DT
PT
Subscribe To Print Edition About The Tribune Code Of Ethics Download App Advertise with us Classifieds
search-icon-img
search-icon-img
Advertisement

Reforms must give us a cutting edge

Structural constraints and legacy issues related to India’s defence R&D need to be addressed
  • fb
  • twitter
  • whatsapp
  • whatsapp
featured-img featured-img
Imperative: The DRDO needs an objective techno-strategic audit by independent experts. PTI
Advertisement

INDIA’s composite defence and military ecosystem is critical for ensuring that national security and sovereignty are not endangered. This domain has been accorded priority by Prime Minister Narendra Modi since he assumed office in 2014.

The need for a holistic review and necessary reforms was long acknowledged — an issue that the late Dr Manmohan Singh often flagged in his interaction with the military top brass — but the institution remained reluctant to go down this path.

During his second term, PM Modi announced the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff. However, the task of initiating defence reforms is mammoth, and it remains a work in progress. The entire organisation that is the responsibility of the Defence Minister is like an octopus, whose many tentacles — some going back to the colonial period (ordnance factories, for example) — are insular, prickly and tenaciously resistant to change. This, incidentally, is not an Indian trait. Most militaries the world over are steeped in tradition and slow to adapt to change — this is part of the institutional DNA.

Advertisement

Thus, it is encouraging to note that in PM Modi’s third term, 2025 has been designated as the ‘Year of Reforms’. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh highlighted this move at the 67th Foundation Day of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) last week. He dwelt on the crucial role the organisation could play in realising the objectives of these much-needed reforms.

In a nutshell, the core objectives of India’s defence reforms are: One, to move the needle of national combat readiness, as warranted by national security and shaped by contemporary techno-strategic and geopolitical compulsions; and two, to reduce dependency on external sources that provide critical platforms/inventory items/technology. The DRDO and the larger national scientific and manufacturing ecosystem have a major role in this endeavour.

Advertisement

Rajnath Singh exhorted scientists to improve their core competencies and set an ambitious benchmark. He added, “The DRDO should aim to become one of the strongest research and development organisations in the world.” He also commended the design team that enabled the success of the Long-Range Hypersonic Anti-Ship Missile, which is the most recent feather in the sparsely burnished DRDO cap.

However, the structural constraints and legacy issues related to India’s defence R&D and manufacturing need to be addressed if the stated objective is to be realised. India does not figure among the top R&D nations of the world, and the defence sub-sector has a relatively modest record in terms of investments and scientific output over the decades, barring a few islands of innovation.

In September last year, DRDO Chairman Samir V Kamat pointed out that India spent only 0.65 per cent of the national GDP on R&D. The contrast with other nations is striking. Their respective R&D spending as a percentage of the GDP is: the US, 2.83; China, 2.14; France, 2.19; and South Korea, 4.8. Kamat added that the government was aware of this insufficiency and that over the next few years, during Modi 3.0, this modest figure will hopefully rise to 1 per cent of the GDP and be doubled to 2 per cent by 2035. But on current evidence, this is a low-probability exigency and may need a major political intervention, especially since the whole defence budget just touches 2 per cent of the GDP.

The legacy challenge for the DRDO and the extended defence-military ecosystem is that India continues to have high dependency on foreign imports to maintain its minimum combat readiness. In the decade from FY 2012-13 to 2021-22, as per a report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, India’s capital expenditure for military inventory acquisitions and modernisation in foreign exchange was above 35 per cent; it hit 49 per cent in one year.

This proportion blunts India’s claim to credible strategic autonomy. PM Modi’s prioritisation of ‘atmanirbharta’ (self-reliance) over the past decade is laudable, but the gestation periods are very long and a broad-brush review of the DRDO and defence public sector undertakings (DPSU) indicates a pattern that needs a review.

Over the past seven decades since its founding, the DRDO, along with other organisations, has achieved commendable success in the strategic domain of military capability (nuclear weapons, missiles, nuclear propulsion) despite India being under US-led technology sanctions for three decades. However, the track record in major conventional platforms has been below par. Whether it’s the main battle tank, fighter aircraft or submarines, the DRDO-DPSU team has not enhanced the country’s combat capability in a significant manner.

The current focus on government-private sector-academia cooperation is welcome, but the procedures and timelines are yet to attain necessary traction. The biggest weakness for India is that despite other indicators, such as a large GDP, a substantial HR gene pool and a viable higher education network, original design of military equipment has largely been missing. Despite limited success with the Ishapore rifle and the HF-24 Marut fighter aircraft in the 1960s, India is yet to acquire credible indigenous military design capability. (Warship design is an exception, but that is not under the DRDO umbrella). Consequently, even personal weapons for soldiers are imported. This is incongruous for a nation that is missile-capable.

Specific to the DRDO, while welcoming this emphasis on reforms, what would be desirable is a deep and objective techno-strategic audit of the organisation over the past five decades by a blue-ribbon team of independent experts. Their findings may provide a better roadmap to ensure that the proposed defence reforms do not go down a non-productive path in relation to national combat efficiency.

PS: Can the current prioritisation of producing chariots by the DRDO and erecting of statues by the Indian ‘fauj’ be reviewed as part of the reforms?

Advertisement
Advertisement
Advertisement
Advertisement
tlbr_img1 Home tlbr_img2 Opinion tlbr_img3 Classifieds tlbr_img4 Videos tlbr_img5 E-Paper