Punjab must push for a fair deal

Amidst the myriad issues raised by a section of the political class in Tamil Nadu, the time has perhaps come to once again revisit the question of regional aspirations and their accommodation within the Indian constitutional scheme.

Undoubtedly, there is a strong case to revisit the unfulfilled aspirations of at least one north Indian state that bore the brunt of the Partition — Punjab. It was really the dismemberment of two of India’s border provinces — Punjab and Bengal. Punjab suffered greatly as a consequence of the Partition, colloquially referred to as Ujaara (devastation) and not Batwara (Partition).

The case of Punjab was unique, if not peculiar. Out of the 2.5 million-strong British Indian Army at the end of World War II, 3,60,000 soldiers were from Punjab, including Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus, in that order.

They constituted 62 per cent of the combatant forces. The two main occupations were agriculture and services in the armed forces. The lands of the Sikhs and Hindus got predominantly left behind in West Punjab (Pakistan) and a demand for constitutionally guaranteeing the percentage share of the partitioned province in the armed forces at the pre-1947 levels was not accepted.

When the Constitution had to be finally adopted, several Sikh members of the Constituent Assembly — Baldev Singh, Gurmukh Singh Musafir, Ranjit Singh, Suchet Singh Aujla, Rattan Singh Lohgarh, Partap Singh Kairon and Joginder Singh — supported the motion and became signatories to the statute.

Hukam Singh and Bhupinder Singh Mann refused to sign. The former went on to become a Member of Parliament, Deputy Speaker, Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Governor of Rajasthan. Nobody labelled both as anti-national or attributed motives to their decision or held it against them. Nobody pilloried and vilified them, as is the staple of proto/pseudo-nationalists today. This conduct bears eloquent testimony to the sagacity and sense of accommodation of those who incubated the modern Indian state in its nascent years.

Articulating the reasons for not voting for the motion in favour of adopting the Constitution on November 26, 1949, Hukam Singh pointed out a number of deficiencies in the draft statute, most importantly that it did not fulfil the aspirations of the Sikh community.

He, however, made a very important economic point holistically germane to Punjab, though expressed in the context of Sikh grievances: “The whole economy of the Sikh community is dependent upon agriculture and Army service. Lands have been left in Pakistan and their proportion in the Army since the Partition has been greatly reduced and is being reduced everyday...” The latter point was with regard to seeking economic safeguards in the context of recruitment in the armed forces.

However, herein lies the conundrum. There were not only Sikh members from undivided Punjab in the Constituent Assembly but also prominent Hindu members — Lala Achint Ram (father of former Vice-President Krishan Kant), Bakshi Tek Chand, Bikram Lal Sondhi, Chaudhary Ranbir Singh, Master Nand Lal, Kaka Bhagwant Roy, Jairamdas Daulatram, Chaudhary Suraj Mal Singh, Thakur Das Bhargava, Nand Lal and Prof Yashwant Rai.

The Muslim members had left to join the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan that first met in the Sindh Assembly building in Karachi on August 10, 1947.

Could the remaining Hindu and Sikh members collectively not have negotiated a better deal for Punjab in the constitutional scheme, given that the ‘nau maas da rishta’ had just been further consecrated and consolidated in the flaming cauldron of the Ujaara?

After all, Jammu & Kashmir, which had lost a substantial part of its territory to Pakistani raiders in October 1947, was able to get Article 370 inserted into the Indian Constitution in Part XXI under the rubric of Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions. It is another matter that the Article was repealed in August 2019.

J&K was able to negotiate a constitutional niche for itself at the inception of the Constitution, but Punjab did not or could not do it, even though two million of its people died and twenty million were displaced in post-Partition fratricide.

J&K was not the only state to negotiate a special arrangement. Article 371 provides for special development boards for Vidarbha, Marathwada and even the rest of Maharashtra, as the case may be, and for Saurashtra, Kutch and the rest of Gujarat.

Then, Article 371A was inserted with regard to Nagaland. The northeastern state, in fact, was able to negotiate control over its underground mineral wealth as the Article provided that no Act of Parliament with respect to ownership and transfer of land would apply to Nagaland unless a resolution to that effect is passed by the Legislative Assembly.

It was followed by Article 371B with respect to Assam in 1969, Article 371C (Manipur), Articles 371D and 371E (Andhra Pradesh), Article 371F (Sikkim), Article 371G (Mizoram), Article 371H (Arunachal Pradesh), 371-I (Goa) and Article 371J (Karnataka).

Most of these Articles, including the repealed Article 370, dealt with border states. It is an example as to how Constitutionalism was utilised to try and integrate India’s periphery into the mainstream given that the Imperial British never had a border policy but rather a frontier policy.

It is not as if undivided Punjab did not have learned members in the Constituent Assembly. Was it the quintessential sense of sacrifice and pride which had evolved over myriad invasions that prevented them from seeking and getting what was rightfully due to Punjab? This error or omission, advertent or unintentional, needs to be probed with some serious scholarship. Successive generations of parliamentarians, unfortunately, could do no better for Punjab.

Punjab had to face not only the horrors of the Partition but subsequently the wars in 1965 and 1971, and then 15 years of Pakistan-sponsored militancy that left it emotionally, economically, politically and socially exhausted. The debt accumulated during the years of militancy continues to be a part of its economic burden.

Punjab needs a new economic deal within the Indian constitutional and federal paradigm to prevent it from backsliding further. For that, however, the political parties and the intelligentsia of the state have to look beyond immediate and narrow partisan considerations and make common cause for the common good.

Are they up to the challenge?