NDS confirms the Trumpian playbook

IN the wake of the National Security Strategy (NSS) document issued by the US White House on December 25, 2025, came the National Defense Strategy (NDS) document released by the US Department of War on January 23, 2026. The NDS elaborates a roadmap to implement the NSS, though it has some new points of emphasis, some notable elaborations of key objectives and several glaring omissions which reflect altered priorities or impulsive, personality-driven initiatives. The Board of Peace, originally for peace and reconstruction in Gaza, has been unveiled at Davos with an ambiguous and broader remit presided over by Trump in his personal capacity, and not as US President. Yet, it was not anticipated in the NDS. One should not, therefore, over-interpret the NDS since President Trump is unlikely to be bound by its logic. The tactical and transactional character of US external relations under Trump has rarely conformed to an overall, internally consistent strategy.

The NDS reaffirms the NSS priorities to homeland security and the overarching importance of hemispheric security, with the US exercising hegemonic control over its western hemisphere, ranging from the Arctic in the north (including Greenland) to the southern tip of Latin America. Curiously, Antarctica is not mentioned, though its strategic importance is self-evident. One wonders why.

The next priority reflects the NSS in focussing on the Indo-Pacific. However, there is a more detailed description of the posture towards China but no reference to other key partners and allies such as Japan, Australia and India and the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Japan is only mentioned in passing as being threatened by North Korean nuclear weapons. The Quadrilateral — the Quad — does not figure in the document nor does AUKUS, the nuclear submarine alliance of Australia, the UK and the US. South Korea merits greater attention as an ally that is capable of defending itself against North Korea and only requires critical support from the US. This fine example of burden-sharing is obviously not applicable to Japan.

The NSS had emphasised the importance of deterring the Chinese threat to Taiwan and its importance in keeping intact the so-called "first island chain", a defence perimeter which commands access to the Western Pacific. There was a commitment to the US maintaining a "military over-match" as part of the deterrence against China. This term is missing with the emphasis now on maintaining a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific which "allows all of us to enjoy a decent peace."

What would a "decent peace" look like? This is not spelt out but what follows is unusually conciliatory towards China: "Fortunately, this peace is compatible with the interests of our potential opponents if they keep their demands reasonable and cabined."

"We do not demand their humiliation or submission. Rather we demand only that they respect our reasonably conceived interests and those of our allies and partners who stand stoutly with us. If we can acknowledge this, we can achieve a flexible and sustainable balance of power among the US and peace."

This sounds very much like "peaceful coexistence" that China advocates.

The NDS makes no mention of Taiwan and while deterrence remains the objective, the language and tone is different, perhaps reflecting the more optimistic outlook in the wake of the Trump-Xi Jinping summit held in Busan on November 30, 2025. The NDS makes the point that it would be unrealistic to think "that a threat to a person halfway across the world is the same as to an American."

Taken together, these articulations in the NDS can hardly be reassuring to Taiwan and US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.

To the extent that a shared concern over the expansion of Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific was a significant component in the perceived strategic convergence between India and the US over the past 25 years, the emerging and more positive equation between the US and China will necessitate significant readjustments in our foreign policy posture.

One such adjustment entails a broader and deeper strategic partnership with Europe, for which the fear of abandonment by the US has turned into a dangerous reality. The NSS and the NDS have relegated Europe to the geopolitical margins and made it clear that Europe will have to look after its own security. Worse, in Davos, Trump made it clear that even minimal support from the US was conditional upon Europe persuading Denmark to accept US sovereignty over Greenland, which Trump considers indispensable to western hemispheric security. The NATO allies were served up insults and abuse and threatened with another round of tariffs. They were accused of preventing peace in Ukraine.

Historians of a later time may well see Davos as an inflection point, when the West, as we have known it for at least the past century, had come to an end. When Canadian Prime Minister Carney described our current situation as representing a "disruption" rather than a "transition", he was not off the mark. India should take his suggestion seriously that the "middle powers" should work together to shape a new international order. Otherwise, as he warned, if they are not at the table, they are probably on the menu.

The Europeans are in a particularly vulnerable spot as they are threatened from three sides — Russia, China and now a hostile US. But India is vulnerable, too. There is a compelling logic to an India-EU axis and India has done well to extend a spectacular welcome to Antonio Costa, President of the European Council,  and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the EU Commission, as chief guests at the Republic Day function.

Another part of the coping strategy would be for India to give top billing to the forthcoming BRICS summit that it will host in July. It will be a gathering of some of the middle powers that the Canadian PM spoke about. A BRICS-EU-Canada forum in the future is not beyond the realm of possibility.