HC warns against ‘weaponisation’ of transfer pleas, says forum shopping threatens judicial stability

Flagging a “disconcerting emerging trend” of litigants seeking shifting of cases from one court to another by levelling reckless allegations against judges and rival counsel, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has issued a strong caution that the power of transfer a matter cannot be allowed to degenerate into a tool for forum shopping or intimidation of the trial judiciary.

Dismissing a case transfer plea, Justice Sumeet Goel made it clear that judicial independence and continuity would be gravely undermined if unfavourable orders were routinely portrayed as proof of bias. Such attempts, if tolerated, would “well neigh yield anarchy in the adjudicatory process.”

“While the right to an impartial trial is sacrosanct, it is equally imperative to recognize a disconcerting emerging trend, where the machinery of transfer is frequently weaponized to undermine the judicial independence,” Justice Goel observed.

The Bench added the power of transfer was a strictly judicial discretion, to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances where justice would otherwise be compromised. A transfer plea could not rest on mere dissatisfaction, subjective fears or imaginary apprehensions; it must be founded on reasonable grounds supported by cogent material showing a real threat to a fair trial.

The court clarified that judicial error was not judicial bias, and that an adverse order—even if later set aside—did not by itself justify a transfer. To curb forum shopping and abuse of process, Sessions Courts must impose costs for frivolous or vexatious transfer pleas. It also cautioned that no rigid formula can govern transfer jurisdiction, which must always turn on the specific facts of each case.

The petitioner in the case was seeking transfer of a complaint case from the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panchkula, to another competent court within the same district. Justice Goel made it clear that a presiding officer was duty-bound to decide cases fearlessly, and was neither expected nor required to recuse merely because allegations were hurled by disgruntled litigants.

“A presiding officer/trial Judge has to perform his duty and not to succumb to the pressure put by the litigant(s) by making callous allegations,” Justice Goel asserted, adding that judges were “not expected to show unnecessary sensitivity to such allegations and recuse himself from the case.”

Placing the issue in a larger institutional context, Justice Goel referred to the realities in which trial courts function. “Judicial Officers often function and discharge their duties in environment which is overloaded with various stakeholders, literally and figuratively, breathing down their necks,” the Bench observed, acknowledging that errors might occur due to “tremendous strain,” but firmly rejecting the notion that every adverse order signalled prejudice.

Drawing a sharp line between error and bias, the court cautioned: “However, to cast aspersions on or besmirch their judicial work due to a development/order, unacceptable or unpalatable to a litigant, therefore pleading for transfer of trial etc. by such litigant is plainly subterfuge.”

The Bench added: “If this could be the foundation in transfer of a case, it will well neigh yield anarchy in the adjudicatory process. The unscrupulous litigants will indulge themselves in court/forum hunting which needs to be curbed with an iron hand”.

Justice Goel further struck a careful balance by reiterating that genuine apprehensions could not be brushed aside. It clarified that a litigant seeking transfer was not required to prove that justice would “inevitably fail,” but must show circumstances from which a reasonable apprehension could be inferred. “However, mere apprehension or imaginary anxiety in the minds of a litigant does not afford an occasion for transfer,” the court said, stressing the need for “some cogent material.”