The new India-US ties

Kanwal Sibal

MODI’S Washington visit has gone off well, but then his earlier visits to the US had gone off equally well, if not better in some ways as he addressed the US Congress, developed a personal chemistry with Obama, was lionised by the Indian diaspora and so on. Under him, the defence ties with the US expanded rapidly, LEMOA was signed, civilian nuclear cooperation was unblocked politically, the India-US joint strategic vision for Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions was announced, and, not the least, Modi found a way to absorb US pressure on climate change issues for the Paris agreement to materialise.

While improved India-US ties gave more balance to India’s foreign policy, enlarged  its strategic space in international dealings, gave a fillip to India’s relations with Japan in particular and put some pressure on China, on key Indian strategic concerns, whether on Pakistan’s terrorist affiliations or China’s geopolitical expansion in our region, Indian and US policies remained divergent. The reality is that the US will seek to maintain its hegemony by incorporating us in its global and regional strategies, for which it will look to positioning itself as an arbiter between adversaries, balance its relations with each in a way that both seek to either earn or become dependent on its goodwill.

That Modi was able to establish a personal equation with Trump will undoubtedly facilitate doing business with the White House where ultimately key foreign policy decisions are taken, but this is not enough to change the fundamental direction of US policies. The country’s inter-agency process inherently favours the status quo and does not easily permit a major change in established policies by consensus.

The India-US joint statement omits any mention of the joint strategic vision on the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, which suggests that the US wants to pursue its China policy without inhibited by the need to fit it into this document. This de-emphasises strategically the naval exercises, trilateral cooperation with Japan, bolstering India’s maritime surveillance capabilities and so on, which remain on the plate. Trump, in fact, spoke of exploring new exercises and cleared the sale of unarmed Guardian UAVs held up by the Obama administration. The US will maintain these pressure points on China as part of managing the China challenge. The joint statement does say that close partnership between the US and India is central to peace and stability in the region, but “as responsible stewards in the Indo-Pacific” — in other words as responsible powers acting in their independent capacity. 

On South China Sea issues, the statement refers to the “importance of respecting freedom of navigation, overflight and commerce throughout the region” and calls upon all nations to “resolve territorial and maritime disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law”. China, which would have been watching closely the text on the subject, can live with these standard formulations. Significantly, no mention is made of UNCLOS which is helpful to China as it had violated the treaty. But then, even the affected Asian countries are no longer using the UNCLOS ruling as a stick to beat China with. 

The Trump administration has oscillated between confrontation and cooperation with China. Whether it has found the right balance between the two, or will find it, is uncertain as China is now confidently expanding its geopolitical ambitions and US response is accommodative. Seeking China’s cooperation against North Korea gives an instrument to the Chinese to bargain with the US, and reviving the Quad dialogue on Afghanistan signals that China’s role in the Af-Pak region is seen as beneficent, which is damaging to us strategically. In fact, the joint statement on Afghanistan is notably weak as it omits any mention of the mayhem the Taliban is causing there and gives no clue to US policy to prevent the situation in Afghanistan from relapsing to what it was before the US intervention. Trump is not dealing with Afghanistan with the optic of destroying Islamic radicalism to which he made a strong reference in his joint press briefing with Modi. In this background, India has to remain wary of the Trump administration’s China policy and single-mindedly build up its own capabilities to deter China which now unabashedly seeks to dominate Asia. Our Russia relationship will remain vital for keeping our options wide.

On Pakistan and terrorism, the US has been giving conflicting signals, appreciating Pakistan’s stepped up counter-terrorism cooperation with Afghanistan, retaining the levels of military and economic aid to that country, backing a resumption of the India-Pakistan dialogue and even suggesting mediation to resolve India-Pakistan differences. But the statement issued this time calls on Pakistan to end “cross-border terrorist attacks” perpetrated by Pakistan-based groups — the first time that the US has endorsed the “cross-border”  formulation, and by declaring Hizbul chief Syed Salahuddin a specially designated global terrorist, it has politically delegitimised the so-called indigenous Kashmiri freedom struggle. No wonder, Pakistan has violently criticised the statement as “singularly unhelpful” and lambasted the US for treating the Kashmiri struggle for self-determination as terrorism. China has, of course, immediately stood up for Pakistan by lauding its front-line role in combating terror. 

Significantly, the US has endorsed our objections to China’s OROB initiative, with Trump and Modi affirming support for “bolstering regional economic connectivity through the transparent development of infrastructure and the use of responsible debt financing practices, while ensuring respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rule of law, and the environment”. The reference to sovereignty has diplomatic connotations in the context of the CPEC that traverses POK. While this is a net gain, the US is not opposed to China’s large-scale investments in Pakistan if they help to stabilise that country. Experience shows that the US will continue to avoid imposing costly sanctions on Pakistan and the latter has learnt to absorb verbal blows and defy US strictures with impunity. 

Trump seems ready to make India eligible for export of US natural gas, as Indian energy companies are already negotiating long-term contracts for the import of LNG worth $32 billion. This would help to reduce the trade deficit between the two countries, but we should expect US pressure on trade, investment and IPRs, as well as on HIB visas and other steps to impose additional costs on India’s IT sector, to continue even more strongly under Trump. If the US is not willing to spare allies, its friends have to be doubly watchful.

The writer is a former Foreign Secretary