Opinion: When military leadership is put to the test

OF late, there has been considerable debate and controversy over the book written by former Army Chief General Manoj Naravane, which is yet to be published. This piece is in continuation of the same debate.But I need to make certain submissions. First, I have no political affiliations and the comments are based on my own personal experience of over 40 years as a military officer. In fact, ours was the last batch to pass out of the Indian Military Academy in June 1962, before the war with China started.All officers of my vintage have served in our active border areas, both on the western front opposite Pakistan and on the north-eastern front facing China. All possess a wealth of experience and knowledge gained from serving in these border areas.Second, I have no comment to make on whether India lost any territory to China in 2020, as the Opposition claims, or that we did not lose any, as the government asserts. Also, not being knowledgeable about parliamentary rules, I cannot comment on whether a Member of Parliament can quote excerpts from a book that has not yet been cleared by the Ministry of Defence for publication.It is well known that in the summer of 2020, there was a clash between Chinese and Indian troops in the Galwan Valley. This resulted in the death of 20 of our soldiers and an unknown number of the Chinese. This is important to remember since in late August 2020 — as the book refers to — although there was no open Indo-China war, the situation was tense and war-like.It is also well known that over 50,000 Indian soldiers are deployed in Ladakh to safeguard the territorial sanctity of the country. Additionally, it needs stressing that it is incumbent on every military leader to ensure the safety of the lives of his men under command. I have had the occasion of serving opposite the Chinese in Ladakh, in the central sector of Uttarakhand, and also of commanding a brigade that was in eyeball-to-eyeball contact with the Chinese in the Doklam area of Sikkim.While, as a matter of policy, we did not initiate hostilities, there did not exist any standing order that we were not to open fire on the Chinese even when they intruded in our territory. To my knowledg, firing in self-defence is never disallowed. This policy, as brought out in the reported excerpts of the book, seems a later addition and is open to question.Let me focus on what reportedly happened on August 31, 2020. As mentioned, four Chinese tanks accompanied by the infantry were advancing on our position in Rinchen La. Since our troops were in occupation of the position, it is to be assumed that we were holding defences on our own side of the Line of Actual Control and the Chinese were not only making an intrusion but were also advancing very aggressively, posing a threat to the lives of our soldiers.There is no denying that it was incumbent on the commanders to contest the Chinese action and take necessary measures to prevent any loss of territory or of human lives. In fact, such defensive action could well have been taken at the level of the Corps Commander concerned even without any reference to seniors in the military hierarchy.However, since the matter had been raised with the Army Chief, we need to focus on what happened thereafter.Instead of taking a decision on a problem that at the time was purely of a military nature, the Army Chief chose to raise it with the political leadership. This amounts to a shifting of responsibility. At that instant, for the Army Chief to ask the political leadership 'what are my orders?' is rather strange. Bluntly put, it amounted to abdication of his own responsibility. There should have been no need to seek any political clearance at that stage since the Chinese were reportedly about 500 metres away and the threat to the soldiers was imminent.The Prime Minister's response to take action 'considered appropriate' can only be lauded. It was a clear political direction with the implied acceptance of responsibility. No restrictions were imposed on action considered militarily necessary and appropriate.The Army Chief's action to fire warning flares was correct as a de-escalatory measure. But since that advice had not been heeded, opening fire would have been in order. For the Army Chief to say that he was handed a 'hot potato' seems strange and misplaced. The honour of commanding one of the largest and finest armies in the world carries with it a corresponding degree of responsibility. It is not a ceremonial post of only perks and privileges.Unfortunately, General Naravane has also reportedly mentioned his apprehension of the incident ending his career, or words to that effect. The occurrence of such a thought at a time when national security and lives of subordinates are at stake goes against the very ethos of the militaryHistory records and his confidants of the time confirm that Sam Manekshaw, as Chief, carried his resignation in his pocket for any eventuality. General Naravane hardly needs to be reminded that in the foundational National Defence Academy, every cadet wears a 'Service Before Self' badge on his arm.At that critical time, the Army Chief faced a bigger issue and even the very thought of his career can only be decried.

Opinion: When military leadership is put to the test

The Tribune Two Views: Instead of taking a decision on a problem that at the time was purely of a military nature, the Army Chief chose to raise it with the political leadership.

Lt Gen Raj Kadyan retd

Opinion: When military leadership is put to the test

The Tribune Two Views: Instead of taking a decision on a problem that at the time was purely of a military nature, the Army Chief chose to raise it with the political leadership.

Lt Gen Raj Kadyan retd

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