Illusion of reform in universities
Efficiency pursued in the absence of freedom encourages conformity, not creativity
The Higher Education Regulatory Bill, presented as a decisive break from the failures of the UGC, is being offered as a solution to institutional stagnation, bureaucratic inaccessibility and authoritarian intrusion. Aligned with the goals of NEP-2020, the Bill speaks the language of reform, autonomy, transparency and rationalisation. Yet, a dispassionate analysis is necessary.
The Bill emerged in 2025, a year when test-driven pedagogies along with AI-induced anxiety and the reduction of learning to employability results have diminished the intellectual culture of universities. At its heart lies a rejection of the UGC model. Over time, universities had begun to be governed less through academic judgment and more through disciplinary monitoring structures, metrics-driven systems and documentation-heavy accountability. The regulation of higher education became an end in itself, detached from the free and lived realities of teaching and critical inquiry.
The Bill sets out to correct this failure. By separating funding, accreditation, regulation and academic oversight into distinct functions, it claims to eliminate overlap, reduce arbitrariness and introduce transparency. Regulation, we are told, will be “light but tight”; governance will be simplified; institutions will be freed from micromanagement.
However, the Bill’s rhetoric belies a narrower truth in its proposal for technocratic recalibration, wherein universities are reimagined as mechanisms within a performance-oriented system, detached from the complex social, caste-based and linguistic realities that shape academia. Its emphasis on “rationalisation” and “efficiency” reflects a continuity with past approaches, recasting autonomy as compliance-dependent allowance rather than a reappraisal of the university’s position within a stratified society.
A paradox lies in the Bill’s embrace of performance-based regulation. While presented as a neutral mechanism for quality assurance, outcomes are never self-evident. The concerns that arise are: who defines them? The pedagogical gaze is conditioned by the tyranny of measurability, wherein learning is rendered legible only insofar as it conforms to quantifiable outcomes and intellectual labour is valorised solely through its alignment with pre-ordained metrics, thereby eclipsing the possibility of alternative assumptions about truth and the space for non-utilitarian forms of knowledge.
This contradiction is stark when read alongside the NEP’s commitment to creativity, critical thinking and multidisciplinary exploration. These values require intellectual risk, institutional trust and the freedom to fail. The Bill’s vision of efficiency thus sits uneasily with the university’s deeper vocation as a space of slow, critical and often irreverent thought in the marketplace of ideas.
Plus, the Bill invokes institutional freedom, yet autonomy without material security and academic self-governance is illusory. If funding is contingent on compliance with central frameworks, if accreditation becomes the mode of control and if regulatory bodies answer more readily to policy imperatives than to academic communities, then autonomy becomes merely rhetorical. The danger is a subtler form of control exercised through norms, metrics and incentives.
The Bill also assumes a level of institutional capacity and ethical governance that does not uniformly exist. Higher education is marked by disparities in infrastructure, faculty strength, regional access and historical privilege. A uniform regulatory vision risks reproducing inequality under the guise of standardisation. What appears as reform from above may translate into inequities and exclusion in institutional functioning
This is where the Bill’s euphoric tone becomes problematic. It assumes that restructuring governance will automatically revitalise intellectual life. But universities are dynamic social institutions shaped by power, ideology and history. Without confronting these structural verities, reform threatens to degenerate into a simulacrum of change, a rebranding exercise that masks stagnation beneath a veneer of novelty.
Consequently, the failure of the UGC should necessarily serve as a cautionary tale. Its decline was not merely structural but philosophical. It gradually abandoned the idea of the university as a site of critical autonomy and embraced a bureaucratic conception of control. If the new Bill does not explicitly safeguard intellectual freedom and academic self-determination, it may reproduce the same failures in a more efficient, technocratic form.
Reform, therefore, must transcend mere administrative rationalisation, embracing instead a democratic vision of education as a public good, a site of contestation and a locus of ethical responsibility. When institutional transparency is detached from relations of trust, it risks functioning primarily as an apparatus of surveillance; similarly, efficiency pursued in the absence of freedom tends to encourage conformity rather than creativity, while claims of institutional autonomy remain largely illusory if they are not accompanied by genuine academic authority.
The Bill, therefore, represents a vision of a streamlined system. Its trajectory hinges on whether it engages with the messy realities of universities and the intellectual labour they nurture. The future of education will be secured through the courage to defend the university as a bastion of critical thought in an era increasingly inimical to it. Reform without intellectual seriousness, humility and a commitment to freedom risks perpetuating a hollowed-out shell, bereft of purpose.



