Force must be used as a last resort

THE Cockroach Janta Party has sought action against the police personnel involved in the crackdown on protesters in New Delhi on July 20, during which a student was injured in pellet firing. Rahul Gandhi, Leader of the Opposition, has endorsed this demand.

Having handled countless crowds throughout my career — starting soon after my early days of training at Mount Abu (Rajasthan) — I have learned that a mob possesses a distinct, volatile personality of its own. The central objective of mob management is to pierce that collective personality and force its constituent members to think once again as individuals.

To achieve this, the application of force is sometimes necessary. However, force is not always the only answer. Early in my career as the Additional Commissioner of Police (Crime) in Mumbai, I managed to disperse an agitated mob without using any force whatsoever.

The incident happened in Malad, where boys playing cricket got into a fierce argument. One of them hit another with a bat, causing his death. The assailant happened to be the son of a known gambling den operator from a minority community, while the victim was a Gujarati boy. Enraged, a large group of youths and local residents staged a massive dharna on the Western Express Highway right outside the Malad police station, blocking the vital artery connecting Mumbai to Ahmedabad.

Although the local police had already taken the perpetrator into custody, the crowd was dissatisfied. They demanded that the boy be handed over to them, presumably to face street justice.

A tense standoff ensued. I was ordered by the Police Commissioner to resolve the deadlock and restore traffic, which had been paralysed for hours. Rather than marching in with batons, I approached the protesting youths and asked them to explain what had happened, pretending that I was unaware of the details. Eager to be heard, they recounted the incident while I listened patiently. I then asked them, “Was the match played right here on the highway?”

“No,” they replied, “it was inside the neighbourhood.”

I suggested that they take me to the exact spot so that I could inspect it myself. Eager to cooperate, the crowd led me away from the highway. Like the Pied Piper, I managed to draw the entire crowd off the main thoroughfare. Traffic resumed smoothly and the situation was defused through dialogue and patience, without a single blow being struck.

Of course, the incident also exposed police negligence regarding the illegal gambling den operated by the assailant’s father; I ordered his operations shut down immediately.

The principle of using the minimum necessary force must strictly guide a command officer at all times. While every officer is trained in the riot drill protocol, the heat of the moment can cause ground commanders to lose sight of this doctrine. A competent police leader must remain calm and composed, systematically dismantling the mob’s collective energy.

However, relying strictly on minimal force is not always practical when a crowd turns violent. In such critical moments, a leader must make a split-second decision before control is lost entirely.

During the late 1960s, the Shiv Sena launched protests in Mumbai against “outsiders”. The party decided to prevent then Union Finance Minister Morarji Desai from entering the city unless he accepted a petition about their grievances. When the police blocked the protesters’ path, the demonstration descended into violent rioting. Shops belonging to non-Maharashtrians were looted and set ablaze.

As the Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) in charge of the Dadar area, I confronted a destructive mob at Gol Dak Khana. Sensing that peaceful persuasion and mild force were no longer viable, I made a tough call. I ordered a state reserve police jawan to fire a round from a rifle. As a result, the rioters scattered instantly.

Political interference will complicate these high-stress situations. A state Home Minister has no business micro-managing field operations or overruling police protocol. During the 1965 communal riots in Pune, the Home Minister sent his personal security officer to instruct field commanders — and even the Army units called in to assist — not to open fire under any circumstances.

As the DCP in charge of a severely destabilised area, I chose to ignore that verbal directive and ordered a round to be fired. Rioting ceased soon; the lawbreakers realised that the police would not hesitate to enforce the law. During the subsequent judicial inquiry, the Home Minister denied issuing the “no-firing” directive. It was a stark lesson for field officers who must rely on established rules of engagement, not the whims of ministers.

Years later, during the 1984 Mumbai riots, the government insisted on deploying the Army despite my assessment as Police Commissioner that it was unnecessary. I eventually conceded, but insisted on a counter-condition: the immediate preventive detention of Shakha Pramukhs (local Sena ward leaders) who were inciting violence.

Supported by then Chief Secretary RD Pradhan, I instructed all 51 Senior Inspectors that I would tolerate no leniency in arresting these key organisers. Though the Chief Minister faced immense pressure from Shiv Sena chief Balasaheb Thackeray to release his men, we held them in detention for 12 days, successfully breaking the momentum of the riots.

Reflecting on recent events at Jantar Mantar involving student protesters, I am puzzled by the handling of the situation. The Delhi Police reported that over 200 known anti-social elements embedded themselves among the protesters to incite violence. Preventive detention of such persons before major rallies is standard policing protocol across the country. Why weren’t they rounded up in advance? Leaving them unchecked invited predictable chaos.

Handling volatile crowds is a complex task — backseat driving is easy. Field officers do not take pleasure in confrontation; they take high-stakes, split-second decisions under immense pressure. If a mistake is made, it is not done on purpose.

Politicians like Rahul Gandhi operate within the realm of political strategy and public optics, and it is natural for an Opposition leader to capitalise on the government’s missteps. However, my priority remains the integrity of law enforcement. Frontline personnel carrying out lawful orders from their superiors must not be made scapegoats. Forces like the CRPF operate under strict hierarchy and discipline; if an anti-riot weapon was discharged, it was undoubtedly done under the explicit command of the seniormost officer on site.

Holding the personnel accountable for executing field orders undermines the fundamental chain of command necessary to maintain public order.