Stuck in turf wars, red-tape & inertia

Dinesh Kumar

What prevents the government from taking a decision to create the post of a Chief of Defence Staff and reorganise the three Services into joint Commands, especially when high-powered committees, including the Group of Ministers Committee comprising the Union ministers of Home, Defence, External Affairs and Finance along with the National Security Advisor, have recommended the same? 

A combination of turf wars, ignorance about defence issues, suspicion of the armed forces and resistance against changing the status quo are the major reasons. Politicians are largely ignorant, indifferent or suspicious of the armed forces. Defence and security has never been a top priority for them during times of peace. Owing to military coups in Pakistan and Bangladesh and the role of the military in other neighbouring countries such as Myanmar and China, large sections of the political class have also been uncomfortable about vesting too much power with the armed forces and creating a centre point of authority.

'Generalist' bureaucrats, who consider themselves 'superior' to the Services, have traditionally always been suspicious of and inimical towards according too much power to the armed forces. 

On their part, the armed forces have been plagued with turf wars with hardly any Service Chief in harness wishing to deprive himself of his operational command and preside over his own disinvestment. Of the three Services, the Navy, which constitutes five per cent of India's armed forces, has been consistent in its support for the creation of a CDS and joint Commands. 

In contrast, the IAF, which constitutes 10 per cent of the armed forces, has been the most resistant since it believes in the primacy of 'indivisible air power' and in centralising its assets for effective use during war time. As a result, it does not want to parcel out its assets to Theatre Commands. Already, for example, against a sanctioned strength of 42 fighter squadrons, the IAF's current squadron strength has fallen to 33 and is expected to only fall further in the years ahead.  

The Army, which constitutes the bulk (85 per cent) of the armed forces, is divided into two camps with one section in favour and the other arguing that Theatre Commands are unsuited for India considering its sustained involvement in border skirmishes and low intensity conflict. Besides, they feel that such joint operational Commands are only suited for power projection, something which India does not stand for. 

At a more macro level, India's inability to take such bold decisions is hampered by strategic culture which, according to Bratton, is one of 'restraint', a 'Continentalist view of security issues', a 'reluctance to formally articulate strategic policies', a 'secretive bureaucracy' that is hesitant to declassify archival material related to security issues and 'a strong separation between civilian and military leaders that hinders adequate civil-military dialogue'. 

Reform or Perish

India's security challenges span the full spectrum of conflict from nuclear to sub conventional - unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, armed violence in Jammu and Kashmir and some of the north eastern states and terrorism in urban parts of the country sponsored by both state (mainly Pakistan) and non-state actors. 

With the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs, the nature of warfare is itself changing. Future battlefields are likely to be vastly different. These are expected to be non-linear, digitised, highly mobile and transparent. Force multipliers will play a crucial role in determining the outcome of conflicts and the use of surveillance, cyber warfare, space and robotics will need to be better exploited.

Thus modern warfare demands unified commands and also an organisation fully responsible for operational control which should be able to determine the type of equipment required for all three Services, the type and scale of operations envisaged and the tactics to be employed.  The long ranges of weapon systems in possession with all three Services will require optimal and efficient use. This further adds to the need for a unified structure to create an interoperable integrated environment.

There is a difference between an integrated response and a joint response. An integrated response is more focused, cohesive and involves optimum utilization of responses. In a joint response, the scope for friction between services is high. In the current system, each Service plans and caters for its own logistics back up for operations. This leads to considerable duplication, long inventories and waste of resources.

Go for a shakeup 

Reforms in the defence management structure will have to be enforced top down as has been done in the United States. Following World War-II, US President Harry Truman had observed: "We must never fight another war the way we fought the last two. I have a feeling that if the Army and Navy had fought our enemies as hard as they fought each other, the war would have ended much earlier".  Based on their experience, the defence reforms in the US have been continuously evolving with the passage of the National Security Act 1947, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 and the land mark Goldwater Nichols Act, 1986 which created the current system. 

In the United Kingdom a CDS was thrust on the military by the government after 18 years of bickering and dissensions amongst the Services. The UK is otherwise the first country to have a chiefs of staff committee dating back to 1923. In addition to a CDS, the UK has a Permanent Joint Headquarters commanded by a Chief of Joint Operations Command. More recently, in February this year, China restructured its armed forces into five region-centric Theatre Commands.

The structure of the Indian armed forces resembles a dinosaur which is becoming less relevant and practical in modern times. There is a need to rise above Service-specific loyalties and turf battles and create a CDS along with integrated Command structures. The current Service-specific approach is potentially divisive and delays responses to emerging situations in a rapidly moving current-day battlefield. It is also more expensive.

But for that the political executive first needs to pro-actively educate itself on defence and security issues and accept that it needs to reform the way both the higher defence management and the armed forces are structured. India cannot afford being yet again caught by surprise and then having to scrape its way out. There is need to reform and restructure or risk becoming inefficient and eventually irrelevant.