Ballots and uncertainty in the eastern neighbourhood

THE year 2026 has opened with an unusually long chain of elections in India's neighbourhood, to the east of New Delhi. Altogether, approximately half a billion people in and around the Bay of Bengal will be witnessing ballot exercises. Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand are all holding General Elections before March. And Assam and West Bengal will have new state legislatures elected by May.

In some cases, elections hold much promise for political change and reform, especially in post-revolutionary Bangladesh and Nepal, where traditional leaders have faced the ire of Gen Z. Yet elections may also lead to unclear verdicts, hung parliaments, a leadership vacuum and a revival of revolutionary protests, all of which pose significant perils to political stability and India's regional interests.

From Kathmandu to Bangkok, this chain of elections is set against a challenging context of multiple socio-economic transitions. The Bay of Bengal region hosts one of the world's youngest populations, where, except for ageing Thailand, one in two citizens is under 30. In the case of Bangladesh and Nepal, the median age goes down to 25 (Assam 23).

The region is now experiencing an economic slowdown after sustained growth over the last 25 years. While only Sri Lanka has, so far, witnessed a financial collapse, there are concerning indications about Bangladesh and Nepal's ability to achieve their middle-income targets. Consequently, the social elevator risks slowing down, squashing hopes of millions for employment and upward economic mobility.

With one of the world's youngest populations, one should therefore not be surprised by growing political impatience and dissatisfaction across the region. Popular demands are rising, and the revolutions in Dhaka and Kathmandu indicate growing impatience and dissatisfaction with elections as a means of expressing discontent. On the supply side, the pressure on the state is piling up to deliver more, better and faster development solutions.

Myanmar's General Elections in January are the first time since the 2021 military coup. The new electoral law disbanded the National League for Democracy and the country remains engulfed in a civil war, with the Tatmadaw struggling to control more than half of the territory. Due to the absence of significant opposition, the army-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) is likely to consolidate power and delay democratisation.

Then, on February 8, Thai voters will return to the polls to elect their third Prime Minister in three years. Despite being one of Southeast Asia's top economies, Thailand's chronic political instability has hindered its escape from the middle-income trap. A hung parliament may well trigger another wave of mass protests, paralysing the country and, once again, limit Bangkok's attention span for foreign policy, whether it is its Look West policy towards India and South Asia.

February will also see Bangladeshis cast their double vote for a new parliament and a referendum on the July Charter, which includes significant constitutional and electoral reforms. With the Awami League banned and the interim government on its way out, one thing is sure: the elections herald a new generational and ideological leadership, marked by the mobilisation of a young electorate (embodied by the National Citizens Party) and a conservative tilt driven by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami.

On March 5, Nepal will hold elections for a new federal legislature. It is, however, uncertain whether the ballot boxes will bring in a new parliament that embodies the revolutionary, youthful spirit of protests that swept the country last September against corruption and inequality. One-third of the voters are under 30 and a record number of parties are contesting, but former Prime Minister KP Oli and other old faces are working hard to return to power.

Finally, before May, there will be two more elections to New Delhi's East, in Assam and West Bengal. With a total of 130 million people, these two states account for one-tenth of India's population and play a pivotal role in both Neighbourhood First and Act East policies. The new state legislatures in Guwahati and Kolkata will be increasingly involved in shaping the developmental and security terms of sub-regional connectivity, from migration to climate or trade and transit with the landlocked North-East.

For India's regional approach, this series of elections and political transitions will bring about two significant challenges for its Neighbourhood First policy. First, whoever takes on power, including so-called anti-India forces, Delhi will have to find pragmatic ways to double down on its regional economic and connectivity strategy. Interdependence is a hard sell these days. But across various sectors — from trade, energy and transportation infrastructure — India has achieved historic successes in implementing initiatives that were only dreamed of for decades. Whatever the difficulties, the focus must be on depoliticising connectivity for win-win development partnerships. India will have to develop a stronger policy and research ecosystem to assess neighbouring countries' developmental strategies and political economy.

Second, India will have to engage with a variety of new political faces and forces that are bound to emerge to its east. The future health of bilateral relations will hinge on New Delhi's ability to engage with a new generation of leaders, many of whom have minimal knowledge about India and, in some cases, negative perceptions. This requires greater diplomatic capacity and tact on the ground, as well as continued non-governmental engagement through bilateral academic, industry, and other civil society Track 2 dialogues that can survive and thrive during times of political tension.

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