India up against Hormuz dilemma
Tehran’s transactional diplomacy is a severe test of Delhi’s strategic autonomy
IN 2003, then Chinese President Hu Jintao’s acknowledgment of his country’s “Malacca dilemma” drew global attention to that Southeast Asian maritime chokepoint, even as the Indian Navy’s (IN) maritime strategy had long identified the Strait of Hormuz as the true jugular vein of global energy. Linking the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea, its closure would, according to the IN assessment, “severely affect the energy security of many nations, including India.” This vulnerability is shared by the world’s other leading oil importers, notably China, Japan and South Korea.
With India’s 23 oil refineries demanding over 5 million barrels of crude daily, the country’s economic and industrial well-being depend on the assured arrival of 2-3 very large crude carriers every day at our west coast ports. Similarly, one ship carrying liquefied natural gas must arrive at one of our “regasification” terminals daily to maintain the national gas grid. Apart from the pain that energy shortages will inflict on the economy and citizens, there will also be second-order adverse effects on sectors like fertilisers and pharmaceuticals.
Iran’s blockade of the crucial Strait of Hormuz is the spearhead of its determined response to the unprovoked US-Israel air campaign targeting Iranian leadership, nuclear facilities and missile infrastructure. The newly chosen Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Mojtaba Khamenei, has adopted a defiant “war of survival” strategy, in which weaponisation of the 30-km-wide Strait of Hormuz aims to achieve two disruptive aims.
First, by posing a threat to oil tankers with sea mines and low-cost drones, Iran has sent maritime insurance premiums and freight rates skyrocketing, paralysing shipping traffic. Second, by lining the strait’s northern shore with missile batteries and “swarms” of aerial and seaborne drones, Iran has created a formidable deterrent.
The US Navy has baulked at entering what it fears has become a “kill box” for its warships. By holding the global energy supply chain hostage, Tehran is issuing an ultimatum: if the US-Israeli alliance is hell-bent on wreaking destruction upon Iran, it will ensure that the global economy suffers intolerable damage.
By granting only conditional approval to Indian-flagged tankers and requiring “case-by-case” diplomatic clearances for each transit through Hormuz, Tehran is reminding us that while India may be a “major defence partner” of the US, it is physically tethered to the Persian Gulf. The emergent situation has confronted India with a “Hormuz dilemma”, characterised by severe restrictions on its energy supplies and the adoption by Tehran of transactional diplomacy. This represents not merely an economic crisis in the making but also a severe test of India’s “strategic autonomy”.
It is tempting to conclude that India’s current predicament is a direct consequence of its open alignment with Israel, but that may not be the full story. It is true that building on the momentum of the Abraham Accords, signed during the first Trump administration, the US-Israel-India triad witnessed unprecedented synergy, including radical initiatives like the I2U2 (India-Israel-US-UAE) economic partnership, also dubbed the “West Asian Quad”, and the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) connecting India to Europe via Israel. Underpinned by US strategic backing, these initiatives would have helped in the assimilation of Israel into its West Asian neighbourhood.
However, labelling India’s posture as a simple act of “ingratiation” ignores two major compulsions that shape its international relationships. Firstly, the geopolitical realities of a hostile neighbourhood, coupled with a laggard military-industrial complex, have pushed it to seek advanced military hardware as well as high-end weapon/sensor technology from abroad. Secondly, the prevailing economic-technological-military asymmetry vis-à-vis an assertive China requires that India seeks a hedge or partner in the Indo-Pacific.
In their anxiety to find obliging partners for the above, Indian statesmen and diplomats seem to overlook some simple realities. Firstly, the sheer magnitude of India’s military requirements makes it a most lucrative customer, and arms-producing nations do us no favour by selling hardware (mostly at outrageous prices). Not only do the cash advances paid by us help amortise a company’s R&D expenses, but there have been many live instances where shipyards, aircraft and missile manufacturers on the brink of bankruptcy have been rescued by a hefty Indian contract.
Secondly, every “strategic partnership” is a two-way street, and any nation that takes a considered decision to engage with India — the world’s most populous nation, having significant economic and military heft — has as much to gain from the relationship as does India.
India’s leadership must not consider itself “beholden” to any single power — be it Russia, the US, Israel or France — for its core security interests. The earlier we attain genuine self-reliance in key technologies — current and futuristic — the stronger will be our posture of “strategic autonomy”.
One hopes that populist political aspirations having been met, the nation will be able to allocate adequate resources to the serious pursuit of science and technology, which is the only path to the attainment of great-power status. PM Modi’s exhortation to attain Atmanirbharta must be faithfully implemented, not just as a slogan, but through heavy investment in R&D and by encouraging the spirit of genuine innovation among the youth.
The genocidal war in Gaza and the ongoing Persian Gulf conflict, coupled with the “civilisational” rhetoric emerging from the Trump administration, signal the demise of the post-WWII “rules-based order” and Western liberalism. This shift confirms Samuel Huntington’s 1996 prophecy of a “Clash of Civilisations” as an emerging reality, which is widening the schism between the Western bloc and the Global South. Clearly, discrimination on the basis of race, colour and faith is gaining over the spirit of universalism that we had briefly glimpsed.
In this turmoil, India must consider breaking its traditional mould to resume leadership of the Global South. Capable of engaging all sides, India is uniquely positioned to act as a bridge across these deepening divides. By spearheading initiatives in energy diplomacy, maritime security and climate justice, New Delhi can transform “strategic autonomy” from a defensive posture into a proactive leadership role that stabilises a fractured global landscape, while retaining its ethical moorings.






