Sunday, June 4, 2000		Lead Article

THE SRI LANKA IMBROGLIO
DESPERATE SITUATIONS; DESPERATE MEASURES

There are many pitfalls before the Vajpayee government, not the least of which is the ambivalent stand of some of the coalition partners from Tamil Nadu. The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is an emotional issue in the state, and there is no knowing how the pro-LTTE elements will react to the action that the Centre may eventually take. India has to tread cautiously in trying to bring Prabhakaran round for meaningful talks with the Sri Lankan government, says A.Balu

THE escalating Sri Lankan ethnic crisis has brought into renewed focus its impact on Tamil Nadu, forcing politicians in the state to mull over what the Vajpayee government at the Centre can do to bring the situation under control. The conflict is so deep-rooted that no one has a ready-made solution.Although strident voices in support of the cause of the LTTE and its demand for a Tamil Eelam (separate Tamil nation) are raised, sometimes strongly and sometimes hesitantly, the overwhelming view appears to be an endorsement of the Centre’s stand of "no military intervention, no arms assistance, but only humanitarian assistance."

In the context of the stand taken by two NDA constituents in Tamil Nadu, the PMK and the MMDK, Karunanidhi is forced to engage in tight-rope walking. His alliance partner, S. Ramdoss of PMK, has taken the extreme stand of open support to the LTTE, urging immediate recognition of Tamil Eelam, the goal of the Liberation Tigers of SriLanka. Ramdoss has even gone to the extent of appealing to the United Nations to intervene and help create an independent Tamil state in the island nation. Some smaller groups even seek to draw a parallel to East Timor which had gained independence from Indonesia.

The MDMK leader, Vaiko, who has been an ardent champion of the LTTE and Tamil Eelam, is against India extending even "non-military logistics" to Sri Lanka in its battle against Tamil rebels in the Jaffna Peninsula. "The psyche in Tamil Nadu, "he says, "is in favour of the Tamils. The Indian government should not do anything which could hurt the sentiments of people in the state". He is convinced that Tamil Eelam alone would provide a solution to the current conflict. The AIADMK leader, Jayalalitha, favours a political solution and India offering its good offices to Sri Lanka is bringing about an end to the ethnic conflict. The Tamil Manila Congress (TMC) leader, G.K. Moopanar, wants to know if the Centre would permit its constituents like the PMK and the MDMK to support terrorism and militancy, both inside and outside the country.

The former President R.Venkataraman, also makes interesting revelations in his book My Presidential Years about LTTE activities in TamilNadu and its connection with the DMK and its leader, Karunanidhi. As a result of the mounting pressure from the Congress and the AIADMK for the dismissal of the DMK government on grounds of breakdown of law and order in the state, he had advised the then Prime Minister Chandrasekhar, not to rely on representations of political parties but to have an assessment by Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) independently and come to a conclusion about the activities of the LTTE and the attitude of the DMK government towards it.

Shortly thereafter, when the President visited Tamil Nadu, he told Karunanidhi that he should not only take action against the LTTE, but that action should also be demonstrable. Karunanidhi responded by saying that he was doing his best to contain the LTTE. "This was, however, at variance", says Venkataraman, "with the refusal to receive the IPKF personnel on their return from Sri Lanka on the plea that the IPKF had killed Tamils inJaffna and therefore did not deserve a reception."

Venkataraman, who on the advice of Chandrasekhar government had dismissed the Karunanidhi government, notes that the report submitted by the government had, on the basis of intelligence information, concluded that the DMK ministry was reluctant to deal firmly with extremists in the state with international links. The IB in one of its briefing had told Venkataraman that the LTTE was infiltrating into Tamil Nadu and creating law and order problems. Though he had passed on the information to both Prime Minister V.P. Singh and Home Minister Mufti Muhamed Sayeed, they did not respond, "presumably because DMK was a constituent of the National Front".

In an interview to India Today in November 1997, Karunanidhi had said the evidence he, Jayalalitha and others had given before the Jain Commission showed that right from Indira Gandhi’s days, political parties had supported the cause of Sri Lankan Tamils at one time or another.In the present crisis, he had made it clear that his party was not supporting or backing any moves by the LTTE on Indian soil. Karunanidhi was facing problems while dealing with fringe groups in Tamil Nadu who had taken up the cause of the LTTE. He was anxious to ensure that the political parties did not try to whip up public sympathy and turn the Sri Lankan situation into an issue in the state Assembly elections due early next year. Before the eruption of the present crisis in Sri Lanka, the DMK government had drawn flak from the opposition for recommending clemency for Nalini, one of the four accused sentenced to death in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case. The decision had been dubbed as a "pleasant message" to the LTTE. Karunanidhi rejected the suggestion that his government had condoned the assassination.But he continued to be accused by his detractors of following "double standards" on the Sri Lankan issue.

