Giving bechirag villages hope on India-Pak border

THE recent decision of the Central government to conduct a social impact survey regarding the shifting of the barbed wire fencing on the Indo-Pak border in Punjab closer to the Zero Line will fulfil a long-pending demand of farmers in border areas who own land beyond the fence. It will bring major relief to more than 11,000 farmers in 279 villages who own about 17,000 acres of cultivable land across the fence.

According to official records, the actual number of such villages is only 212 (not 279). Villages have effectively disappeared because of the many hardships in the area, earning the moniker bechirag (uninhabited) or ghost villages.

Punjab has a 553-km frontier with Pakistan running through six districts of Pathankot, Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Tarn Taran, Ferozepur and Fazilka. It commences in the north where the west branch of the Ujh river enters Punjab's Gurdaspur district from J&K and ends in south-west Punjab, where the Sutlej river enters Pakistan in Fazilka district. Criss-crossed by the Ravi and Sutlej rivers, dozens of villages are located across these rivers in Gurdaspur and Ferozepur districts.

Emerging from the Radcliffe Award following the Partition, the border is marked by stones, pillars and fence, and is heavily guarded by the Border Security Force (BSF), involving an excessive security apparatus.

With the relations between the neighbouring countries hardly being cordial since the Partition, the border fencing was introduced in response to rising terrorist infiltration and the smuggling of weapons from across the border in Punjab during the 1978-93 period. It created severe livelihood problems for farmers in the border belt, especially for those whose agricultural land fell beyond the barbed-wire fencing.

Though the fence helped curb terrorism in Punjab, it also disrupted crop patterns, cultivation schedules and farm operations, along with several restrictions imposed on the movement of farmers across the fence.

The decision to fence the border was taken by the Central government in 1986 when Surjit Singh Barnala was Punjab Chief Minister. He constituted a high-powered committee under then Chief Secretary SL Kapur and asked it to look into the problems likely to arise from the border fencing.

The deputy commissioners of the three border districts of Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Ferozepur and some other senior officials of the state government were a part of the committee. Many recommendations were made, one among which was that the fencing should be just 50 to100 yards from the international border so that a minimum number of farmers were affected, and that they receive full compensation for the land acquired by the government.

However, these recommendations could not materialise for several reasons. The most important impediment was that the Pakistan government raised objections to this decision at various levels and started creating hurdles in the execution of the fencing plan. There was firing from the Pakistan side on workers assigned the fencing task, which began in early 1987, resulting in discontinuation of the fencing process.

The situation in the state was gradually deteriorating due to increased infiltration from across the border and soon, Punjab came under President's rule in May 1987. However, the Central government was determined to go ahead with the project. It ordered the authorities concerned to complete the fencing, giving top priority to the safety of the workers. Ultimately, the fence was put up at some places 2-3 km away from the border. The length of the border is 553 km, but the fencing was done along 462 km only.

As a result of the fencing, more than 17,000 acres of cultivable land fell across the fence which is manned by Border Security Force (BSF) in peacetime and the Army during wartime situations. The fencing left farmers insecure and helpless in their own country as agricultural operations across the fence are still regulated under the supervision of security forces.

The most painful irritant has been the denial of free access to their own land. It has not only thrown their lives out of gear but also deprived farmers, mostly marginalised, of their only means of subsistence.

Their working hours across the fields are limited and fixed at the convenience of the security forces. Due to structural problems, officially the farmers can work daily in their fields from 9 am to 4 pm, but the ground reality is different. Also, the timings of the access of farmers to their lands across the fence are subject to many other factors.

The cultivation of land across the fence is allowed only by farm machinery. The majority of the affected farmers have small and marginal landholdings and do not own tractors. They are dependent upon other farmers who own farm machinery for executing their agricultural operations. Such machinery must be registered with the BSF with a condition that its owners must own land across the fence.

Farmers must undergo rigorous security checks at entry gates, which includes carrying identity cards and inspection of lunch boxes, fertilisers, seed bags and farm implements. Tool kits are not allowed with any farm machinery. No farmer is allowed to take along labourers who do not have valid identity cards.

The farmers have to cover a long distance of more than 2 km on an average to reach their fields through the entry gate. There are 294 entry gates for the farmers, but only 273 are operational as per our own field study.

Another crippling restriction is that affected farmers are not allowed to grow (other than wheat and rice) crops that attain a height of more than three feet for security reasons. It deprives the farmers of the opportunity to optimise the production of crops and affects the fertility of the soil in their landholdings.

The other important issue is the market price and the rent of land across the fence, which is one-third of the normal price of non-fenced land. With no buyers for land across the fence and banks and cooperative societies not sanctioning loans, the farmers are forced to take loans from commission agents or other informal agencies at very high rates of interest.

There are many other such issues that adversely affect the lives of these farmers and their families. Thus, if the Central government implements its decision to shift the fence closer to the border and acquire land beyond the fence, it will ease farmers' hardship and strengthen border security. If the survey yields the desired results, farmers will at last, finally, go to their own fields at their own convenience to manage their land.