IAF mishaps: CAG blames it on poorly trained pilots

Ajay Banerjee

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, December 19

The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), in a report today, blamed the lack of proper training of pilots for increase in the number of Indian Air Force fighter aircraft accidents.

In a report tabled in Parliament, the CAG said that in 2012-13, there were as many as 33 accidents in which 27 pilots lost their lives. All these accidents, the CAG said, occurred because of “technical defects” and “human error.”

These have been caused because IAF can no longer train its pilots properly due to lack of trainers. The CAG has said that IAF doesn’t have the full complement of basic trainer aircraft, intermediate and advanced jet trainers and even simulators. Notably, CAG Shashikant Sharma is a former Defence Secretary.

Going into the details, the CAG said that Bangalore-based defence public sector unit Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has been trying to develop a trainer aircraft for the IAF for the past 14 years. Its inability to produce an aircraft has “adversely affected the stage-II training of pilots” that is when pilots graduate to fly in the supersonic speeds of fighter jets.

The CAG also found that IAF has paid the HAL over Rs 3,000 crore for development of various planes but HAL has spent only about Rs 6 crore. In the meantime, the IAF has inducted some 75 basic trainers for rookie pilots.

If the non-availability of aircraft and training aids adversely affected the fighting of IAF, the CAG has questioned the IAF for improper storage of missiles and bombs.

The missiles need to be stored in controlled “dust-free” conditions and expired ammunition need to be stored carefully to “prevent environmental hazards”, but “certain stores are being kept” in the open.

Further, the air element of the Indian Navy suffered equally because of shortage of a certain category of torpedoes -- considered as critical deterrents against submarines -- used from helicopters.

The CAG said inquires have revealed defence public sector unit Bharat Dynamics Limited that was to supply the torpedoes could only supply “13 per cent of the required numbers” of torpedoes to the Indian Navy.

The inquires also reveal that major changes were made to specifications such as speed for the ship-borne and fixed-wing version of the torpedo which were accepted by the Navy.

The exercise began in 2006 and, even in 2014, all the versions of the torpedoes that can be fired from all helicopters are not complete.