The LTTE and its activities have either been glorified or denounced, depending on how one views its aims and methods to achieve them. Terrorists often claim they are freedom fighters for what they consider to be a just cause the LTTE makes no bones about claiming that it is only retaliating against the atrocities perpetrated against Tamils by Sri Lankan forces and the injustice meted out to them by the Sinhala government. Vaiko will unequivocally endorse their contention. The fact is the LTTE has, over the years, grown into a ruthless outfit that has no compunction about carrying out assassination and indulging in terrorist activities.

According to the US State Department profile of theLTTE, the Tigers have integrated a battlefield insurgency strategy with a terrorist programme that targets not only personnel in the countryside but also senior political leaders in Colombo. The LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran has established an extensive network of checkpoints and informants to keep track of any "outsiders" who enter the group’s area of control. The LTTE’s overt organisations support Tamil separatism by lobbying with foreign governments and the UN. The LTTE also uses its international contacts to procure weapons, communications and bomb-making equipment. The LTTE exploits large Tamil communities in North America, Europe and Asia to obtain funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri Lanka.

Even as it is celebrating its victories in the current confrontation with Sri Lankan forces in Jaffna peninsula, the LTTE has suffered a few diplomatic reverses. The European Parliament had adopted a resolution recommending tough measures against theorganisation, including its ban in Britain, considered as its main overseas base. At the UN, a 17-member committee of non-government organisations (NGOs) refused to grant NGO status to the Tamil Centre for Human Rights because of its involvement in terrorist activities. But as long as the LTTE is able to score victories in the battlefield, there is little chance that it will agree to sit at the negotiating table.

The million-dollar question now is if a negotiated settlement of the ethnic conflict is at all possible. Prabhakaran seems to be in no mood to give up the fighting and negotiate without the Sri Lankan government agreeing to fulfil certain pre-conditions. The LTTE blames the Kumaratunga government for reneging on the peace process in 1995 and refusing to create conditions of normalcy in the war-torn Tamil areas conducive to negotiations. From the onset of the talks, the LTTE had requested that the SriLankan government should relax its economic pressure on the Tamil populace. To this end, the LTTE requested the lifting of the "draconian" economic embargo (including that on food and medicine) on the Tamil areas. They had insisted that the day-to-day problems of the Tamils should be solved before negotiations on the fundamental solution of the conflict could begin. The LTTE, as a gesture of goodwill, agreed to release Sri Lankan prisoners of war, but according to them, Sri Lanka dragged its feet and their requests were never acceded.

The version given by Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, puts the onus of the fiasco on Prabhakaran "The entire world knows how Prabhakaran broke off and unilaterally entered war — he was the who one chose the option", he said in a recent press interview. "The agenda of Prabhakaran has always been a separate state. His means of achieving this agenda is war. These are the two policies of his dream. So we have not been fooled by his varying statements for cease-fire and peace talks." President Chandrika Kurmaratunga insists that her government has no conditions, only LTTE has. "They want the military to withdraw from the peninsula which is a bit of a joke".

So the two warring sides are back to square one and have reached a dead end. The Sri Lankan government is hoping for Indian assistance to facilitate talks but at the same time is conscious of New Delhi’s limitations and its policy not to intervene again militarily since the story of the IPKF has left a "bitter taste in the mouth", as Kadirgamar put it. TheJanata party leader, Dr Subramaniam Swamy, whose comments on men and matters are sometimes bizarre, has for once hit the nail on the head with his observations that "the message from the decade of the 1980’s for India is crystal clear. We are damned if we do, and damned if we don’t. Most importantly, the Sri Lankan problem won’t go away if we look the other way."

The positive factor in favour of Indian intervention is that there appears to be a consensus in this regard both in Sri Lanka and in India. International opinion also is clearly in favour of a negotiated settlement with India as a facilitator. The United States is supportive of a Norwegian role as well as of any Indian move to provide humanitarian assistance. The negative factor is the apparent intransigence of the LTTE with its refusal to consider the devolution package offered by the Sri Lankan President and its talk of a "viable alternative". The LTTE may have a legitimate grievance that successive governments in Sri Lanka were not even prepared to grant autonomy to the minorityTamils and that the devolution proposals are too late and too little.

There are many pitfalls before the Vajpayee government, not the least of which is the ambivalent stand of some of the coalition partners from Tamil Nadu. The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is an emotional issue in the state, and there is no knowing how the pro-LTTE elements will react to the action that the Centre may eventually take. India has already burnt its fingers while dealing with the LTTE and will have to tread cautiously in trying to bring Prabhakaran round for meaningful talks with the Sri Lankan government. There is also no knowing if volatile Vaiko and Dr Ramdoss’s contradictory postures will create problems for the Centre. Who knows if the Vajpayee government will be able to rescue Sri Lanka from its present predicament or it will itself need a rescue squad in case some NDA constituents from Tamil Nadu choose to make a sacrifice in favour of the LTTE and decide to part company with NDA.