HC refuses to quash FIR against lawyer who ‘posed’ as magistrate

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has dismissed a petition for quashing an FIR registered against “a budding lawyer”, who allegedly impersonated as a judicial officer before fleeing from a traffic checkpoint. He had allegedly introduced himself as a Judicial Magistrate and had “tried to take undue advantage of the position by impersonating a member of judicial fraternity” after a police officer stopped him for alleged traffic violations.

Justice Surya Partap Singh’s Bench was told during the course of hearing that an FIR in the matter was registered on May 19, 2024, at the Sector 49 police station. The Bench was told that the petitioner drove a Scorpio with not properly visible number plate, refused to produce his driving licence, claimed to be a Judicial Magistrate, and fled the spot after police insisted on compliance during a traffic check at the Sectors 45/46/49/50 crossing. The police also alleged that a “Judge” sticker was affixed on the car’s windshield and that the petitioner obstructed a constable from discharging official duty.

His counsel contended that an altogether false story regarding obstruction in the discharge of duty and

cheating by impersonation was cooked-up against the petitioner out of vengeance. “Neither there is any

substance in the mentioned allegations nor any reliable evidence is available and that filing of FIR against the petitioner is nothing but misuse of authority by the police department”.

His counsel contended the petitioner had been complaining against the misdeeds of senior police officers

and other officers of the UT Administration.

“As far as the above-mentioned allegations and counter allegations are concerned the most significant fact qua allegations is that without proper appreciation of evidence, to be adduced at the time of trial, it is

not possible to arrive at a conclusion as to whether which of the two stories is true,” Justice Surya Partap Singh asserted.

The Bench cited the Supreme Court’s decisions saying, among other things, that “quashing of FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule” and that courts could not embark upon an inquiry into the “reliability or genuineness” of allegations at this stage.

As far as the present petition was concerned, the Bench asserted that deciding it required an assessment of the factual situation pleaded by the petitioner. Such an assessment could not be undertaken unless both sides were given an opportunity to lead their evidence. Any determination of these disputed facts at the stage of quashing, without proper evidence, was likely to result in a miscarriage of justice.