HE Westminster model of parliamentary system is based on the concept of
government by party. In his Cabinet Government, Ivor Jennings stated: “Democratic government just demands not only a parliamentary majority but
also a parliamentary minority. The Opposition will, almost certainly, be
defeated in the House of Commons, because it is a minority. Its appeals are
to the electorate…The Opposition is at once the alternative to the government
and a focus for the discontent of the people.” Though in the UK, the Conservative and the Labour are two major parties coming to power mostly, there are as many as 351 parties registered with the Election Commission. However, in the last 2005 election, only candidates belonging 14 parties got elected to the House of Commons.
Of the present strength of 646 members in the Commons, the three major parties cornered 94 per cent of the strength of the House. While the Labour Party has 349 members, the Conservative and the Liberal Democrat have 193 and 63 members respectively.
However, the Indian Constitution as drafted in 1950 did not contain the word ‘party’ anywhere in it. Article 75(3) lays down that the Cabinet formed by the Prime Minister “shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People”.
It is quite possible to have Lok Sabha with a majority of Independent members without any party affiliations. Only the Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act 1985 introduced the term ‘party’ in the Tenth Schedule.
It may be noted that even now, the parliamentary debates of either House denote the name of the constituency of the participating member and not that of the party he belongs to.
Until the mid-Sixties, there had been many occasions when senior members of the Congress intervened in the debates to oppose the provisions of a Bill introduced by the government and even to vote against such a provision despite a whip issued; their actions did not attract any disciplinary action under a law or the rules of the House. At that time, the government had absolute majority and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru allowed dissents to be expressed.
In the UK, whenever a government or Opposition member does not vote with his own party in a particular division, it is called “crossing the floor”. There has been no disciplinary action against any member voting or abstaining against the whip issued by his party. On serious charges of misconduct of a member, the House may resort to order expulsion.
There is no anti-defection law in the UK, USA or Australia as we have in India. There have been demands in some quarters that a member leaving the party by which he was nominated and elected should resign and seek re-election to join another party.
In the Australian Federal Parliament during the period 1950-2004, there had been 439 instances of floor-crossing by members, Senator Reg Wright (Labour Party, Tasmania) had the record of 150 times and another Senator Ian Word (Labour Party, Queensland) 130 times. But no action had been taken against those members by the House or by the parties concerned.
The practice of members changing parties on principle or on personal equations has been there all along in India, without causing any alarming consequences. As regards defections in the state legislatures, there were 542 cases reported in the first 15 years of Independent India and 438 in 1967-68 alone during the infamous saga of Aya Rams and Gaya Rams.
A parliamentary committee was formed in 1967 under Home Minister Y. B. Chavan. The committee recommended that a defector should be debarred from appointment as a minister for a period of one year or till such time as he resigned his seat and got himself elected. The Constitution Amendment Bills introduced in 1973 and 1979 to give effect to the recommendations of the Chavan’s Committee lapsed on dissolution of the House. Ultimately in 1985, the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act was passed to introduce the Tenth Schedule.
However, the Tenth Schedule contained a provision to bar the jurisdiction of courts in respect of any matter connected with the disqualification of a member. In the Kihota Hollohon case (AIR 1993 SC 412), the Supreme Court struck down that provision as unconstitutional.
In May 1990, the Janata Dal government constituted the Committee on Electoral Reforms with Union Law Minister Dinesh Goswami as Chairman and other members, H. K. L. Bhagat, MP (Congress), L. K. Advani, MP (BJP), Somnath Chatterjee, MP (CPM), Ghulam Rasool Matto, MP (National Conference), Chimanbhai Mehta, MP, Indrajit, MP, Homi F. Daji, Former MP (CPI), Era Sezhiyan, Former MP (Janata Dal), V. Kishore Chandra Deo, Former MP (Congress-S), L.P. Singh, former Governor and S. L. Shakdher, Former Chief Election Commissioner.
As regards the Anti-Defection Law, the Goswami Committee recommended:
lthat disqualification provisions should be limited to cases of (a) voluntary giving up the membership of his political party
lvoting or abstaining against the party direction only in respect of a vote of confidence or no confidence or Money Bill or Motion of Vote of Thanks to the President’s Address.
lthat the power of deciding the legal issue of disqualification should not be left to the Speaker or Chairman of the House but to the President or the Governor as the case may be, who shall act on the advice of the Election Commission to whom the question should be referred for determination as in the case of any other post-election disqualification of a Member and
lthat the nominated members of the House concerned should incur disqualification if he joins any political party at any period of time.
Excepting the Congress Member H. K. L. Bhagat who opposed the above recommendations, all others in the committee unanimously supported them.
Paragraph 3 of Tenth Schedule on Disqualification on ground of split by less than one-third of the total members of the legislature was removed fully by the Constitution (Ninety-first Amendment) Act 2003 (with effect from January 1, 2004).
As regards recognition of a political party in Parliament, Speaker Mavalankar enunciated certain principles which were incorporated in the Speaker’s Directions 120 and 121. Therein, it was required that a political party should have a minimum of one-tenth or more of the total membership of the House and that a political group should have at least 30 members.
However, in certain cases, where an association had less than 30 members, the Speaker gave the nomenclature of a group for the sake of convenience without according formal recognition.
When the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution came into effect from March 1, 1985 and Section 29A of the Representation of People Act (from June 15, 1989) required compulsory registration of all political parties with the Election Commission, the concept of recognition of political parties and groups in the House by the Speaker has materially changed.
Kaul and Shakhder’s Practice and Procedure of Parliament states: “However during the deliberations of the Janata Dal case under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, the provisions of the Tenth Schedule came in for in-depth scrutiny. In the context of the breakaway groups that emerged due to splits in the legislature parties in the Lok Sabha, a view came to be established that accord of recognition to political parties came within the sole domain of the Election Commission…
Consequently, from the Eleventh Lok Sabha onwards, while legislature parties continue to enjoy certain functional facilities on the basis of their numerical strength in the House, the practice of according recognition by the Speaker in terms of Directions 120 and 121 was done away with.” (Page 360, Fifth Edition 2001)
The Goswami Committee had earlier recommended that the legal issue of disqualification under the Tenth Schedule should be left to be decided by the Election Commission.
In its Report (2002), the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution headed by Justice M.N. Venkatachalaih also recommended:
“Further, the power to decide questions as to disqualification on ground of defection should vest in the Election Commission instead of in the Chairman or Speaker of the House concerned.” (Para 4.18.2, Report 2000).
At the Symposium on “Anti-Defection Law – Need for Review” held during the Conference of Presiding Officers of Legislative Bodies in India, in Chandigarh, on September 23, 2008, Speaker Somnath Chatterjee, presiding over the deliberations, stated: “The judiciary has taken up matters where the decisions of the Presiding Officers under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution have been challenged and this jurisdiction has been upheld by the Supreme Court of India.
...It is my considered view that it is desirable and indeed necessary, that the jurisdiction and authority to deal with matters of defection as provided in the Tenth Schedule need not continue to be exercised by the Presiding Officers and the power should be conferred on some other authority like a special tribunal comprising people well versed in law or on an authority like the Election Commission.”
It is desirable to take note of the sober advice given by Speaker Somnath Chatterjee who has not only a distinguished long-term experience in Parliament but also an eminent lawyer and jurist by himself. It is high time a thorough review was made to transfer all matters of defection in legislatures to the jurisdiction of the courts.
The writer, Senior Fellow, Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi, is a former Member of Parliament