Revisiting the valour of 9 JAT in the 1971 battle of Chhamb

9 JAT was mobilised as a part of 68 Infantry Brigade from Khrew (J&K) to the Akhnoor area in September 1971, to be launched as a part of the 10 Infantry Division offensive against Pakistan. The unit was in the area for training and coordination for the planned offensive.All commanders up to the platoon level carried out a recce of Pak BOPs, ie Bokan, Dalla, etc, nearly 30 km deep into Pakistan's territory now, from Chhamb, in BSF uniform. 9 JAT also carried out extensive Infantry-tank cooperation training in the Jaurian (PDC) area with 9 Deccan Horse. The unit was ready as part of 68 Infantry Brigade (Corps Reserve) to take revenge of the 1965 loss of Chhamb from Pakistan.On December 3, Pakistan made surprise pre-emptive airstrikes on Indian airbases. It immediately changed the battle profile of 10 Infantry Division from offensive to defensive operation, though their formations were still in defence positions. 9 JAT was asked to move to the Pallanwala sector to take defences on the eastern bank of the Manawar Tawi river. No one from the unit had ever seen this area. The men had to find their own paths and defences.While 9 JAT was moving on December 4 on the Akhnoor-Pallanwala axis on foot, troops of 191 Infantry Brigade, who were forced by the enemy to abandon their permanent defences within three days, were also withdrawing on this axis from across the Tawi.One can imagine what impact it would have had on the morale of the fresh troops of 9 JAT, moving up in an absolutely new area to stall the enemy's advance, which was following close on the withdrawing troops’ heels.To precipitate the problem, a few Pak Artillery Operations infiltrated along with the withdrawing troops of 191 Infantry Brigade and were bringing accurate artillery fire on our moving column. But the unit managed to reach its operational location in excellent shape and high morale.On reaching Pallanwala, Bn HQ occupied the bathing cubicles of a well outside a school since there was intense enemy arty shelling. 9 JAT Companies were briefed about the general area on the eastern bank of the river and they took up hurried defence positions. The area had 10-foot sarkanda grass and boggy patches. For administrative convenience, their platoon localities were sited about 50m behind the river line without having visible fields of fire and domination over the Tawi. There were no mines or defence stores. The defences were hastily prepared in four to five days.The unit had no tank support or arty OP. It was guarding the Raipur and Darh crossings — the most expected route of enemy armour ingress — without any outside support. Since the unit had just come from Mod 'M' to 'P', it hurriedly managed to collect its RCL guns (only six) from Mumbai. No worthwhile conversion training could be carried out before deployment on the Tawi defences.The attack on the 9 JAT area was launched by Pak 111 Brigade of 23 Pak Infantry Division and their 28 Cavalry at 01:00 hours on December 10 opposite Darh and Raipur crossings. This included an assault on the two forward companies of 9 JAT by enemy tanks and its Depth Company, which were overrun in the Pak 28 CAV-led assaults. Since 9 JAT had no armour support, it was purely an Infantry-tank battle. Some jawans tried to climb the assaulting enemy tanks and some faced them with SLR rifles and died fighting. But the Balwans of 9 JAT did not leave their trenches/locations.The infantry assault was repulsed by the unit despite severe handicaps, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. In turn, it suffered losses of officers (three), JCOs (three) and ORs (76), killed. An equal number were wounded, leaving the unit minus two rifle companies, including company commanders. (killed) on the fateful day of December 10.Despite so many casualties, 9 JAT companies did not leave their positions, which later provided a firm base for our 10 Infantry Division counter-attack to regain the lost locations.Small mercies came from God for the 9 JAT jawans — the area around the two crossings of the Manawar Tawi was too boggy for the enemy tanks to manoeuvre. Second, the GOC of Pak’s assaulting 23 Infantry Division died in a helicopter crash on December 10, and the command shifted to C artillery 23 Infantry Division, which did not press on the gains. Hence, our Division counter-attacking force did not find the enemy, who had withdrawn to the Tawi’s west.Despite their numerical superiority and geographical advantage, the Pakistan forces failed to make inroads and multiple attacks were beaten back by the fierce and brave 9 JAT Balwans occupying weak defences. It was the resolute leadership and dauntless courage of the officers and men of 9 JAT that stemmed the tide of multiple waves of enemy onslaught, ensuring the unit held on its defences despite all odds in the honour of their unit, Regt Quam, and the nation.Unfortunately, this valour was not recognised by 10 Infantry Division since 9 JAT was a part of Corps Reserve. Secondly, the formation overlooks such act of bravery when you suffer overall serious reverses in the battle. So was the case with 10 Infantry Division, which lost the Chhamb sector the second time to Pakistan.9 JAT pays rich tributes to its martyrs of the Battle of Chhamb, 1971, on December 10 every year. The aim now is to get the unit it's due recognition in the battle. In real terms, it was 9 JAT that stalled the enemy advance to Akhnoor at a very high cost.The author was (Capt) Adjutant of 9 JAT during the 1971 Battle of Chhamb.

Revisiting the valour of 9 JAT in the 1971 battle of Chhamb

9 JAT pays tributes to the martyrs of the Battle of Chhamb, 1971, on December 10, its battle honour day.

Brig RA Singh retd

Revisiting the valour of 9 JAT in the 1971 battle of Chhamb

9 JAT pays tributes to the martyrs of the Battle of Chhamb, 1971, on December 10, its battle honour day.

Brig RA Singh retd

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