Why it is vital to document a national security policy

N N Vohra, a passionate advocate of defence and national security, has held important positions such as Defence Secretary and Principal Secretary to the PM. India's National Security Challenges is the Vohra-edited seminal collection of essays which he has discussed at the India International Centre with both Chiefs of Defence Staff, the late Gen Bipin Rawat and Gen Anil Chauhan, and held several public debates.

In the latest discussion on February 28, he emphasised two issues: the absence of a national security policy; and lack of transparency in the national security discourse. He listed the litany of woes: single service approach, inadequate higher defence management, lack of cross-domain connects and failure to integrate internal security with external security challenges. He has advocated a separate ministry for internal security. Along with former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, he recalled that three national security policy drafts were prepared, one endorsed by NSA Shiv Shankar Menon, but none saw the light of day due to fear of accountability by the political leadership. A fourth draft is likely lying with NSA Ajit Doval, collecting dust.

During his one-on-one with General Chauhan last year, Vohra got him to admit that a national security doctrine was indeed required and "something was being written." However, earlier, on May 29, 2024, during the release of Lt Col Gautam Das’(retd) book Indian Art of War for Future Challenges, when asked about the national security policy, General Chauhan had replied: "A written policy is not needed….We have fought wars for the last 70 years and have managed well…." Elsewhere, later that year, one of General Chauhan's acolytes, a cerebral General, concurred with him on not codifying the doctrine, saying: "It is in our head."

Modern statecraft is managing and safeguarding national interest predicated on written plans and contingencies for execution by different instruments of state. The security strategy should emanate from a holistic strategic defence and security review, that would lead to defence and security planning, resource allocation as a percentage of GDP, higher defence organisation and capability creation with inherent flexibility in an era of uncertainties and massive disruptions. Deterrence, diplomacy and development have to adapt to changes.

US President Trump has set the cat among the pigeons over his plan to end the Ukraine conflict. Suddenly, Europe and NATO, likely to be decoupled from the US, are scrambling to enhance defence budgets not just to 2 per cent, but 5 per cent. Russia is the enemy, but apparently not for the US. In 1991, after the dissolution of the USSR, CDS Field Marshal Lord Bramall told me that the UK no longer had an enemy. "We're looking for one," he said. They have found one.

Lack of long-term defence planning has led to frightening operational situations. Among many, the one staring India in the face for two decades has now exploded: IAF fighter squadrons depleting to less than 31 squadrons, when 42 squadrons are authorised. In an unprecedented admonition of the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Air Chief Marshal AP Singh recently said that HAL had failed to provide LCA at the promised rate of supply, adding: "I am not confident of HAL. It is not in mission mode." While the IAF requires 35-40 jets every year, HAL has promised 24 LCA MK1A in 2025. The rest, Singh says, can be provided by the private sector. With the AON for 114 MRCA out of sight and no mention of GE414 engine in the Trump-Modi joint statement last month, the IAF will face a daunting situation that, one former IAF C-in-C told me last week, would render the IAF unable to support a two-front situation. He recalled that during his time (1986-2002), the IAF held 39 and a half squadrons, with defence spending being 3-4 per cent of the GDP.

Christopher Clary, international affairs and security expert, currently with the University of Albany, has reported that between 2014 and 2024, while China and Pakistan added 435 and 31 jets, respectively, India's inventory depleted by 151 jets (International Institute for Strategic Studies figures).

Prime Minister Narendra Modi believes this is not an era of war and describes India as a land of Buddha, not yuddha. That is why his reliance on Agniveer. Deterrence and capacity-building cannot be developed on the assumption that there would be no war and with just 1.9 per cent of GDP for defence.

Vohra's focus on opacity is illustrated by the wide disparity between the Chinese and Indian readouts after the October 2024 disengagement agreement in east Ladakh. The Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India–China Border Affairs (WMCC) statement of December 5, 2024, saying that all issues that emerged from 2020 had been resolved contradicted Foreign Minister Jaishankar's statement in Parliament on December 3: "We will be discussing de-escalation (de-induction) as well as effective management of our activities in the border areas." There is no transparency on patrolling rights, grazing and future of buffer zones. Both former Army Chiefs — General Naravane and General Pande — and COAS General Dwivedi have called for the restoration of status quo ante (May 2020), a pipedream.

In January this year, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh declared 2025 as the year of reforms, though the political elite has failed to appreciate the strength of military power.

Marc Faber, military historian, has said: "India continues to be ambivalent about power; has failed to coin a strategic roadmap (national security policy) commensurate with its growing economic wealth and use military instruments in support of national interests."

India's complacency stems from the illusion that it is in a sweet spot. It is lack of political will that fails the government in documenting a security policy and implementing reforms that ensure there is no deterrence failure, as in Kargil, attacks on Parliament, Mumbai and Galwan. Vohra is repeatedly warning the establishment to reform and build deterrence.