After Balakot, LoC no longer sacrosanct : The Tribune India

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After Balakot, LoC no longer sacrosanct

NOW that the clouds of war have lifted after Operation Balakot and de-escalation has commenced, the tactical and strategic actions bear scrutiny for drawing some lessons.

After Balakot, LoC no longer sacrosanct

Alacrity: Pakistan was stunningly prompt in releasing Wg Cdr Abhinandan Varthaman.



Maj Gen Ashok Mehta (Retd)
Former GoC, IPKF, Sri Lanka

NOW that the clouds of war have lifted after Operation Balakot and de-escalation has commenced, the tactical and strategic actions bear scrutiny for drawing some lessons.

The February 26-27 air skirmish was the briefest in the history of India-Pakistan conflicts and among any inter-State conflicts. There have been crises — in 1984 and 1986 — about likely Indian attacks on Pakistan nuclear facilities; 1987 Operation Brasstacks; 1990 Kashmir standoff; 1993 Mumbai blasts; 1998 nuclear tests; 1999 Kargil conflict; 2001 Parliament attack; and 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. In each of these cases, US intervention was sharp and swift in preventing the crises from turning into a major conflict.

It was the first time one nuclear power conducted an air strike against another. This was the first conflict in which the US did not prevent one side (India) from militarising the crisis. Three days before the air strike, President Donald Trump had said: “India is planning something big…and it's a bad situation.” The US, in a sense, let India release its pent-up anger and Pakistan be warned to act against terrorism emanating from its soil.

Although India’s response was retribution for the Pulwama attack, it was the first time India targeted the source of terrorism and not just the launch pads, like in the 2016 surgical strikes. India carried out a classic counter-terrorism air strike against an elaborate training centre of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) at Jaba, Balakot. It was described as a “preemptive, non-military action in self-defence based on actionable intelligence…” This was ludicrous use of military terminology to distinguish Pakistani terrorists (strategic assets) from their owners, the military. India made this distinction during the ground surgical strikes, too, emphasising that the targets struck were terrorist launch pads, not Pakistan military posts. 

The contours of the aerial strike and Pakistani reprisals were narrated by the Foreign Secretary, the Air Force, the tri-service briefing and the Chief of Air Staff, in that order. India’s retribution was moved one step up the escalation ladder to the air strike.

Surprise and deception were secured by a combination of steps. The Prime Minister repeatedly kept saying that retribution had been left to the Army; yet, no mobilisation of troops or curtailment of leave of the armed forces was ordered. The Prime Minister announced in his Mann ki Baat programme that “retributive action was accomplished within 100 hours of the Pulwama attack.” The IAF, on the night of the attack, implemented deception measures like activating air fields deep in the south, using decoys, all to confuse the enemy that Bahawalpur, not Balakot, was the target. Pakistan’s Defence Minister admitted that their air force could not react as it was ‘very dark’ and the Director General, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), noted that combat air patrols could not be in the air 24x7.

To avenge the violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty by India, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) retaliated the very next day across the LoC in the Poonch sector. Their reaction was to resuscitate the image of the Pakistan military that had been tarnished by the Balakot raid, further burnishing their sense of humiliation inflicted in 1971. The PAF’s intrusions resulted in dogfights, one between an F-16 and a MiG-21 Bison flown by Wg Cdr Abhinandan Varthaman, who brought down the F-16 but was hit himself by an AMRAAM missile, forcing him to eject  and be captured. 

The decision by Pakistan to release Abhinandan as a peace gesture was taken with stunning dispatch, making his 60-hour captivity the briefest in the history of captured pilots. Once again, Trump played a pivotal role when he said: “There will be decent news soon.”

The conflict narrative transfixed on aerial combat and escalation swung dramatically towards the suspense-filled release of Abhinandan, becoming the turning point in hostilities; and for India, the inflection point: to escalate or exit with honour. Retribution had been achieved with total success, it was claimed. The decision not to escalate militarily but let other components of national power take over in keeping pressure on Pakistan was wise and prevailed. For the ruling party in India, the bigger battle was the upcoming elections. This distracted the government from turning the knife.

The signal to Pakistan is loud and clear: the LoC is no longer sacrosanct. A new red line has been defined. India will conduct counter-terrorism operations against terrorist bases on Pakistani soil if mass casualty attacks are carried out in India and are sourced from Pakistan. The cover of impunity has been lifted.

India’s defence and national security policy is based on three pillars: non-use of force (only with UN Blue Helmets); no military alliances; and strategic restraint. The last has been jettisoned, replaced with ‘strategic resolve’.

The euphoria and enthusiasm over the Balakot success has introduced into the India-Pakistan military balance some excitement with new metaphors like game-changer, paradigm shift, calling Pakistan’s nuclear bluff, lowering the nuclear threshold, new normal, etc. We need not be flippant or hasty in arbitrating Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. If AQ Khan is the father of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, Lt Gen SP Kidwai is the intellectual custodian of its nuclear policy. After spending decades in the nuclear establishment, he is currently the adviser to its Nuclear Command Authority. In 2003, he outlined Pakistan’s four nuclear redlines: attrition to Pakistan’s army, existential threat to Punjab, threat to the very survival of the State, and an economic blockade. Tactical nuclear weapons were designed to counter India’s Cold Start doctrine to punish mass casualty terrorism. There is no Pakistani nuclear antidote to an Indian air strike!

Some questions/thoughts remain:

(a) The government must issue a detailed damage assessment, including an estimate of the Balakot body count. During the 2016 surgical strikes, no number was put out — only substantial casualties claimed.

(b) What was an antiquated MiG-21 doing in the battlefield? It reflects abject neglect of modernisation and depleting squadron strength of the IAF, even as the Prime Minister makes tall claims about enhancing military capacities.

(c) The counter-terrorism campaign inside Pakistan will have to be relentless and also comprehensive and calibrated in J&K. 

(d) Why did India lose the perception battle? And will India have the will and capacity to do what Israel does against terrorism in its non-nuclear neighbourhood, ‘keep mowing the grass’?

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