Old ally’s priorities changing?

Anita Inder Singh

The deeper significance of President Vladimir Putin's visit to India may lie in far more than Prime Minister Narendra Modi's  hailing Russia as India's top defence partner.  After all, the relationship needs more than weapons to be sustained, and trade can play an important part in shoring up the tie.  The aim  of both countries is   to increase trade from current $10 billion to $30 billion by 2025. That goal appears ambitious but is modest  when compared to  Sino-Indian trade, which stands at around $ 67 billion, or Indo-US trade - around $ 60 billion —  or India's trade with a small country like Switzerland which is about  $ 31 billion.

Putin visited India  at a time when  Russia's economic troubles, symbolised by a  falling rouble and oil prices in the face of tough  Western  economic sanctions imposed in protest against Moscow's' invasion of Ukraine last March. Having become a pariah of sorts in the West he was greeted warmly by Modi at November's G-20 meeting, so Indo-Russian friendship seemed to be on a firm footing. But Putin's visit also came at a time when Russia is moving closer to India's arch-rivals — China and Pakistan, which have since long laid claims to certain parts of north Indian territory.

If Russia is facing economic decline, India, by contrast,  Russia's partner-in-BRICS, is widely perceived as a likely  rising power under Modi. Within the last four months India has entered into major economic agreements with Japan, the US and Australia and upgraded defence ties with them. It has also secured an assurance of $20 billion Chinese investment.  

Russia wants BRICS to work against the American world domination. But Modi's visit to Washington - and his invitation to President Barack Obama to be the chief guest on the Republic Day in 2015 --  showed that New Delhi and Moscow are not necessarily not keeping rank with  each other.  That does not mean India favours American hegemony, but that it has much to gain economically and militarily and diplomatically by keeping on good terms with the US. 

Putin's visit showed that India will not isolate Russia because it invaded Ukraine. India does not support Western sanctions against Russia for its actions in Ukraine; nor did it approve of Russia's annexation of Crimea.

In fact, the US is annoyed that India signed deals with Russia, especially as Sergei Aksyonov, the Prime Minister of Crimea, severed by Russia from Ukraine last March, was included in Putin's delegation to New Delhi. Reports suggest that New Delhi had informed Washington that it was not 'officially aware' of Aksyonov's presence in the Putin delegation and Washington saw no reason to disbelieve that assertion. Further clarifications will be aired by India and the US. 

If India has adroitly balanced closer relations with the US while reaffirming strong ties with Russia , Moscow is  no less adept at maximising its political options.  The new "cold peace" between Moscow and Washington has prompted Russia to get strategically closer to  China. This could  have  implications for India.

Last May Russia signed  $40 billion energy deal under  which it will supply gas to China for 30 years. Moscow is juggling with several balls, and how it will play the Chinese ball will affect its ties with India, especially with the US seemingly undecided about the substance or strength of its pivot to East Asia. 

Unlike India and the US, which share an interest in countering Chinese expansion in Asia, Moscow and New Delhi have so such understanding. As China begins to implement its "Silk Road" strategies to connect China to Europe, there is no sign that Russia and India have  conceived their own visions  of  economic integration across Eurasia - which could include Central Asia, Turkey and Iran. 

The signing of the first  defence deal between Russia and Pakistan on November 20 is of  concern to  India. The military agreement marks a significant shift in Russo-Pakistani relations. The agreement has been described in Pakistan as a "milestone" in Russia-Pakistan relations. For, during the cold war Pakistan joined  two American military alliances and provided the US with bases from which to spy on the Soviet Union.  Washington rewarded Pakistan with military and development aid —  and the military largesse was used against India. Will Russian weapons for Pakistan have the same result? 

The old Indo-Soviet political ties expanded after the 1960s amid growing Sino-Russian hostility and Sino-Pakistani amity. Given America's interest in mending its own fences with China in 1971, Russia offered India some political insurance  against security threats from China and Pakistan. Over the next few years, if a  beleaguered, anti-West Moscow moves closer to China and Pakistan, India's long-standing friendship with Russia could be in for an uncertain ride. 

In the 1980s, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,  Islamabad trained and backed the anti-Soviet mujahedeen and  later, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Russia along with Iran and India,  reached out to the Northern Alliance. It was only during the last few years that attempts were made to improve their relationship. 

So,  last June, India was taken by surprise when  Russia lifted its embargo on arms deliveries to Pakistan. It also began negotiating the sale of Mi-35 multi-role helicopters to Islamabad, and India expects arms sales to Pakistan to increase.  As Nato withdraws from Afghanistan, Pakistan welcomes Russia's engagement in the Afghan peace process. Pakistan's view is that together with China,  Russia could contribute to regional stability.  

Shoigu says the military agreement would have "a great practical focus and contribute to increasing combat efficiency" of Pakistan's armed forces. Besides sales of weapons, military cooperation is envisaged.   Russian commenters say that the deal will not cause problems with India. After all, India and Pakistan both buy weapons from the U.S., and this has not troubled  them.  

In fact, the  Russia-Pakistan pact has caused some unease in India. One troubling question for India is whether Moscow will continue to support India on Kashmir, especially by using its UN Security Council veto to block Pakistani or Western manoeuvres against India. 

The Indo-Russian "druzhba-dosti" (friendship) will probably hold. But politics is about impermanence. Both Russia and India are maximising their political and military options and the ongoing diplomatic game has brought their shifting priorities out into the open. 

— The writer is a Visiting Professor at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution in New Delhi