Gallantry display at Barki

Brig Kanwaljit Singh (Retd)

The Indian Army responded to the Pakistani offensive of September 1 by launching a three-pronged attack with three divisions towards Sialkot, Lahore and Khem Karan-Kasur. The 7 Infantry Division was tasked on the Khalra-Barki-Lahore axis. The International Border was to be crossed at 4 am on September 6; 4 Sikh of 65 Infantry Brigade and 6/8 GR of 48 Infantry Brigade were to secure firm base along the road. The 48 Infantry Brigade was to advance to capture Barki by last light.

4 Sikh, of Saragarhi fame, had been moved to Ferozepur in August. The CO, (the late) Lt Col Anant Singh, an outstanding leader, tasked two companies — ‘A’ under Maj Shamsher Singh Manhas  (VrC, the late Brigadier) and ‘B’ under Maj DS Sidhu (the late Brigadier), who captured two enemy observation posts. At the same time, 6/8 GR cleared the barrier; a secure firm base was established across the border.

The 48 Infantry Brigade, supported by a squadron of Central India Horse, cleared the Hudiara drain area, about 4 km from the IB. The enemy was having a field day with the Indian troops advancing in an open area. The troops dug up slit trenches after every advance and a lull, but casualties were mounting due to artillery fire. The 65 Infantry Brigade was now tasked to capture Barki and secure the eastern bank of Icchogil canal, 9.5 km from the border.

On the morning of September 8, 4 Sikh advanced and its ‘D’ Company, led by me, then a Lieutenant, captured Brahmnabad village, suffering casualties because of the severe airburst shelling. By late evening, 9 Madras and 16 Punjab had captured Barka Kalan and Barka Khurd villages. 4 Sikh was moved north of the road the same night.

The formidable defence at Barki and Icchogil behind it had 11 concrete pillboxes, besides other fortifications. Each pillbox was equipped with a medium machine gun, a light machine gun, one or two rifles or Sten guns and an ample supply of ammunition and grenades. To the left of the road was a police station, strengthened by sand bags. 

A deep ditch was expected before Barki. Icchogil’s rear bank was 3 feet higher than the front, with solid fortification. Tanks were sheltered behind the canal, 150 feet wide and 17 feet deep, filled with water, which could be controlled.

After last light, the Central India Horse, equipped with Sherman tanks, was to assault Barki with lights on, firing all its armaments, followed by 4 Sikh to physically capture Barki in the first phase of the brigade attack. Ichhogil canal, which was expected to be 500 to 700 yards behind, was to be captured by 16 Punjab in the second phase.

As per the 4 Sikh plan, the ‘A’ and ‘C’ companies, the latter under Sub Sadhu Singh, formed up on the right side of the road at 7.50 pm for assault. ‘B’ company was in the rear as reserve. ‘D’ company was asked to move behind the tanks in civilian trucks full of wooden planks, to be lowered in Barki drain for the crossing over of tanks.

After this task, it was to clear the police station area. ‘D’ company formed up at 7.30 pm. Somehow the tanks did not arrive till 8 pm. The CO of 4 Sikh, confident of the tanks coming, ordered the assault companies to move at 8 pm. The artillery pounded the enemy positions. The enemy illuminated the entire area, turning it into daylight. This spurred the jawans to reach the objective as fast as possible.

After 20 minutes of the assault, the CO ordered me to complete the assigned task. The company moved at a fast pace, hardly for 15 minutes, when the tanks arrived, firing towards the objective. Assaulting troops therefore were subjected to firing from the rear.

I climbed atop the nearest tank, and the fire was then switched to the left of the road. Contrary to the plan, they had not put on their lights, which proved to be a boon for the infantry ahead.

The enemy’s intense artillery fire was augmented by direct firing weapons and tanks from behind Ichhogil canal, pillboxes and fortified positions from housetops and the police station. Our companies inched forward through fire and move tactics with grit and determination, till they were 100 yards away from the pillboxes. They shouted their war cry, “Bole So Nihal, Sat Sri Akal”, and pounced upon the enemy, men crawling and lobbing grenades.

Once the forward crust was pierced, there were hand-to-hand fights, bayonets crossing bayonets. The enemy was crushed. The survivors abandoned their positions, running to the safety behind Ichhogil, wading through it since the bridge had been demolished.

After a stiff fight, ‘D’ Company captured the police station area; the enemy’s tanks brought in devastating fire from across Ichhogil, 150 yards away.

I conveyed to the armour not to leave the road or move forward as the objective had been captured. While this message was being passed, a 4 Sikh recoilless gun jeep with the CO of CIH, Lt Col SC Joshi, came rushing along and was blown off near the police station.

The assaulting companies found Ichhogil only 150 to 250 yards from Barki, scrambled up and secured the east bank. Maj Shamsher Singh and Capt SS Duggal (later Colonel), the Adjutant, were wounded and evacuated.

Phase II of the brigade attack thus was completed during Phase I itself, within two hours of the assault. 16 Punjab was assigned the task of capturing the area along Icchogil further north.

The enemy had fired 3,000 bombs within half an hour. Maj Aziz Bhatti, tasked to defend with two companies, was conferred Pakistan’s highest gallantry award posthumously.

4 Sikh had 39 killed and 121 wounded. It was awarded Battle Honour ‘Barki’ and Theatre Honour ‘Punjab’, besides one MVC, three VrCs and one SM.

Ironically, the defender of Barki got his nation’s highest gallantry award, but the CO of the battalion capturing those formidable defences got nothing.