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Politics of PLA modernisation

Recently, Xi Jinping, Chinese President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), asked the People''s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ''loyal''.

Politics of PLA modernisation


Bhartendu Kumar Singh


Indian Defence Accounts Service 

Recently, Xi Jinping, Chinese President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), asked the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to be 'loyal'. Within a few days, the CMC and the PLA issued statements of 'absolute loyalty' to Xi Jinping. Such statements, made in past as well, are bit surprising since the PLA has placed itself as the lead force in the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and has been the tested edifice of the Chinese political leadership's power-base. Interestingly, it is coming at a time when Xi has established total control over party and government. 

Unlike other authoritarian countries, the Chinese PLA is primarily affiliated and identified with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) than with the state. The CCP exercises complete control through the political commissar system. These political commissars are party functionaries and report on the functioning of PLA through party channels. The CMC, which is the highest decision-making body for the PLA, reports to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CCP. The PLA has always shown deference to the political leadership of the CCP except during the early seventies when Lin Biao revolted against Mao and the attempt by some leaders last year to play power games against Xi Jinping. 

The bewildering demand for loyalty can have several interpretations. First, despite the overt centralisation of all powers under his belt, Xi is still not confident of complete support from PLA. He does not come from their ranks and has toiled hard to gain control over them, best reflected in Xi Jinping thought 'now' forming the part of political education curriculum of the PLA. His anti-corruption drive has included some 40 senior PLA generals as well, apart from 13,000 other military officials, making Xi eager to earn the command and respect of the PLA. Second, the PLA is undergoing modernisation, such as manpower reduction, force restructuring and changes in control system. Further, in the recent Party Congress, he declared his intentions to work on short term (by 2020), medium term (by 2035) and long term (2050) targets so as to make it a 'world class'military power. These targets require unflinching support from the PLA. 

The demands for show of loyalty, however, reflect the chinks in the PLA modernisation process. The PLA comes across as a highly politicised army and suffers from the pangs of political interference. It has to show loyalty to the CCP, its ideology and its paramount leader. Political education comes before professional education as part of their training. While one generation of PLA had to educate itself in Mao's thought, this generation of PLA is being groomed in the Xi Jinping thought. The CMC recently came out with a document on the responsibility system in politics where the entire military has to resolutely follow Xi's orders, be responsible to Xi and leave no doubt on obeying him. 

Beginning with Samuel Huntington, many military theorists have believed that politics or political ideas have no place in  military theory. Professional armies, according to them, must remain within barracks and stoutly apolitical. The PLA remains an exception. It has not only been highly politicised, but the weak political structures have also led to increased militarisation of politics. This is best reflected in PLA generals hankering for political posts. The idealised distinction amongst military, party and state is highly diluted, with professionalism taking a beating. 

As a result: 1. the PLA is playing a big role in decision-making in state and party, particularly in foreign policy. The leadership  is often prone to wrong whispers from the PLA, the largest pressure group in the government. 2. China's democratic future seems to be bleak. It would continue to be what Daniel Bell calls as 'political meritocracy' where the PLA would continue to influence the party and the state. Xi Jinping's objectives in calling for more loyalty from PLA are quite obvious. He wants the PLA to 'unswervingly’ adhere to the Party's absolute leadership over the armed forces and make sure that the PLA always follows the Party'. 3. The PLA leadership is not able to distinguish between just and unjust wars and has unleashed an aggressive strategy towards its Asia-Pacific neighbours. There is no institutional democratic constraint to moderate its often offensive foreign policy conduct, giving a free hand to PLA generals. Xi would not mind playing to the gallery in return for their loyalty. 

Regarding PLA’s modernisation and its attempt to become a world class military, unless it is depoliticised in its organisational structure and operational management, its attempt towards being a professional army will remain a distant target.

(Views are personal)

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