t the end of a high-level inter-agency meeting organised to discuss the country’s internal security situation soon after the July 2006 serial train blasts in Mumbai which left over 500 dead and injured, a question was asked by a senior official: “What urgent remedial and precautionary measures should we take to prevent recurrence of such incidents?” After a pregnant silence, the sole suggestion forthcoming was: “We must give the Station House Officers in the police stations more and quality walkie-talkie sets to ensure faster communication.” This suggestion by a top officer despite the monotonous regularity with which terrorist attacks have been occurring in the country reflects both the mediocrity and poverty of thinking by some at the highest levels in our country with whom the security of the nation has been entrusted. The question that follows from this reply, as pointed out by former Navy chief Admiral Arun Prakash, who was present at the meeting, is: “Is buying more walkie-talkie sets the panacea for the tremendous hazards posed to our nation’s security today?”
It took the US just 46 days to overhaul its internal security system post 9/11. That country has since then not witnessed a single terrorist attack on its soil. In contrast, two years after the high-level meeting in Delhi, India witnessed its arguably most daring and horrific carnage comprising over 10 brutal co-ordinated attacks by Pakistani terrorists that lasted about 60 hours (November 26-29, 2008), which left 173 killed and 308 wounded.
Such is the fragility of a country that boasts of having the world’s third largest military force and is among the world’s fasted growing economies with ambition to be a global power that the absence of any major incident in the last 17 months is to be ‘credited’ to not mainly its internal security apparatus but rather to the temporary restraint applied by Islamabad following ‘pressures’ from the US.
This is hardly comforting for a nation. Indeed there is enough evidence to prove that India’s internal security situation continues to drift downhill. There is little in sight to indicate a reversal. Brave words and occasional action by successive governments at the Centre and in the states offer little consolation.
Consider India’s ‘red corridor’. In 2001, the Naxalite presence was confined to fewer than 50 of India’s 639 districts. By 2009, its geographical scope had expanded to 223 districts across 20 of India’s 28 states. In all, about 40,000 sq km of our territory is currently under the Naxalites’ sway. The coordination required between the Centre and the states along with the varying levels of efficiency at the government and police level presents a nightmare for any Union government and the country at large.
In conforming to our ‘strategic culture’, the response has been piecemeal and slow, reflecting on the sloth with which decision making takes place. For example, it was only as recent as 2008-9 that the Union government began raising the fancy-named ‘Commando Battalions for Resolute Action’ with the acronym CoBRA. In all, only 10 such battalions are to be raised by 2011. In addition, it has sanctioned Rs 1,300 crore for police modernisation to improve mobility, firepower, communication systems, infrastructure and forensics. But then, there is no way to rigorously account for the money being spent by states and to ensure uniformity in standards.
The flaws in India’s internal apparatus are considerable and the task is increasingly becoming daunting. India’s internal security problems arise from a combination of factors that include political and administrative mismanagement for which military or police solutions are seen as the way out. The army and the police can at best suppress and even eliminate terrorists.
However, common sense dictates that tackling terrorism, insurgency and political grievances is far more complicated and requires a wider and deeper strategy which entails “the employment of all means for the end”. The key word here is ‘means’ which goes beyond employing policing or military methods alone. A deeper question that requires introspection is whether we, as a people, make good managers, leaders and governors of a country that is among the world’s most multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-religious and multi-ethnic.
What are we doing meantime with the very instruments tasked to combat terrorism? Do we have effective instruments to fight the different types of violence whether in the form of terrorism or insurgency in the country?
India’s post-Independence history has shown that state police forces have rarely been effective in quelling externally-sponsored terrorism and insurgency. The north-eastern states and Kashmir are prime examples. The only exception has been the Punjab Police, which with some generous assistance from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Army along with some ‘measures’ taken by both the Research and Analysis Wing and Intelligence Bureau, managed to fight terrorism in Punjab.
But everywhere in the country, standards of policing are on the decline. The concept of the ‘beat constable’, a crucial source of ground-level information, is near extinct. The quality and methodology of recruiting policemen is, to put it mildly, highly questionable. To top it all, politicians are known to have wantonly politicised the force in many states.
Over half-a-century since we first began fighting insurgency in the country starting with Nagaland, India still does not have a dedicated professional force to combat insurgency and terrorism.
Ironically, though India has among the world’s largest Central Police Organisations (CPOs), none of them is trained to fight insurgency and terrorism. The primary aim of the Border Security Force (159 battalions), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (45 battalions) and the Sashastra Seema Bal (41 battalions) is to guard the international border. Yet, the BSF is often deployed on counter-insurgency operations.
The CRPF (206 battalions) again is not specifically trained in the specialised art of fighting terrorism or insurgency. Yet again, it gets assigned to duties that range from guarding historical places of worship, crowd management and quelling riots to fighting insurgency in Kashmir and violence by the Naxalites.
A direct entry into the officer cadre of any of the country’s CPOs can never hope to command the force in which he has given his working life. That privilege is reserved for officers of the Indian Police Service (IPS), almost all of whom join the police by default after falling short (in marks) to qualify for the IAS. In other words, officers are not selected to the IPS on the basis of their aptitude for what is otherwise a very difficult and exacting profession that contributes to the security of the country.
Such is India’s generalist approach that even the National Security Guards, a quick reaction Special Force to counter hostage situations on board aircraft or fight close quarter battles in built-up areas, is headed by an IPS officer, who until recently could have been Commissioner of a metropolis with no prior knowledge about special forces.
It is rare, if ever, for an IPS officer to serve as a Commandant of a CPO battalion. Like officers from the IAS, who prefer to seek deputation to Union ministries at the pivotal division head level of Joint Secretary and above, IPS officers too seek deputation to CPOs at the rank of Deputy Inspector General and above since it does not involve commanding troops on ground. This ad hoc and generalist system leaves it on IPS officers at the individual level to show interest and display initiative.
The Army, which has been spearheading counter-insurgency operations for over half-a-century, is over-stretched and fatigued. The Army’s ‘internal health’ is not just about growing incidents of corruption. It suffers from a serious crisis that ranges from officer shortfalls of about 12,000 which works out to slightly over 25 per cent of the sanctioned officer strength, a rising number in pre-mature retirements, suicides and service problems-related cases filed by about 9,000 officers who account for about 30 per cent of the Army’s existing officer strength.
Besides, prolonged deployment in counter-insurgency operations has a disorienting effect on the Army, which according to an internal Army report, was evident at the start of the limited war fought between India and Pakistan in the high altitude Kargil region from May to July 1999.
Our strategic culture, which can be summed up in two oft-repeated words – chalta hai and jugaad – is reflected in the way we treat internal security. India’s internal security is too serious a matter to be left to such ad hocism. Our pontifications on “our rightful place in the world” will never get taken seriously unless we start taking ourselves seriously and change both our mindset and the way we think.
Our approach that “we have a thing or two to teach the world” is better left to the flourishing cottage industry of our god men. As a nation and people we need to seriously introspect and get professional. Let us always remember: History is replete with examples of nations perishing all because their leaders were unfit to
govern.