Sentencing of former ISI chief Hameed is warning to Imran Khan's supporters

The 14-year rigorous imprisonment sentence handed down to Pakistan’s former ISI chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed forms part of a sustained crackdown on political and military figures linked to Imran Khan, the Oxford-educated former international cricket star who served as Pakistan’s prime minister until he was ousted from office in 2022.

Hameed, who headed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during Imran Khan’s rise to power and early period in office, was convicted by a military court in a case that officials have framed as an internal disciplinary matter. The severity of the punishment, however, has drawn wide attention in Pakistan, where retired officers of his rank are rarely subjected to such long custodial sentences.

The ruling comes against the backdrop of an expanding campaign by the state to dismantle political, bureaucratic and security-linked networks associated with Imran, following his removal through a parliamentary vote of no confidence in April 2022. Rather than a single dramatic confrontation, the approach has been incremental: arrests, prosecutions, disqualifications, bans and sustained legal pressure aimed at weakening the former prime minister’s political base.

From prison, Imran has portrayed the action against him and his allies as politically driven. In a message circulated publicly after his incarceration, he warned supporters: “Hold Asim Munir accountable if anything happens to me,” explicitly linking his detention to the authority of the army chief. The statement marked one of the most direct public accusations by a civilian leader against Pakistan’s military leadership in recent years.

The military has responded with unusual bluntness. In public remarks reported by international media, the army’s spokesperson dismissed Imran as a “narcissist” whose political ambitions threatened national stability, adding that the armed forces would not allow anyone to create divisions between the military and the public. Such language, rarely used in official briefings, underlined how decisively Imran has moved from tolerated political partner to institutional adversary.

Hameed’s conviction is widely seen as reinforcing that message internally. As ISI chief, he was perceived as unusually visible and closely aligned with a civilian political project — a departure from the traditional discretion expected of intelligence chiefs. Following Imran’s ouster, Hameed was removed from his post, marginalised within the military hierarchy and ultimately prosecuted, a sequence that mirrors past internal corrections within Pakistan’s security establishment.

Beyond individual cases, the scope of the post-2022 crackdown is evident in the treatment of Imran’s party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Senior party leaders and organisers have been detained, prosecuted or pressured into public disengagement. Others have defected or withdrawn from politics amid legal and financial pressure. The party itself has faced restrictions on campaigning and media coverage.

PTI officials have repeatedly raised concerns about Imran’s conditions of detention. Party representatives and lawyers have said he has been denied adequate access to medical treatment and legal counsel, describing his incarceration as punitive rather than procedural. Government officials have rejected those claims, insisting he is being treated in accordance with the law.

At the same time, the authorities have expanded internal security measures. Defending the creation of a new internal security force amid continuing unrest, a senior interior ministry figure said the country required “a stronger force… for internal security.” Opposition figures countered that such steps were aimed at “silencing political opponents” and deterring further mobilisation by Imran’s supporters.

The courts have also played a central role. In recent months, large numbers of PTI-linked figures have received lengthy prison sentences in cases related to protests and unrest following Imran’s arrest. PTI leaders have described the verdicts as politically motivated, arguing that punishment is being imposed for political allegiance rather than individual criminal acts.

There is historical precedent for such moments. Pakistan’s political memory still carries the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979, following a contested trial under military rule. Bhutto’s hanging was widely seen at the time — and since — as a judicially sanctioned removal of a civilian leader who had fallen irretrievably out of favour with the security establishment. While the present crackdown has taken a different form, relying on legal attrition rather than a single terminal act, the underlying logic is familiar: when civilian authority is judged to have exceeded its bounds, the system ultimately reasserts itself.

Supporters of the government reject claims of persecution, arguing that the state is enforcing the law after violent attacks on military installations and public property. Officials have repeatedly said that no political party or individual can be allowed to challenge the authority of the state.

Taken together, the developments suggest a coordinated effort to ensure that the political conditions which enabled Imran’s rise cannot be easily recreated. The focus has shifted from removing a single leader to dismantling the broader network of influence — political, bureaucratic and security-linked — that sustained his government.

Hameed’s 14-year sentence stands out because intelligence chiefs seldom fall so publicly or so severely. Yet analysts note that the quieter aspects of the crackdown — prolonged detentions, legal attrition and enforced political withdrawal — may ultimately prove more consequential than any single verdict.

Rather than a sudden rupture, Pakistan’s post-2022 response has been marked by patience and accumulation. The message, critics and supporters alike acknowledge, is intended to be unmistakable: political (civilian) power that challenges institutional authority (the army) will be systematically dismantled.