Peace deal in pieces

Tilak Devasher 
Member, National security advisory board

After nine rounds of ‘peace’ talks between the US special envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in Doha, President Trump, in a tweet on September 7, called off the exercise. He also called off secret talks with the Taliban and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, to be held at Camp David to personally clinch the deal. The reason cited was the killing of a US soldier in a Taliban suicide attack in Kabul.

As per media reports, the proposed agreement laid out a timetable for the withdrawal of around 5,400 out of nearly 14,000 US troops from five Afghan bases in 135 days. Within two weeks of the agreement, intra-Afghan talks were to be initiated. In reality, the agreement was less of a ‘peace’ deal and more of an ‘exit’ deal, because, as constituted, it was unlikely to bring peace to Afghanistan. It had several deficiencies: there was no agreement on a ceasefire; there was nothing in it for the legitimate Afghan government — the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan — that was excluded from the discussions; the US had to accept the Taliban word that they would not let Afghan territory be used for terrorism against other countries and deny safe havens to the Al-Qaeda (AQ); there was no clarity about the remaining US troops (8,600) for residual counter-terrorism (CT) and intelligence presence against the AQ.

The basic weakness of the US position in the negotiations was its desperation to exit due to Trump’s electoral calculations. The Taliban have had the upper hand throughout the negotiations, because they knew the US had a timeframe for withdrawal — the 2020 presidential election. This convinced them not to agree to a ceasefire. The US would probably have greater success if it were to delink negotiations from domestic politics.

There has been much speculation about why the deal was called off. The killing of a soldier could not have been the reason, because 16 US soldiers were earlier killed in 2019. By this logic, the US should not have continued talks with the Taliban in the first place. One reason could be the Taliban insistence that the deal be announced before the Camp David visit, thereby denying Trump the spotlight of clinching the deal. There were also reports that the Taliban Rahbari Shura — or supreme council — had stopped the group’s negotiating team from visiting the US, since any interaction with the Americans in Washington would have been viewed as abject surrender. So, Trump pulled the plug before the Taliban made their stand public. Another reason could be the strong opposition in the US to the deal, since nine former US ambassadors to Afghanistan warned that ‘there is an outcome far worse than the status quo, namely a return to the total civil war that consumed Afghanistan.’ Secretary of State Pompeo had also declined to sign on the deal.

What of the future? Three trends are apparent. One, the US has warned that things ‘are about to get worse’ for the Taliban. According to Pompeo, US forces have killed over 1,000 Taliban in the past 10 days.

Second, some have speculated that Trump’s announcement could be signalling US bargaining position — ceasefire and direct talks with the Afghan government — and, not necessarily, a permanent closure of talks. However, even though the doors of future talks have been left open, it is unlikely that they would be resumed soon. The US could reduce troop levels in the meanwhile, even without an agreement. Without some road map for an intra-Afghan dialogue, this could be hugely problematic.

Third, the suspension of talks has opened the door for the postponed Afghan presidential election on September 28. The election had been in doubt because it would have interfered with the intra-Afghan dialogue that was expected to begin soon after the proposed agreement. Though there are security concerns, a credible election is critical to have a legitimate government that can forge national consensus on talks with the Taliban.

The Taliban have certainly gained legitimacy from the negotiations. The US, in effect, recognised them as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the principal stakeholder in the agreement, and like a government-in-waiting. Despite the setback, the Taliban believe that the US will leave sooner or later. Their goal is to re-establish the Islamic Emirate and not share power. They do not believe in the constitution, democracy, election or women’s rights. They have threatened to scale up violence (as has the US) and disrupt the election. On September 17, two suicide attacks, one of which targeted President Ghani’s rally, killed 48, and could be indicative of things to come.

The military situation is stalemated. Despite reports about the ever-increasing areas controlled by the Taliban, the fact is that the war has become one of attrition: Taliban capturing districts, but being unable to hold on due to the government onslaught. According to Afghan media, the Taliban are taking heavy casualties. The military situation is not a win-win for them or a lose-lose for the government. If the Taliban were winning, they would hardly be negotiating. They know they can’t win so long as the US is in Afghanistan. 

Pakistan did not expect the talks to break down when everything seemed settled. This is a challenge since it could end up being blamed for not being able to convince the Taliban for a ceasefire. Pakistan is trying to project that developments in Kashmir have diverted its attention; the implication is to persuade the US to intervene in Kashmir. What, however, would be uncomfortable for Pakistan is that the Taliban have delinked the situation in Afghanistan from Kashmir.

For the moment, the situation looks bleak. There is bound to be an intensification of violence, especially in the run-up to the election. If the election is credible, the new Afghan government would be better placed to deal with the Taliban. If the election is discredited, or there is a run-off, Afghanistan will fall further into spiralling violence.