Anil Chowdhry
AROUND noon on April 25, a 36-strong contingent of the 74th Bn of CRPF deployed to protect a road construction party in Sukna (Dantewada) of Chhattisgarh was ambushed by a huge band of about 300 fully armed Naxal militia. 25 brave young CRPF personnel were taken by surprise, killed on the spot and another eight were seriously injured. Such a heavy toll of lives of the central police force playing a key role in combating terrorism naturally aroused concern in the media.
As an ex-cop and internal security professional, this made me very sad. It raised a number of questions about how it happened and where we went wrong in protecting our brave policemen. Before dwelling on the do’s and dont’s to ensure that such incidents are not repeated in the future, let us take stock of the facts leading to the tragedy.
Sukna, carved out of erstwhile Bastar district is the area worst affected by Naxal violence, accounting for almost 70 per cent of casualties suffered by the police forces operating in these areas. It is a hilly and deeply forested terrain. The Naxal armed militia, comprising local Adivasis, are recruited, trained, equipped and financed by Maoist thinkers living in comfort in urban areas. They issue directions to the armed groups to strike against selected targets via their network of local commanders through a well-defined command structure.
The contact of the "Jungle Parties" of Maoists with the local villagers is minimal. They maintain utmost secrecy in their movements. Road construction on the remaining 50-km distance, aimed to end the isolation of the tribals from government services, is critical to the anti-Naxal strategy. The Naxals were opposed to this road contruction activity.
Their desperation was increasing with the successes achieved in counter-insurgency operations in recent years. They were apparently busy planning this big strike to regain hold over the area to boost the sagging morale of its cadres. The CRPF is deployed to assist the local government in counter-Naxal operations and is under the tactical command of the District SP. The regular deployment of the CRPF at the same spot in a highly vulnerable, ambush-prone terrain was avoidable.
The location and numbers was known to the local Naxal commanders. The latter were surreptitiously gathering troops to hopelessly outnumber the adversary and inflict maximum casualties. It is not known whether the CRPF commanders either at the local or higher levels had expressed concerns over the risks involved in such deployments.
Standard operating drills to guard against ambushes in hostile terrain were not followed. The Naxal leadership has been taking advantage of the poverty, unemployment and illiteracy among the local tribals, which has become more acute following revision of the forest conservation laws to make them stringent. Naxals have been luring innocent young tribals to leave their homes and families and take up the gun after being paid adequately every month.
Actionable tactical intelligence holds the key to success of all counter-terrorist operations of the police and security forces. Human intelligence (Humint), which is the forte of our local and central intelligence agencies, has severe limitations in penetrating underground groups operating from deeply forested inaccessible hideouts. Our technical intelligence (Techint) capabilities fall woefully short to yield meaningful results in counter-terrorism operations. UAVs deployed to provide technical intelligence regarding the movement of armed groups in deep forest areas of Chhattisgarh and contiguous territory called “Abhujmarh”(unknown areas) are not able to provide any worthwhile inputs, given the inability of the cameras mounted on them to penetrate deep vegetation and take pictures of objects below .
Here are a few suggestions based on my experience of heading intelligence outfits in terrorism-affected areas in J&K and the North-East. We need to recast our counter-Naxal strategy and tactics to ensure that such losses do not reoccur:
Do involve the CRPF and state police officers facing ground realities in affected areas while discussing and deciding upon counter measures in Delhi and state capitals. During a stint in the MHA in 2004-5, I was asked to chair the first Joint Task Force to combat Naxalism nationally. The deliberations were held in Delhi and the capitals of the affected states, including Chhattisgarh. Officers handling the situation on the ground participated and the Union Home Minister too attended such conclaves in the state capitals and actively involved the state governments at the highest level. Naxal groups operating in Chhattisgarh and elsewhere are making extensive use of electronic devices to communicate via cyber space and using Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) which cannot be intercepted. Information on the presence and movement of Naxals can be considerably stepped-up by extensively analysing the cyber data being exchanged among them, even minus content.
Air support being extended at present to the police and the CRPF by the IAF is currently limited to logistics — supplies, movement of manpower, equipment etc.. The IAF helicopters can be used more effectively in para-dropping of troops to overwhelm and strike against armed groups. Of course, such para-droppings are possible only in clearances in deep forest areas.
Finally, the CRPF must draw heavily on the expertise of the Andhra Pradesh/ Telangana police force Greyhounds that has achieved significant success in countering Naxalism by sharpening the troops’ skills. The training of CRPF personnel deployed in Naxal areas needs to be undertaken on a war footing. The appointment of an officer with a proven track record as full-fledged DG of the CRPF, the largest paramilitary force in the world, as announced a couple of days back, will ensure the toning up of operational capabilities. A salute to the brave CRPF personnel who had to lay down their lives in trying to keep our country safe from depredations of armed hostile groups.
The writer is Former Secretary, Internal Security, MHA.