Courts can pull in any accused the moment evidence points finger: HC

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that a trial court may summon even those not originally chargesheeted solely on the strength of an injured eyewitness’s examination-in-chief. The Bench made it clear that Section 319 of the CrPc existed “to ensure that the real perpetrator of an offence does not escape accountability merely because the investigation blinked.”

Relying extensively on recent Supreme Court pronouncements — including Sartaj Singh, Manjeet Singh and Sukhpal Singh Khaira — Justice Aman Chaudhary asserted that the touchstone at the stage of Section 319 was prima facie satisfaction, not the likelihood of conviction.

The court noted that the law no longer insisted on waiting for cross-examination or fresh material.

Justice Chaudhary asserted that “even examination-in-chief, if it discloses clear involvement, is sufficient to trigger the jurisdiction.”

Calling Section 319 CrPC a legislative safeguard against investigative omissions and inadvertent exclusions, the court observed that the march of law had been consistent: presence in the occurrence, specific attribution, or even consistent naming from the inception of the FIR constitutes adequate ground for summoning, and the probative worth of an inquiry report could not override an injured eyewitness’s account at that stage.

Justice Chaudhary asserted that the Supreme Court had repeatedly deprecated reliance on police inquiries to negate a clear ocular account.

Quoting the ruling in Sartaj Singh case, the Bench reiterated that “what will be the evidentiary value of the inquiry report submitted by the DSP is another question.”

The court asserted that the evaluation belonged exclusively to trial, not to the threshold jurisdiction under Section 319.

Capturing the spirit of Section 319, the court asserted that the provision was meant to ensure that “no accused stands outside the courtroom merely because he stood outside the chargesheet.”

Justice Chaudhary emphasised the constitutional underpinning of the power by stating that “criminal law cannot be hostage to investigative selectivity when the testimony of an injured witness travels unbroken from the FIR to the witness box.”

Citing another case, the court asserted that even a person not named as an accused at all could be summoned under Section 319 purely on witness statements.

In another matter, the Supreme Court held that when allegations were consistent from FIR through deposition, the trial court was empowered — indeed obligated — to summon omitted accused to prevent “fragmented justice.”

Justice Chaudhary added that the high court would not interfere merely because the trial court’s satisfaction was not recorded in formulaic language, as long as its reasoning disclosed an application of mind.