China’s renewed interest in Shaksgam valley
The abrupt attention directed towards the Shaksgam valley coincides with a Chinese delegation’s meeting with the BJP and RSS in Delhi.
The Indian media recently observed the swift development of China's road network in the Shaksgam valley, which is backed by numerous construction sites, utilising Landsat satellite data from the global land imaging body USGS EROS Center.
The abrupt attention directed towards the Shaksgam valley coincides unexpectedly with the Chinese Communist Party delegation’s meeting with the BJP and RSS in New Delhi. Such underhand manoeuvres are not new, having taken place multiple times alongside major occurrences. This represents a shrewd strategy utilised by a group that persistently attempts to hinder a positive normalisation process. Consequently, this is the reason India lacks trust.
Chinese construction endeavours in Shaksgam are not a recent phenomenon. The People's Liberation Army has been monitoring the Shaksgam valley in West Karakoram since its influence expanded in Depsang (East Karakoram) in 2013.
India was undoubtedly not informed regarding the development of a new road in the Shaksgam valley trijunction. The past satellite imagery has shown that China's activities in this area began immediately after the 2017 Doklam tri-junction standoff.
Since 2018, China has improved its connectivity to the Aghil Pass. Open-source intelligence satellite images have revealed that China has built a 70-km road in the Aghil Pass area.
China's main objective regarding Shaksgam has been to shorten the travel from Kashgar to Skardu and Hunza via the G-219 highway, which traverses the Karakoram and the Aghil Pass. The present road is part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
In 1963, Pakistan formally ceded over 5,400 sq km of the Shaksgam region through a boundary agreement. However, the actual territories transferred to China encompassed the entire Karakoram-Tract, totaling 20,000 sq km in return for approximately 750 sq km.
However, according to Article VI of the 1963 Sino-Pak Boundary Agreement, it is stipulated that “The two parties agreed that after the resolution of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the relevant sovereign authority will reopen negotiations with the Chinese government regarding the boundary as outlined in Article Two of the current Agreement, to sign a formal Boundary Treaty to replace the existing agreement.” Since 1963, China has regarded the Shaksgam-Karakoram tract as provisional, with sovereignty subject to renegotiation, which should ultimately be resolved between India and Pakistan.
India had the chance to resolve the issue during the conflict in 1972; however, the Simla Agreement signed afterward left the disputes regarding the Siachen Glacier and the Karakoram Tract unresolved. The Simla Treaty did not clarify the final 100 km of the ceasefire line that runs from the end of the Line of Control to the border with China.
A decisive military operation in 1972 could have enabled India to reclaim not only the entire Siachen Glacier but also 5,400 sq km of Indian territory in Shaksgam and Karakoram Tract. The second opportunity for India to address the issue arose after the 1999 Kargil war.
The theoretical trijunction point of India, Pakistan, and China is presently situated near Indira Col, extending from Sia Kangri Point 7422 to Point 6599, covering a distance of 59 km, where the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) between Indian and Pakistani forces intersects with the Chinese border.
From NJ 9842, the AGPL delimitation line follows the Saltoro Ridge, which is under Indian control, although Pakistan disputes this and aims to extend the delimitation line eastward from NJ 9842 to connect with the Karakoram Pass.
At present, 75 percent of the territory of India that was transferred by Pakistan to China is incorporated into the Tashkurgan Tajik Autonomous County in Xinjiang, while the remaining 25 percent is situated in Yarkand Yecheng (Kargilik) County.
China continues to refer to the Indian Consulate building at Chini Bagh as the Pakistan-India Consulate. Since then, China has been actively engaged in the extraction of significant quantities of precious metals, gemstones, uranium, gold and copper from the Shaksgam Valley.
India has persistently expressed its formal objections to both Chinese and Pakistani officials concerning illegal efforts to change the status quo at the Daulat Beg Oldie-Karakoram Pass. The decision not to open the Karakoram Pass for trade has proven to be a poor strategy, even though the region is not contested and is regarded as an Internal Boundary (IB), rather than the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
The conflict has emerged in recent years as the PLA endeavours to construct a second road through the southern Karakoram range providing the PLA with access to the trijunction point near Siachen.
Former Army Chief General Bipin Rawat then dismissed allegations of any Chinese construction in the Shaksgam Valley, claiming that such an endeavour is nearly “impossible” and therefore “not a threat.”
It is also accurate to state that the Indian authorities have been overly preoccupied with perceived threats from the Tibetan front, neglecting the significance of the Eastern Karakoram sector.
Nonetheless, the strategic placement of the road along the Teram Sher axis could have profound operational consequences for India in the Siachen, Karakoram Pass, Daulat Beg Oldie, and Depsang regions, potentially escalating tensions with Pakistan.
Pakistani military forces, which previously did not have direct access to the Teram Shehr glacier, may now be positioned to cooperate with the Chinese at the trijunction, thereby posing a threat to Indian supply routes to the Siachen Glacier.
One possible approach for India might entail military intervention to secure the Teram Shehr glacier. Nevertheless, such a course of action could escalate into a three-front conflict, leading China to initiate additional confrontations in eastern Ladakh.
Over the years, India has significantly enhanced its infrastructure in the Karakoram region. Another alternative for the Indian military is to push beyond the Turtuk Sector to seize the Chorbat Lungpa Valley across the Shyok River and gain control over adjoining villages. This offers a distinctive opportunity to acquire land in Gilgit-Baltistan with minimal demographic impact.
