Courts need to view non-compliance of their orders seriously

For inactivity by state governments and other respondents after passing of orders and pronouncement of verdicts in cases, the courts need to initiate stricter action against the erring for noncompliance.

For years, the courts have held that the essence of contempt proceedings is to ensure compliance and implementation of judicial orders in letter and in spirit on one hand, and to ensure that the dignity of the court is not undermined by the public at large on the other.

But in a system where non-compliance of court orders is a norm, and action on it by the respondents only an exception, the practice of letting go the violators after compliance under judicial scrutiny has only brought about multiplicity of litigation.

The fact that non-initiation of action by the courts for non-compliance of directives further encourages passivity and fails to act as a deterrent for others is no more in the sphere of debate. The ‘we-will-get-away-with-it’ syndrome, stemming from the fact that those indulging in disdain are not taken to task once they comply with the orders after the issuance of notice on contempt pleas, has done little good to the institution.

The orders and directions passed after years of legal battle on the judicial turf, to begin with, are not complied with in a substantial number of cases, predominantly the ones involving governments and their agencies. Compliance follows filing of contempt petitions and that too after notice is issued and case taken up on more than a few dates.

The pleas, once the orders are complied with or assurance of observance is given to the courts, are disposed of as infructuous with observations that cause of action does not survive for pursuing the contempt petitions. Often, the petitioners find themselves armed with liberty to revive contempt petition in case assurances of compliance before the courts are not adhered to. The actuality that the petitioners are at times forced to exercise the liberty in case of repeated noncompliance is beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.

The courts have, indeed, been trudging on unfamiliar grounds by coming out with an extraordinary strategy to ensure compliance of their order on deciding representations. Disposing of petitions, the courts have been making it clear to the authorities concerned that they will end up paying costs in case directions on deciding representation are not adhered to. The efficacy of these orders to prevent the petitioners from invoking contempt jurisdiction is still in the domain of obscurity.

It is well-settled proposition that contempt of court consists of doing an act, not complying with the orders of the court or publishing writing calculated to interfere with the due course of justice. Broadly speaking, a person exposes himself to the perils of contempt by either indulging in an act that undermines the dignity of the courts, or by not complying with court orders.

The concept has its genesis in “early-modern” England, when courts were perceived more as an arm of the state, than institutions to check unrestrained executive powers. But the rod of contempt was not used liberally in the coming years.

British judge, Lord Denning, in Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1969), observed contempt “jurisdiction undoubtedly belongs to us, but which we will most sparingly exercise: more particularly as we ourselves have an interest in the matter. Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our dignity...”

Indeed, the courts are guardians of the Constitution, and their own rights and dignity. The law that has crystallised over the years also makes it clear that the court is well within its jurisdiction to order punishment for contempt for itself and the subordinate judiciary. The courts may not be endowed with unbridled rights under the contempt Act, but the powers are in abundance.

Spare the rod and spoil is a concept that has apparently been working well for the judiciary when it comes to preserving its dignity in case of acts that have the potential to corrode its majesty.

Such acts travel beyond the realm of noncompliance and are aimed at obstructing the administration of justice or lowering the esteem.

But the courts need not exercise restrain when it comes to wilful disobedience of directions or judgments. Heavy costs need to be slapped even if the orders are complied with after the issuance of notice on the contempt pleas, if the courts come to the conclusion that the initial disobedience or reluctance to comply with a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other processes of a court was wilful.

BENCH MARK
by Saurabh Malik

Law, and the order
Marriage no parting of ways with protection

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has made it clear that protection of life and liberty has nothing to do with the marital status of a couple or the validity of their marriage. The couple cannot be deprived of their fundamental right to seek protection even if the groom is not of marriageable age. The court has ruled that the Constitutional Fundamental Right under the Article 21 of Constitution stands on a much higher pedestal. “Being sacrosanct under the Constitutional scheme, it must be protected, regardless of the solemnisation of an invalid or void marriage or even the absence of any marriage between the parties”. Justice Arun Monga has ruled that it was state’s bounden duty as per the Constitutional obligations cast upon it to protect the life and liberty of every citizen. “The mere fact that the petitioner-groom is not of marriageable age in the present case would not deprive the petitioners of their fundamental right as envisaged in the Constitution of India, being citizens of India”.