Middle East crises

With Tunisia the only hold-out of what promised a new renaissance in the Arab world in 2011 christened the Arab Spring, what went wrong? Is the Arab world then doomed to repeat the cycle of coups and military dictators interspersed with the salience of religious formations and rulers?

The tentative answer is that the Arab world was not ready for a transition as dramatic as democracy and the conservative outlook of most peoples, mingled with large doses of religion, overwhelmed the more secular and modern elements. I once asked a seasoned Egyptian diplomat to give his take on the seizure of power by Gen Abdel Fatah el-Sisi. His answer was to point to the example of Napoleon.

Iran, of course, created its own revolution and has in place its system in which an attempt at democracy is aced by a religious dispensation with supreme powers. The turmoil we have seen there in recent years is sought to be eased by the leadership seeking a modus vivendi with the outside world to placate an educated and skilled middle class. They have also been given a pragmatic President and foreign minister.

The ruling elite in Egypt, the major country in the Arab world, is happy with the familiar old-new pattern of rulers, and the United States, which at one time supported the year-long rule of the first-ever democratically elected President, took little time to reconcile itself with the familiar pattern of military rule. In fact, President Barack Obama has certified that the slap on the wrist administered by Washington after the coup has been waived in pursuit of vital national interests. And Egypt has returned to its slot as the second highest recipient of US military aid, after Israel.

The other major countries of the region have their own problems and insecurities. Syria has been locked in a civil war for four years, with outside powers seeking to dethrone President Bashar al-Assad for their own diverse reasons giving space to extremist movements that have taken shape under the names of al-Qaeda affiliates or Isis or Isil morphing into and separate from the Islamic State (IS). The minority Alwvite President has proved more resilient than expected while the US administration has hinted at doing a deal with him.

Iraq presents another picture of disarray. The hanging of Saddam Hussein after the US invasion led to the coming to power of the majority Shias, with a sectarian Prime Minister seeking to marginalise the Sunnis, who sided with the extremists to oppose Shia rule. The change was, of course, a gift to Shia Iran, but in the process the extremists took control of the mainly Sunni areas. The most dramatic result was the creation of an Islamic state holding territory and administering large chunks of Syria and Iraq.

One result has been the return of the American military to the Middle East, thus far largely in the air. But a new twist was added by the Houthi advance on Yemen's capital even piercing the southern port of Aden. Saudi Arabia, under a new ruler, took the lead in challenging the Houthi through air operations mounted by its air force and those of other Gulf monarchies although Pakistan cried off leading to warnings to Islamabad that it would pay a price. The Houthis are, in a larger sense, classed as Shia.

Turkey, the strongest regional power and a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, has its own travails. It famously started with the ambition of having "zero problems" with neighbours and ended up with major problems. Turkey, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, now President, has been a strong advocate of dethroning Syria's President Assad. Along its long porous border with Syria, it has provided the main route for jihadists of various varieties to buttress the militants of many stripes fighting for their causes.

The United States, desperate to disentangle itself from the region, did not buy the Turkish plan, leaving it greatly disappointed. At the same time Ankara is facing internal problems with the Kurds left in a limbo and the authoritarian tendencies of the President becoming a focal point for domestic players.  True, the traditional military rulers of the country after the advent of Kemal Ataturk following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire were put in their place by Mr Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP). But the attempt to Islamise the country (AKP's main supporters in Anatolia are religiously inclined) has not been welcomed by the more secular elements. This time the battle is being fought alone without the support of the powerful Gulen movement whose leader lives in self-exile in the US and is engaged in mortal combat with the AKP.

In this complex web of internal strife and civil wars, the contours of the two leading regional powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran are taking shape. The new Saudi King Salman has just reshaped the power structure by giving prominence to the security proponents as his successors and advisers and, as his action in Yemen shows, is projecting a more purposeful dispensation in fighting challenges.

Iran, now locked into a final effort at a compromise with the United States and the other major powers on its nuclear programme, is seeking a wider regional and world role. Tehran believes that it is a major power and is seeking to expand its sphere of influence.  If the nuclear deal with the US does succeed, Iran will acquire a new legitimacy in promoting its interests. Inevitably, Iranian ambitions will collide with the big boy of the Sunni world and its Gulf monarchical allies.  The US, of course, is ever mindful of its ally Israel, which is muddying the waters by its ambition permanently to colonise Palestinians. Given the clout of the American Jewish lobby, this is a baggage every US President carries.

In short, peace will not return to the Middle East in the foreseeable future.