Fresh perspective & way forward

Ajay Banerjee

What the British did to demarcate a rather contentious India-Tibet boundary and its outcome on today's India-China relations requires a 'deep-dive' into British-Indian history and a sense of geo-strategy backed by an understanding of modern day real-politick.

Gen JJ Singh, a former Indian Army Chief (Feb 1, 2005-Aug 31, 2007) draws upon years of experience in the Army and then as the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh to bring out a well-researched in-depth book, The McMahon Line: A Century of Discord. He draws from a mélange of information from multiple sources — British, Tibetan, Indian — and offers a fresh perspective on the events of late 1800s and the early 1900s. 

He narrates, in the language of a well-rounded researcher, as to how the McMahon line — the de facto boundary between India and China — came about and what has happened over the past hundred years, including the conflict in October-November 1962. 

He makes a vital argument — based on documented evidence — that the Chinese never had any control over what is the modern-day Arunachal Pradesh. Surely, the mandarins in our own South Block as well as Beijing know about it. The former General, who was also the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh between January 2008 and May 2013, taps into local references, Tibetan and British records, to cite how the Chinese were trying to nibble away at the tribal areas in the north-eastern state by conducting some excursions briefly between 1910 and 1912, without ever taking control. 

Why the British stepped into an area dominated by hill tribes, now known as Arunachal Pradesh, is explained through an interesting turn of events between 1903  and 1914. The British first invaded Tibet in 1903-1904 and then, following a treaty with Russia, in 1907, backed off to have a 'hands-off Tibet' policy. This literally allowed China to step in, and reach a stage to declare sovereignty over Tibet in May 1912. Noticing the Chinese probes in the Himalayas in 1910-1911, the British responded to expeditions conducted by hill tribes and warned the Chinese not to interfere in the internal matters of Tibet. The General says the British were 'compelled' to give a new shape to their policies.

As such the McMahon line, named after Sir Henry McMahon, the British Foreign Secretary, following a meeting at Simla with the Tibetan and the Chinese officials in 1914 remains un-demarcated on ground. Beijing continues to claim large parts of the north eastern state terming it as ‘Southern Tibet’.

The former Army Chief also suggests a way forward for India and China. The book has ample documentation and referencing to act as a reminder of how India and China need to understand a simple fact. Their boundaries are no more than a flexible cartographic expression of the British 'forward policy' with no relevance to any modern-day principle of demarcating boundaries.

He reminds that people on both sides (India and China) are ignorant or have inadequate knowledge of this Himalayan frontier which has pressurised decision makers on either side to adopt a rigid approach. “No straight forward or universally applicable principle can be rigidly applied,” argues the General as he suggests a rational approach in dealing with China and resolving the existing dispute.

Arguing further about a new approach, he does not digress with what is already known in strategic circles. He suggests, and quite logically at that, about making adjustments. Leaving aside the populated areas, small adjustments of the boundary in the uninhabitated high-altitude Himalayan wilderness would be of interest to both countries as they move towards centre stage of world affairs, is his sincere advice.

Laced with factual anecdotes and events, the General recalls how during the Cold War (1945-1991), the US, in a way, sided with China in 1969. He cites the powerful Secretary of State Henry Kissinger having warned the Soviet Union that it would ‘act according to its strategic interest’ when the Soviet Army had a built-up on its borders with China and threatened to attack the Chinese nuclear facilities. The US-Soviet rivalry during the Cold war era is well documented. It remains unclear if the warning de-escalated the matter or whether it was the Cold War dynamics that sorted it. Moscow and Beijing resolved their boundary dispute in 1991 and 1994.