PoK turmoil rattles Pak rulers
People of the region are coming to terms with the painful reality that they are no longer special
THE events of the last two months in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) — protests by local residents, the brutal violence unleashed on them by the Pakistani security forces and a flawed election — frame an unexpected reversal of situations.
Neither the people of PoK nor anyone in Pakistan could have imagined that a region they revered as “Azad Kashmir”, the “base camp” for the campaign to liberate the rest of Jammu & Kashmir, would one day experience events that they thought happened only on the other side of the Line of Control (LoC).
The Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), the civilian face of Pakistan’s de facto military government, is poised to win the majority of the seats in the three-phase election (the unrest has forced a phased poll for the first time) that began in July. In scenes resembling elections in Kashmir, thousands of troops were deployed on polling days. The turnout was lower than in previous elections in the region, malpractices were alleged, including booth capturing and mass stamping of ballot papers, and results were declared after every phase.
The last phase on August 10 covering Poonch district — the area worst affected by the conflict — could not be completed, with polling postponed in seven of the 11 constituencies. Five of these are in Poonch district, including Rawalakot, where several people were killed when the Pakistani security forces fired at protesters in June and July, with the protests escalating each time. New dates for voting in these constituencies have not yet been announced.
The PML(N)’s majority is no surprise as elections in PoK have almost always been won by the ruling party in Islamabad. But it will be a crown of thorns for sure. Even now, people are continuing a sit-in at Drek in Rawalakot, refusing to accept bodies of their family members killed in the firing because the security forces are describing the victims as terrorists.
The continuing unrest makes it clear that the region cannot be taken for granted anymore by an entitled elite ruling class that runs on politics and hunts with the military, and is more at home among family and friends in the affluence of militablishment enclaves in Islamabad-Rawalpindi than in the rough environs of Muzaffarabad.
Moreover, people in PoK are upset that politicians with no roots in the region, whose forefathers came as refugees to Pakistan in 1947, enter the PoK Assembly by contesting from the 12 “refugee seats”. The voters for these seats are not PoK residents, but have lived across Pakistan’s four provinces since their arrival in 1947. Their total number adds up to no more than 4.5 lakh, of which 40,000 are Kashmiris and the rest from Jammu. The party that wins most of these refugee seats usually wins the election too.
Elected by a few thousand people, the “refugee” winners are given cabinet berths and they get to decide the lives of 4.5 million people with whom they have no connect. As a PoK resident said, “This is what colonisation feels like.”
Underneath their disconnect with Pakistan’s politics, the people of PoK have been coming to terms with a painful reality. They are not “special” anymore. They no longer have the same importance to Pakistan’s “jugular vein”, as Kashmir is often described in popular Pakistani discourse, that they had even a decade ago. And that realisation came from something as commonplace as the price of wheat flour.
There was a time when, in recognition of PoK’s importance to Pakistan’s campaign for making Jammu & Kashmir its own, Islamabad subsidised the price of atta for the residents of the region. The people did not view this as a gift from their patron, but as their right. After all, the water for Punjab’s wheat fields came from rivers that flowed through their land. Their electricity supply was also heavily subsidised, but then again the water for the hydroelectric projects came from rivers that coursed through PoK.
Some people in PoK even link the withdrawal of subsidies and the consequent steep increase in the price of wheat and electricity in 2022-23 to India’s constitutional changes in J&K that ended the state’s special status bestowed by Article 370, and the fact that Pakistan did nothing to resist it.
In the 2021 PoK election, both the PML(N) and the Pakistan People’s Party accused Imran Khan, then Prime Minister, of conniving with the Army to “sell out” Kashmir. Maryam Nawaz, daughter of PML(N) leader Nawaz Sharif, accused Khan of legitimising Indian actions with a plan to make PoK a province of Pakistan. There was also talk then that PoK might be merged into Pakistan’s Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.
The Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), a civil society group formed in 2023 to highlight public issues and advocate for the rights of the people of PoK, has been in the forefront of the protests in the region since then. The group’s 38 demands include doing away with the 12 refugee seats, better education facilities in PoK, improvement in healthcare services, better roads and other civic amenities, upgrading of power transmission lines so that residents are not condemned to flickering light bulbs, and more autonomy over their resources.
In 2024, the government accepted some demands, including the restoration of lower electricity rates and subsidised wheat. While the power bills came down, the wheat prices remained high, because, as sources in PoK said, permit holders were profiteering by smuggling the wheat to Afghanistan, forcing people in PoK to buy from the open market.
This year, after a promise to negotiate other pending demands such as doing away with the refugee seats, the government banned JAAC, a group that enjoys widespread non-partisan public support, as a “terrorist outfit” on July 6. Defence Minister Khwaja Asif said the protesters in PoK were an “enemy like India”; another minister called them “agents of India”, echoing India’s labelling of protesters in the Kashmir valley as “terrorists” and “Pakistani agents”.
On the other hand, the hatred for the Pakistani establishment that rules over PoK seems to be as strong as, if not stronger than, what Kashmiris feel towards the Indian establishment. India, therefore, has little to gloat over Pakistan’s troubles in PoK. In fact, by dragging its feet on the restoration of statehood to J&K, the Indian leadership risks being as much out of step with the people as the Pakistani leadership is on its own side.
Nirupama Subramanian is an independent journalist



