrategic necessity, and more of a political mandate to buttress the nationalistic claims of the ‘steely resolve’ of the incumbent government, then. Post-test, a lot of editorials were glowing in appreciation, Bombay Stock Exchange rose and a public resurgence of a brave ‘new’ India surcharged the nation as a whole. This political and public exuberance was followed by a reciprocal nuclear test by Pakistan (Chagai-1) 15 days after the Indian tests — the carefully covered lid of the scientific and strategic communities of both countries was blown, arguably for domestic political posturings. The long-term price for short-term political gratification included a damaging condemnation from the UN, international sanctions and unhelpful restrictions on further lendings by major international financial bodies.

By itself, neither is a covert understanding with a neighbouring country like Myanmar wrong, nor is the investment in a nuclear deterrence or capability — it is the unwarranted usage of these strategic imperatives for galvanising cadres of domestic audiences and the accompanying short-term populism that potentially derails a nation’s future preparedness and the carefully crafted positions. Israel, believed to possess nuclear weapons, practices a policy of ‘nuclear ambiguity’ that maintains a certain opacity on the issue and avoids inviting either censure or sanctions on that front, whilst, ensuring the truth behind the ambiguity is well understood in the right quarters, without falling for the trap of full-fledged acceptances, shenanigans and public display of all its ‘means’ available at its disposal.

Now, federal agencies like RAW and IB are in the business of protecting and advancing India’s strategic interests. Their operations (read, ‘means’) and existence remain in the relative shadows owing to the nature of their tasks. The basic principle of a larger good emanating from retaining secrecy and ambiguity, versus publicising the domains of operations of the secret services, mandates countries to maintain a shroud of cover on sensitive issues. Surely, policy makers, strategic operatives and security agencies would keep a hawk eye and have a built-in algorithm of various ‘soft spots’ within Pakistan, like Balochistan, Karachi, and the unrest in Af-Pak border areas. But to publically specify and indulge in a verbal ‘tit for tat’, using the Balochistan angle is a delicious sweet spot of populism and political bravado, however, it weakens the traditional Indian line of ‘non-interference’ and compromises on plausible ‘deniability’. Any public posturing of thundering declarations, acceptance or rejections does not result in any tangible difference on the ground.

Pakistan has continuously lowered the quality of diplomatic conversations and is facing pariah-like portents with its regressive spiel that is attracting condemnation from Kabul, Tehran, Washington DC and most other Western capitals. To fall prey to one-upmanship with a rabid neighbour is to compromise on the historically chiselled narrative established around India and its diplomacy. Security agencies and strategic planners need to work in silos to avoid fronting their calculus in public space, however tempting, the subject is to the domestic constituents in the short-term.

In a faltering global order, the West is witnessing the horrors of terror at its doorsteps. With specters of a religiously polarised society haunting the world, and ISIS-like organisations running amok, the relative calm in India with its tradition of ‘inclusivity’ and ‘secularism’ is emerging as a rare role model in multicultural governance. With all our fragmentations and inequities, India has held its own, whilst using a tonality of positions, reference and phraseology that is at variance to the strident ones in either Islamabad or Beijing. Without compromising on our own security requirements and ensuring that the requisite investment levels is done in deploying the necessary wherewithal to secure ourselves both internally and externally, we need to strengthen the traditional Indian narrative instead of triggering quid pro quo brinkmanship, via alluding to Balochistan and feeding an unnecessary and unhelpful frenzy.

— The writer is a former Lt Governor of Andaman and Nicobar Islands & Puducherry