What went wrong at Jantar Mantar

I watched some of the proceedings at Jantar Mantar on July 20. The crowd of protesters was humongous and, by comparison, the law-and-order forces appeared to be inadequate. Large, unruly crowds and inadequate police personnel are the essential ingredients that create a very volatile situation. As I think it over, it’s obvious that the response to the Sansad Chalo call given by the Cockroach Janta Party was grossly underestimated. As a result, the response of the forces was insufficient.

Looking back at the events, it was a fast-developing situation once the word “cockroach” had entered the discourse. The man from Boston tried to create his own version of the “Tea Party” in New Delhi by giving a call for a march on Parliament. The decision to allow or disallow a gathering or protest is not the sole purview of the police but of the civil administration.

The police force is an instrument of the State and its professional conduct can be the difference between a situation escalating or diffusing. The window of preparation and planning was missed by the authorities as they didn’t assess the scale of the march adequately and the situation snowballed into an unequal confrontation.

Usually, whenever such a march is announced, the administration at the ground level goes into overdrive. The district magistrate and the Superintendent of Police meet, along with officers of the intelligence agencies, and assess the threat level and draw contingency plans to meet it. Force levels are assessed and the availability of lathi squads, tear gas, armed components, etc. is estimated. If more manpower and material are required, necessary requisitions are made.

The officers assigned to supervise the arrangements are listed out and only those with proven experience in handling such situations are picked. Alongside, executive magistrates are nominated and paired with police officers. The area is divided into sectors, and these officers are given specific areas of operation. Overall, a very senior officer is deputed to oversee all the arrangements and ensure that all the above factors have been taken care of. He briefs the officers of all departments and they, in turn, brief officers and men in their areas of responsibility.

Briefing is of the utmost importance so that they understand to the last man the threat and their response. The use of force is based on the principle of minimum use to obtain the desired result. Officers and personnel must remember that these are our own brethren, and we are not to treat them as enemies. Minimum force must be used to obtain maximum results. The whole operation must be closely supervised.

The tear gas squad must be kept separately at a strategic point under the supervision of a Gazetted Officer (GO), and it should function only on his orders. Similarly, any armed squad must be available at a safe place under a GO and act only on his orders. Tear gas weapons and other arms should not be given to the general force, which should be equipped with regulation lathis only.

Another very essential component of the arrangements is the control room, which should be set up near the area of operations and manned round the clock by senior officers. The latest communication equipment should be available at the control room, as also by the officers in charge of sectors, and an effective channel of communication should be established.

Senior officers should be in this control room — both police and executive officers should not remain confined to their offices. Once the arrangements have been made, officers and men briefed and rehearsals conducted, the senior officers should liaise with intelligence agencies for latest updates regarding crowd strength and intentions. If possible, senior civil and police officers should meet the organisers and impress upon them the importance of an orderly and peaceful protest. This attempt should be made at various levels, and it usually produces good results. That day, I saw on TV a lone policeman firing tear gas shells with no visible sense of direction or purpose. Similarly, groups of protesters while running were being chased by policemen armed with all kinds of lathis and sticks. They would catch hold of one or two protesters and beat them up.

The activity of a uniformed force has to be an organised effort; a lathi charge should be conducted by a body of men and be effective in dispersing their target. A random, disorganised charge achieves no positive result — it only leads to accusations of brute force or outcomes such as head injuries. Force must be used under supervision — controlled, measured and sufficient to achieve the objective of crowd dispersal. The objective is not to vanquish an enemy at all costs as that only results in more protests and provokes the people.

Once the objective is achieved, an orderly withdrawal of men and materials should be made effective. Every person, lathi, tear gas shell and bullet should be accounted for. The injured officers and protesters must be looked after and taken to designated hospitals, if needed.

The subject is vast, and I have tried to encapsulate the importance of planning and following the old laid-down procedure and regulations. The Delhi administration would do well to hold an in-house, in-depth inquiry into what happened and what could have been done to prevent it. The problem today is that much of the prescribed procedure is ignored or at best given scant attention. There is much to be said for the importance given to regular training and inspections by the officers and training academies of earlier times. Today, much has been lost in the culture and conduct of our police forces and, in fact, in the entire criminal justice system.