Viksit Bharat is our grand strategy

IN the midst of a turbulent, uncertain world destabilised by its most powerful nation, it is worth asking what exactly is India’s grand strategy and are our policies, at home and overseas, serving the cause of pursuing the goal of Viksit Bharat that we have set for ourselves.

In his monumental study, Strategy: A History (2013), Lawrence Freedman says a strategy is about “getting more out of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest. It is the art of creating power.” Power itself, as we know from Bertrand Russell and many others, has multiple dimensions. Hence, strategies come in all shapes and sizes with varying durations of execution.

What, however, is a ‘grand strategy’? On this too there are multiple definitions depending on the sphere of activity one is studying. Militaries, businesses and, indeed, nations have their ‘grand strategy’. A long-term plan for not just the ‘creation of power’ but also its retention and deployment.

What then is India’s ‘grand strategy’? It is now commonplace for many to suggest that ‘multi-alignment’ is today India’s grand strategy, just as non-alignment was. This is a wrong way of viewing both concepts. Non-alignment, multi-alignment and indeed even alignment are only means to an end. They are not ends in themselves.

India’s grand strategy, as my intellectual guru on this subject, the late K Subrahmanyam, often said, is its re-emergence as a developed nation, recognising that “Knowledge, not weapons, will be the currency of power in this century.” Subrahmanyam wrote in a 2012 essay, “The Constituent Assembly’s oath in 1947 implied that India would promote world peace for the welfare of mankind, including its own population, and it would assume its rightful global position by developing itself to the standards of the industrialised world.” This, he suggested, was as good a definition as any of India’s grand strategy.

An overpowering idea that captured the imagination of the leadership of the Indian national movement was that the Indian subcontinent had once been home to a prosperous economy and even as recently as the 18th century, it accounted for one-fourth of the global economy, with China accounting for another one-fourth.

As the painstaking statistical work of the British historian Angus Maddison showed, both China and India had each accounted for close to 25 per cent of the world’s income in 1700. This had shrunk to less than 5% for both by 1950. Both countries overthrew colonialism and have sought to regain their share of the global income.

Independent India’s national agenda — its grand strategy, so to speak — has been to seek an international order that would enable it to pursue its economic development and modernisation, seeking to restore its due status in the comity of nations and its due share of world income and trade.

There is, however, a caveat. As Subrahmanyam says in the 2012 essay, “The other aspects of India’s grand strategy related to governance and development. No other country is comparable to India in terms of its diversity of religions, languages and ethnicities. Consequently, unity is only possible under a secular, pluralistic, democratic and quasi-federal constitution.”

In relating the pursuit of economic development to a conducive global environment, Subrahmanyam emphasised that the character of the Indian political system and governance at home is an important second leg of India’s grand strategy. This should never be forgotten.

Consider the present moment in world affairs. Are the actions of the US and Israel likely to create a global, and regional, environment conducive to India’s economic development? If not, should we not be objecting to their actions rather than remain mute? Will the destabilisation of West Asia not slow down India’s journey towards Viksit Bharat? If so, does the Modi government’s present stance fit in with our grand strategy?

Our strategic partnership with the US was based on the assumption that the US would be a partner in the pursuit of India’s grand strategy. Recent developments and statements from the Trump administration suggest that the US can no longer be regarded as a ‘strategic’ and ‘trusted’ partner in the pursuit of such a goal.

Our global personality as a liberal, plural and secular democracy has been defined by our constitutional principles and values. If the world is becoming less tolerant of such values and if nations led by leaders who are bigoted and authoritarian are becoming more assertive, ought we not to reiterate our interests based on our grand strategy?

The military and economic policies of major powers are not creating a global environment that would be conducive to India’s emergence as a developed economy and a liberal, plural and secular democracy. Against this background, how we govern ourselves at home and pursue our development becomes even more important.

Are the policies being followed at home likely to help us meet the goals of Atmanirbharata and Viksit Bharat? An increasingly communalised ruling dispensation that pursues policies that slow down economic development and make it less egalitarian is, by definition, not pursuing the goal of Viksit Bharat as defined by our constitutional view of a grand strategy. It is precisely for this reason that the Modi government should take a more long-term view of developments at home and overseas and examine whether they serve our national interest.

The problem with much scholarship these days is that it views domestic and global events in a piecemeal manner without grasping their impact on our goal of becoming Viksit Bharat. With fundamental changes taking place in the global system, it is necessary to evaluate who India’s partners really are in the pursuit of the goal of Viksit Bharat. The task at hand, to be sure, is entirely in our hands, but the external environment matters too.