A new perspective on the Sino-Indian war
Reviewed by D S Cheema

China’s India War 1962
Ed Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM (Retd)
KW Publishers, New Delhi. Pages 332. Rs 920

The story of the 1962 Indo-China war has been told so many times in so many different ways that the reader does not expect anything which has not been said earlier. Fortunately, the contributors to this volume have analysed the causes and consequences of China’s 1962 war and the lessons India should have learnt, from a fresh and an unconventional minority-view angle. The book has been edited by a distinguished soldier, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, a Padma Bhushan awardee and defence expert, who headed the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) for many years and is presently the Director-General of the Centre for Air Power Studies.

Recent incursions by the Chinese in DBO Sector in Ladakh, have revived the sad memories of the humiliating defeat we suffered at the hands of the Chinese 52 years ago.

Most Indians perceive the 1962 war as an act of treachery, deceit and back-stabbing by a friend who launched an unprovoked aggression. This book brings to light the minority view of some military researchers that although we suffered a much higher number of causalities, a large number of our troops were captured as PsOW and we ceded huge tracts of land to the Chinese, India was not the poor innocent victim of war, we like to believe.

For an objective assessment, one needs an in-depth analysis of the politico-strategic setting before 1962. These would lead to complex dynamics of Indo-China relations, blunders by Indian political masters and strategic mistakes made by the military commanders at different levels. The Intelligence Bureau (IB), responsible for manning and managing the border before 1962, denies that one of the major factors that led to the stand off was Indian "Forward Policy," as reported in media. However, in face of the facts, the allegation of the Chinese sticks to some extent. China then had an entirely different worldview and was looking for leadership of the Socialistic Bloc and the world as a whole. Due to this, their aims and strategies of international relationship were very different from that of India, which was also seen as a competitor. Mao’s concept of "mobile frontiers" through a creeping process, complexity of US –USSR-China-India-Pakistan relations and the Tibet factor ultimately resulted in the war India would like to forget but can never do so. Jawaharlal Nehru’s pride, seen by many as arrogance, and his desire to see India playing a bigger role in world events as also Krishna Menon’s (the then Defence Minister) anti-Americanism were factors that led to the Sino-Indian War. After years of suspicion and self-doubt, China and India seem to have realised that they have no option but to move ahead without sticking to dogmas. In this background, this is one book which every proud Indian, who believes in "Chindia", should read with an open mind. The book is an invaluable source of information for India and China observers and thinkers, military leadership and students of all disciplines. It deserves a place in every library.

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